7 February 2002
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html
[Congressional Record: February 6, 2002 (Digest)]
[Page D59-D62]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr06fe02-1]
Wednesday, February 6, 2002
Daily Digest
Senate
[Excerpt]
WORLD THREAT
Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee concluded hearings to
examine issues surrounding global threats and challenges, focusing on
the emerging global security environment, after receiving testimony
from George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence; Dale L. Watson,
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Justice; Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research.
WORLD THREATS
Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee concluded closed hearings
to examine issues surrounding world threats to American national
security, after receiving testimony from officials of the intelligence
community.
US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
06 February 2002
(He says terrorists plan strikes across the globe) (7,170) Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups will continue to plan to attack the United States and its interests abroad, says George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "Their modus operandi is to have multiple attack plans in the works simultaneously, and to have al-Qa'ida cells in place to conduct them," Tenet said February 6 in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Tenet said current intelligence indicates that al-Qa'ida also has plans to strike against U.S. and allied targets in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. In addition, he told the senators that "American diplomatic and military installations are at high risk -- especially in East Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey." Al-Qa'ida may also exploit its presence or connections to other groups in countries such as Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia and the Philippines, Tenet said. Terrorist groups worldwide have also shown an interest in acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and their components, he said. Moreover, the terrorist threat goes well beyond al-Qa'ida, he said. "[T]he situation in the Middle East continues to fuel terrorism and anti-U.S. sentiment worldwide. Groups like the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and HAMAS have escalated their violence against Israel, and the Intifada has rejuvenated once-dormant groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," he said. Tenet said U.S. intelligence officials are continuing to monitor states such as Iran and Iraq that continue to support terrorist groups. "Iran continues to provide support -- including arms transfers -- to Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah. Tehran has also failed to move decisively against al-Qa'ida members who have relocated to Iran from Afghanistan," he said. As for Iraq, Tenet said it has a long history of supporting terrorists, including giving sanctuary to Abu Nidal. On other key threats, Tenet said: -- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs are becoming more advanced and effective as they mature, which is exacerbated by the diffusion of technology over time. -- "Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW [chemical weapons], BW [biological weapons], nuclear, and ballistic and cruise missile projects." -- Chinese firms are key suppliers of missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran and several other countries. -- North Korea continues to export ballistic missiles and production capabilities along with raw materials, components, and expertise. "Profits from these sales help Pyongyang to support its missile -- and probably other WMD -- development programs, and in turn generate new products to offer to its customers -- primarily Iran, Libya, Syria and Egypt." Following is a text of Tenet's remarks: (begin text) Worldwide Threat -- Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 6 Mr. Chairman, I appear before you this year under circumstances that are extraordinary and historic for reasons I need not recount. Never before has the subject of this annual threat briefing had more immediate resonance. Never before have the dangers been more clear or more present. September 11 brought together and brought home-literally-several vital threats to the United States and its interests that we have long been aware of. It is the convergence of these threats that I want to emphasize with you today: the connection between terrorists and other enemies of this country; the weapons of mass destruction they seek to use against us; and the social, economic, and political tensions across the world that they exploit in mobilizing their followers. September 11 demonstrated the dangers that arise when these threats converge-and it reminds us that we overlook at our own peril the impact of crises in remote parts of the world. This convergence of threats has created the world I will present to you today-a world in which dangers exist not only in those places where we have most often focused our attention, but also in other areas that demand it: -- In places like Somalia, where the absence of a national government has created an environment in which groups sympathetic to al-Qa'ida have offered terrorists an operational base and potential haven. -- In places like Indonesia, where political instability, separatist and ethnic tensions, and protracted violence are hampering economic recovery and fueling Islamic extremism. -- In places like Colombia, where leftist insurgents who make much of their money from drug trafficking are escalating their assault on the government-further undermining economic prospects and fueling a cycle of violence. -- And finally, Mr. Chairman, in places like Connecticut, where the death of a 94-year-old woman in her own home of anthrax poisoning can arouse our worst fears about what our enemies might try to do to us. These threats demand our utmost response. The United States has clearly demonstrated since September 11 that it is up to the challenge. But make no mistake: despite the battles we have won in Afghanistan, we remain a nation at war. TERRORISM Last year I told you that Usama Bin Ladin and the al-Qa'ida network were the most immediate and serious threat this country faced. This remains true today despite the progress we have made in Afghanistan and in disrupting the network elsewhere. We assess that Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups will continue to plan to attack this country and its interests abroad. Their modus operandi is to have multiple attack plans in the works simultaneously, and to have al-Qa'ida cells in place to conduct them. -- We know that terrorists have considered attacks in the United States against high-profile government or private facilities, famous landmarks, and U.S. infrastructure nodes such as airports, bridges, harbors, and dams. High profile events such as the Olympics or last weekend's Super Bowl also fit the terrorists' interest in striking another blow within the United States that would command worldwide media attention. -- Al-Qa'ida also has plans to strike against U.S. and allied targets in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. American diplomatic and military installations are at high risk-especially in East Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. -- Operations against U.S. targets could be launched by al-Qa'ida cells already in place in major cities in Europe and the Middle East. Al-Qa'ida can also exploit its presence or connections to other groups in such countries as Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Although the September 11 attacks suggest that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists will continue to use conventional weapons, one of our highest concerns is their stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty." -- Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons via the Internet, and we know that al-Qa'ida was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. Documents recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research program. -- We also believe that Bin Ladin was seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear device. Al-Qa'ida may be pursuing a radioactive dispersal device-what some call a "dirty bomb." -- Alternatively, al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States to cause widespread toxic or radiological damage. We are also alert to the possibility of cyber warfare attack by terrorists. September 11 demonstrated our dependence on critical infrastructure systems that rely on electronic and computer networks. Attacks of this nature will become an increasingly viable option for terrorists as they and other foreign adversaries become more familiar with these targets, and the technologies required to attack them. The terrorist threat goes well beyond al-Qa'ida. The situation in the Middle East continues to fuel terrorism and anti-U.S. sentiment worldwide. Groups like the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and HAMAS have escalated their violence against Israel, and the intifada has rejuvenated once-dormant groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If these groups feel that U.S. actions are threatening their existence, they may begin targeting Americans directly-as Hizballah's terrorist wing already does. -- The terrorist threat also goes beyond Islamic extremists and the Muslim world. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Latin America because it associates us with the government it is fighting against. -- The same is true in Turkey, where the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front has publicly criticized the United States and our operations in Afghanistan. -- We are also watching states like Iran and Iraq that continue to support terrorist groups. -- Iran continues to provide support -- including arms transfers -- to Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah. Tehran has also failed to move decisively against al-Qa'ida members who have relocated to Iran from Afghanistan. -- Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorists, including giving sanctuary to Abu Nidal. The war on terrorism has dealt severe blows to al-Qa'ida and its leadership. The group has been denied its safe haven and strategic command center in Afghanistan. Drawing on both our own assets and increased cooperation from allies around the world, we are uncovering terrorists' plans and breaking up their cells. These efforts have yielded the arrest of nearly 1,000 al-Qa'ida operatives in over 60 countries, and have disrupted terrorist operations and potential terrorist attacks. Mr. Chairman, Bin Ladin did not believe that we would invade his sanctuary. He saw the United States as soft, impatient, unprepared, and fearful of a long, bloody war of attrition. He did not count on the fact that we had lined up allies that could help us overcome barriers of terrain and culture. He did not know about the collection and operational initiatives that would allow us to strike -- with great accuracy -- at the heart of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. He underestimated our capabilities, our readiness, and our resolve. That said, I must repeat that al-Qa'ida has not yet been destroyed. It and other like-minded groups remain willing and able to strike us. Al-Qa'ida leaders still at large are working to reconstitute the organization and to resume its terrorist operations. We must eradicate these organizations by denying them their sources of financing and eliminating their ability to hijack charitable organizations for their terrorist purposes. We must be prepared for a long war, and we must not falter. Mr. Chairman, we must also look beyond the immediate danger of terrorist attacks to the conditions that allow terrorism to take root around the world. These conditions are no less threatening to U.S. national security than terrorism itself. The problems that terrorists exploit -- poverty, alienation, and ethnic tensions -- will grow more acute over the next decade. This will especially be the case in those parts of the world that have served as the most fertile recruiting grounds for Islamic extremist groups. -- We have already seen -- in Afghanistan and elsewhere -- that domestic unrest and conflict in weak states is one of the factors that create an environment conducive to terrorism. -- More importantly, demographic trends tell us that the world's poorest and most politically unstable regions -- which include parts of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa -- will have the largest youth populations in the world over the next two decades and beyond. Most of these countries will lack the economic institutions or resources to effectively integrate these youth into society. THE MUSLIM WORLD All of these challenges come together in parts of the Muslim world, and let me give you just one example. One of the places where they converge that has the greatest long-term impact on any society is its educational system. Primary and secondary education in parts of the Muslim world is often dominated by an interpretation of Islam that teaches intolerance and hatred. The graduates of these schools -- "madrasas" -- provide the foot soldiers for many of the Islamic militant groups that operate throughout the Muslim world. Let me underscore what the President has affirmed: Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West -- and toward governments friendly to us -- among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is a threat to us. We have seen -- and continue to see -- these dynamics play out across the Muslim world. Let me briefly address their manifestation in several key countries. Our campaign in Afghanistan has made great progress, but the road ahead is fraught with challenges. The Afghan people, with international assistance, are working to overcome a traditionally weak central government, a devastated infrastructure, a grave humanitarian crisis, and ethnic divisions that deepened over the last 20 years of conflict. The next few months will be an especially fragile period. -- Interim authority chief Hamid Karzai will have to play a delicate balancing game domestically. Remaining al-Qai'da fighters in the eastern provinces, and ongoing power struggles among Pashtun leaders there underscore the volatility of tribal and personal relations that Karzai must navigate. -- Taliban elements still at large and remaining pockets of Arab fighters could also threaten the security of those involved in reconstruction and humanitarian operations. Some leaders in the new political order may allow the continuation of opium cultivation to secure advantages against their rivals for power. Let me move next to Pakistan. September 11 and the U.S. response to it were the most profound external events for Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the U.S. response to that. The Musharraf government's alignment with the United States -- and its abandonment of nearly a decade of support for the Taliban -- represent a fundamental political shift with inherent political risks because of the militant Islamic and anti-American sentiments that exist within Pakistan. President Musharraf's intention to establish a moderate, tolerant Islamic state -- as outlined in his 12 January speech -- is being welcomed by most Pakistanis, but he will still have to confront major vested interests. The speech is energizing debate across the Muslim world about which vision of Islam is the right one for the future of the Islamic community. -- Musharraf established a clear and forceful distinction between a narrow, intolerant, and conflict-ridden vision of the past and an inclusive, tolerant, and peace-oriented vision of the future. -- The speech also addressed the jihad issue by citing the distinction the Prophet Muhammad made between the "smaller jihad" involving violence and the "greater jihad" that focuses on eliminating poverty and helping the needy. Although September 11 highlighted the challenges that India-Pakistan relations pose for U.S. policy, the attack on the Indian parliament on December 13 was even more destabilizing -- resulting as it did in new calls for military action against Pakistan, and subsequent mobilization on both sides. The chance of war between these two nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971. If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack. -- Both India and Pakistan are publicly downplaying the risks of nuclear conflict in the current crisis. We are deeply concerned, however, that a conventional war -- once begun -- could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Let me turn now to Iraq. Saddam has responded to our progress in Afghanistan with a political and diplomatic charm offensive to make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible on U.N. sanctions and inspections issues. Last month he sent Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and Beijing to profess Iraq's new openness to meet its U.N. obligations and to seek their support. Baghdad's international isolation is also decreasing as support for the sanctions regime erodes among other states in the region. Saddam has carefully cultivated neighboring states, drawing them into economically dependent relationships in hopes of further undermining their support for the sanctions. The profits he gains from these relationships provide him the means to reward key supporters and, more importantly, to fund his pursuit of WMD. His calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people. Let me be clear: Saddam remains a threat. He is determined to thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf war. Today, he maintains his vise grip on the levers of power through a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force -- which is less than half its pre-war size -- remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups and threatening Iraq's neighbors. As I said earlier, we continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorist activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It has also had contacts with al-Qa'ida. Their ties may be limited by divergent ideologies, but the two sides' mutual antipathy toward the United States and the Saudi royal family suggests that tactical cooperation between them is possible -- even though Saddam is well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences. In Iran, we are concerned that the reform movement may be losing its momentum. For almost five years, President Khatami and his reformist supporters have been stymied by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the hardliners. -- The hardliners have systematically used the unelected institutions they control -- the security forces, the judiciary, and the Guardian's Council -- to block reforms that challenge their entrenched interests. They have closed newspapers, forced members of Khatami's cabinet from office, and arrested those who have dared to speak out against their tactics. -- Discontent with the current domestic situation is widespread and cuts across the social spectrum. Complaints focus on the lack of pluralism and government accountability, social restrictions, and poor economic performance. Frustrations are growing as the populace sees elected institutions such as the Majles and the Presidency unable to break the hardliners' hold on power. The hardline regime appears secure for now because security forces have easily contained dissenters and arrested potential opposition leaders. No one has emerged to rally reformers into a forceful movement for change, and the Iranian public appears to prefer gradual reform to another revolution. But the equilibrium is fragile and could be upset by a miscalculation by either the reformers or the hardline clerics. For all of this, reform is not dead. We must remember that the people of Iran have demonstrated in four national elections since 1997 that they want change and have grown disillusioned with the promises of the revolution. Social, intellectual, and political developments are proceeding, civil institutions are growing, and new newspapers open as others are closed. The initial signs of Tehran's cooperation and common cause with us in Afghanistan are being eclipsed by Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. influence there. While Iran's officials express a shared interest in a stable government in Afghanistan, its security forces appear bent on countering the U.S. presence. This seeming contradiction in behavior reflects deep-seated suspicions among Tehran's clerics that the United States is committed to encircling and overthrowing them -- a fear that could quickly erupt in attacks against our interests. -- We have seen little sign of a reduction in Iran's support for terrorism in the past year. Its participation in the attempt to transfer arms to the Palestinian Authority via the Karine-A probably was intended to escalate the violence of the intifada and strengthen the position of Palestinian elements that prefer armed conflict with Israel. The current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has been raging for almost a year and a half, and it continues to deteriorate. The violence has hardened the public's positions on both sides and increased the longstanding animosity between Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian leader Arafat. Although many Israelis and Palestinians say they believe that ultimately the conflict can only be resolved through negotiations, the absence of any meaningful security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority -- and the escalating and uncontrolled activities of the Palestine Islamic Jihad and HAMAS -- make any progress extremely difficult. -- We are concerned that this environment creates opportunities for any number of players -- most notably Iran -- to take steps that will result in further escalation of violence by radical Palestinian groups. -- At the same time, the continued violence threatens to weaken the political center in the Arab world, and increases the challenge for our Arab allies to balance their support for us against the demands of their publics. PROLIFERATION I turn now to the subject of proliferation. I would like to start by drawing your attention to several disturbing trends in this important area. WMD programs are becoming more advanced and effective as they mature, and as countries of concern become more aggressive in pursuing them. This is exacerbated by the diffusion of technology over time -- which enables proliferators to draw on the experience of others and to develop more advanced weapons more quickly than they could otherwise. Proliferators are also becoming more self-sufficient. And they are taking advantage of the dual-use nature of WMD -- and missile-related technologies to establish advanced production capabilities and to conduct WMD -- and missile-related research under the guise of legitimate commercial or scientific activity. Let me address in turn the primary categories of WMD proliferation, starting with chemical and biological weapons. The CBW threat continues to grow for a variety of reasons, and to present us with monitoring challenges. The dual-use nature of many CW and BW agents complicates our assessment of offensive programs. Many CW and BW production capabilities are hidden in plants that are virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities. And the technology behind CW and BW agents is spreading. We assess there is a significant risk within the next few years that we could confront an adversary -- either terrorists or a rogue state -- who possesses them. On the nuclear side, we are concerned about the possibility of significant nuclear technology transfers going undetected. This reinforces our need to more closely examine emerging nuclear programs for sudden leaps in capability. Factors working against us include the difficulty of monitoring and controlling technology transfers, the emergence of new suppliers to covert nuclear weapons programs, and the possibility of illicitly acquiring fissile material. All of these can shorten timelines and increase the chances of proliferation surprise. On the missile side, the proliferation of ICBM and cruise missile designs and technology has raised the threat to the United States from WMD delivery systems to a critical threshold. As outlined in our recent National Intelligence Estimate on the subject, most Intelligence Community agencies project that by 2015 the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq. This is in addition to the longstanding missile forces of Russia and China. Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles pose a significant threat now. -- Several countries of concern are also increasingly interested in acquiring a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capability. By the end of the decade, LACMs could pose a serious threat to not only our deployed forces, but possibly even the U.S. mainland. Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic and cruise missile projects. Russia appears to be the first choice of proliferant states seeking the most advanced technology and training. These sales are a major source of funds for Russian commercial and defense industries and military R&D. -- Russia continues to supply significant assistance on nearly all aspects of Tehran's nuclear program. It is also providing Iran assistance on long-range ballistic missile programs. Chinese firms remain key suppliers of missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran, and several other countries. This is in spite of Beijing's November 2000 missile pledge not to assist in any way countries seeking to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Most of China's efforts involve solid-propellant ballistic missile development for countries that are largely dependent on Chinese expertise and materials, but it has also sold cruise missiles to countries of concern such as Iran. -- We are closely watching Beijing's compliance with its bilateral commitment in 1996 not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and its pledge in 1997 not to provide any new nuclear cooperation to Iran. -- Chinese firms have in the past supplied dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. We remain concerned that they may try to circumvent the CW-related export controls that Beijing has promulgated since acceding to the CWC and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea continues to export complete ballistic missiles and production capabilities along with related raw materials, components, and expertise. Profits from these sales help P'yongyang to support its missile-and probably other WMD-development programs, and in turn generate new products to offer to its customers-primarily Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. North Korea continues to comply with the terms of the Agreed Framework that are directly related to the freeze on its reactor program, but P'yongyang has warned that it is prepared to walk away from the agreement if it concluded that the United States was not living up to its end of the deal. Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD. Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to CW production. We believe it also maintains an active and capable BW program; Iraq told UNSCOM it had worked with several BW agents. -- We believe Baghdad continues to pursue ballistic missile capabilities that exceed the restrictions imposed by U.N. resolutions. With substantial foreign assistance, it could flight-test a longer-range ballistic missile within the next five years. It may also have retained the capability to deliver BW or CW agents using modified aircraft or other unmanned aerial vehicles. -- We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Iraq retains a significant number of nuclear scientists, program documentation, and probably some dual-use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program. Baghdad's access to foreign expertise could support a rejuvenated program, but our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material. Iran remains a serious concern because of its across-the-board pursuit of WMD and missile capabilities. Tehran may be able to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by late this decade. Obtaining material from outside could cut years from this estimate. Iran may also flight-test an ICBM later this decade, using either Russian or North Korean assistance. Having already deployed several types of UAVs -- including some in an attack role -- Iran may seek to develop or otherwise acquire more sophisticated LACMs. It also continues to pursue dual-use equipment and expertise that could help to expand its BW arsenal, and to maintain a large CW stockpile. Both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing fissile material, and increasing their nuclear stockpiles. We have continuing concerns that both sides may not be done with nuclear testing. Nor can we rule out the possibility that either country could deploy their most advanced nuclear weapons without additional testing. Both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land-attack capability. As I have mentioned in years past, we face several unique challenges in trying to detect WMD acquisition by proliferant states and non-state actors. Their use of denial and deception tactics, and their access to a tremendous amount of information in open sources about WMD production, complicate our efforts. So does their exploitation of space. The unique spaceborne advantage that the United States has enjoyed over the past few decades is eroding as more countries -- including China and India -- field increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance satellites. Today there are three commercial satellites collecting high-resolution imagery, much of it openly marketed. Foreign military, intelligence, and terrorist organizations are exploiting this -- along with commercially available navigation and communications services -- to enhance the planning and conduct of their operations. Let me mention here another danger that is closely related to proliferation: the changing character of warfare itself. As demonstrated by September 11, we increasingly are facing real or potential adversaries whose main goal is to cause the United States pain and suffering, rather than to achieve traditional military objectives. Their inability to match U.S. military power is driving some to invest in "asymmetric" niche capabilities. We must remain alert to indications that our adversaries are pursuing such capabilities against us. RUSSIA Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to other areas of the world where the United States has key interests, beginning with Russia. The most striking development regarding Russia over the past year has been Moscow's greater engagement with the United States. Even before September 11, President Putin had moved to engage the United States as part of a broader effort to integrate Russia more fully into the West, modernize its economy, and regain international status and influence. This strategic shift away from a zero-sum view of relations with the United States is consistent with Putin's stated desire to address the many socioeconomic problems that cloud Russia's future. During his second year in office, Putin moved strongly to advance his policy agenda. He pushed the Duma to pass key economic legislation on budget reform, legitimizing urban property sales, flattening and simplifying tax rates, and reducing red tape for small businesses. His support for his economic team and its fiscal rigor positioned Russia to pay back wages and pensions to state workers, amass a post-Soviet high of almost $39 billion in reserves, and meet the major foreign debt coming due this year (about $14 billion) and next (about $16 billion). -- He reinvigorated military reform by placing his top lieutenant atop the Defense Ministry and increasing military spending for the second straight year -- even as he forced tough decisions on de-emphasizing strategic forces, and pushing for a leaner, better-equipped conventional military force. This progress is promising, and Putin is trying to build a strong Presidency that can ensure these reforms are implemented across Russia -- while managing a fragmented bureaucracy beset by informal networks that serve private interests. In his quest to build a strong state, however, he is trying to establish parameters within which political forces must operate. This "managed democracy" is illustrated by his continuing moves against independent national television companies. -- On the economic front, Putin will have to take on bank reform, overhaul of Russia's entrenched monopolies, and judicial reform to move the country closer to a Western-style market economy and attract much-needed foreign investment. Putin has made no headway in Chechnya. Despite his hint in September of a possible dialogue with Chechen moderates, the fighting has intensified in recent months, and thousands of Chechen guerrillas -- and their fellow Arab mujahedeen fighters --remain. Moscow seems unwilling to consider the compromises necessary to reach a settlement, while divisions among the Chechens make it hard to find a representative interlocutor. The war, meanwhile, threatens to spill over into neighboring Georgia. After September 11, Putin emphatically chose to join us in the fight against terrorism. The Kremlin blames Islamic radicalism for the conflict in Chechnya and believes it to be a serious threat to Russia. Moscow sees the U.S.-led counterterrorism effort -- particularly the demise of the Taliban regime -- as an important gain in countering the radical Islamic threat to Russia and Central Asia. So far, Putin's outreach to the United States has incurred little political damage, largely because of his strong domestic standing. Recent Russian media polls show his public approval ratings at around 80 percent. The depth of support within key elites, however, is unclear -- particularly within the military and security services. Public comments by some senior military officers indicate that elements of the military doubt that the international situation has changed sufficiently to overcome deeply rooted suspicions of U.S. intentions. Moscow retains fundamental differences with Washington on key issues, and suspicion about U.S. motives persists among Russian conservatives -- especially within the military and security services. Putin has called the intended U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty a "mistake," but has downplayed its impact on Russia. At the same time, Moscow is likely to pursue a variety of countermeasures and new weapons systems to defeat a deployed U.S. missile defense. CHINA I turn next to China. Last year I told you that China's drive to become a great power was coming more sharply into focus. The challenge, I said, was that Beijing saw the United States as the primary obstacle to its realization of that goal. This was in spite of the fact that Chinese leaders at the same time judged that they needed to maintain good ties with Washington. A lot has happened in U.S.-China relations over the past year, from the tenseness of the EP-3 episode in April to the positive image of President Bush and Jiang Zemin standing together in Shanghai last fall, highlighting our shared fight against terrorism. September 11 changed the context of China's approach to us, but it did not change the fundamentals. China is developing an increasingly competitive economy and building a modern military force with the ultimate objective of asserting itself as a great power in East Asia. And although Beijing joined the coalition against terrorism, it remains deeply skeptical of U.S. intentions in Central and South Asia. It fears that we are gaining regional influence at China's expense, and it views our encouragement of a Japanese military role in counterterrorism as support for Japanese rearmament -- something the Chinese firmly oppose. As always, Beijing's approach to the United States must be viewed against the backdrop of China's domestic politics. I told you last year that the approach of a major leadership transition and China's accession to WTO would soon be coloring all of Beijing's actions. Both of those benchmarks are now upon us. The 16th Communist Party Congress will be held this fall, and China is now confronting the obligations of WTO membership. On the leadership side, Beijing is likely to be preoccupied this year with succession jockeying, as top leaders decide who will get what positions -- and who will retire -- at the Party Congress and in the changeover in government positions that will follow next spring. This preoccupation is likely to translate into a cautious and defensive approach on most policy issues. It probably also translates into a persistently nationalist foreign policy, as each of the contenders in the succession contest will be obliged to avoid any hint of being "soft" on the United States. China's entry into the WTO underscores the trepidation the succession contenders will have about maintaining internal stability. WTO membership is a major challenge to Chinese stability because the economic requirements of accession will upset already disaffected sectors of the population and increase unemployment. If China's leaders stumble in WTO implementation -- and even if they succeed -- they will face rising socioeconomic tensions at a time when the stakes in the succession contest are pushing them toward a cautious response to problems. In the case of social unrest, that response is more likely to be harsh than accommodative toward the population at large. The Taiwan issue remains central. Cross-strait relations remain at a stalemate, but there are competing trend lines behind that. Chinese leaders seemed somewhat complacent last year that the growing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait was boosting Beijing's long-term leverage. The results of Taiwan's legislative elections in December, however, strengthened President Chen's hand domestically. Although Beijing's latest policy statement -- inviting members of Chen's party to visit the mainland -- was designed as a conciliatory gesture, Beijing might resume a more confrontational stance if it suspects him of using his electoral mandate to move toward independence. Taiwan also remains the focus of China's military modernization programs. Over the past year, Beijing's military training exercises have taken on an increasingly real-world focus, emphasizing rigorous practice in operational capabilities and improving the military's actual ability to use force. This is aimed not only at Taiwan but also at increasing the risk to the United States itself in any future Taiwan contingency. China also continues to upgrade and expand the conventional short-range ballistic missile force it has arrayed against Taiwan. Beijing also continues to make progress towards fielding its first generation of road mobile strategic missiles -- the DF-31. A longer-range version capable of reaching targets in the United States will become operational later in the decade. NORTH KOREA Staying within East Asia for a moment, let me update you on North Korea. The suspension last year of engagement between P'yongyang, Seoul, and Washington reinforced the concerns I cited last year about Kim Chong-il's intentions toward us and our allies in Northeast Asia. Kim's reluctance to pursue constructive dialogue with the South or to undertake meaningful reforms suggests that he remains focused on maintaining internal control -- at the expense of addressing the fundamental economic failures that keep the North mired in poverty and pose a long-term threat to the country's stability. North Korea's large standing army continues to be a priority claimant on scarce resources, and we have seen no evidence that P'yongyang has abandoned its goal of eventual reunification of the Peninsula under the North's control. The cumulative effects of prolonged economic mismanagement have left the country increasingly susceptible to the possibility of state failure. North Korea faces deepening economic deprivation and the return of famine in the absence of fundamental economic reforms and the large-scale international humanitarian assistance it receives -- an annual average of 1 million metric tons of food aid over the last five years. It has ignored international efforts to address the systemic agricultural problems that exacerbate the North's chronic food shortages. Grain production appears to have roughly stabilized, but it still falls far short of the level required to meet minimum nutritional needs for the population. Large numbers of North Koreans face long-term health damage as a result of prolonged malnutrition and collapse of the public health network. LATIN AMERICA Other important regions of the developing world are test cases for many of the political, social, and demographic trends I identified earlier -- trends that pose latent or growing challenges to U.S. interests, and sometimes fuel terrorists. I have already mentioned Southeast Asia in this respect, citing the rise of Islamic extremism in Indonesia and terrorist links in the Philippines. Latin America is becoming increasingly volatile as the potential for instability there grows. The region has been whipsawed by five economic crises in as many years, and the economic impact of September 11 worsened an already bleak outlook for regional economies as the global slump reduces demand for exports. In this context, I am particularly concerned about Venezuela, our third largest supplier of petroleum. Domestic unhappiness with President Chavez's "Bolivarian revolution" is growing, economic conditions have deteriorated with the fall in oil prices, and the crisis atmosphere is likely to worsen. In Argentina, President Duhalde is trying to maintain public order while putting into place the groundwork for recovery from economic collapse, but his support base is thin. Colombia too remains highly volatile. The peace process there faces many obstacles, and a significant increase in violence -- especially from the FARC -- may be in the offing. Colombia's tenuous security situation is taking a toll on the economy and increasing the dangers for U.S. military advisers in the country. Together, the difficult security and economic conditions have hampered Bogota's ability to implement Plan Colombia's counterdrug and social programs. Colombia remains the cornerstone of the world's cocaine trade, and the largest source of heroin for the U.S. market. AFRICA The chronic problems of Sub-Saharan Africa make it, too, fertile ground for direct and indirect threats to U.S. interests. Governments without accountability and natural disasters have left Africa with the highest concentration of human misery in the world. It is the only region where average incomes have declined since 1970, and Africans have the world's lowest life expectancy at birth. These problems have been compounded by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which will kill more than 2 million Africans this year, making it the leading source of mortality in the region. Given these grim facts, the risk of state failures in Sub-Saharan Africa will remain high. In the past decade, the collapse of governments in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa, and elsewhere has led the United States and other international partners to provide hundreds of millions of dollars worth of aid, and to deploy thousands of peacekeepers. A number of other African states -- including Zimbabwe and Liberia -- are poised to follow the same downward spiral. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe's attempts to rig the presidential election scheduled for next month increases the chances of a collapse in law and order that could spill over into South Africa and other neighbors. The U.N.-monitored truce between Ethiopia and Eritrea also remains fragile. BALKANS Finally, let me briefly mention the Balkans, the importance of which is underlined by the continuing U.S. military presence there. International peacekeeping troops, with a crucial core from NATO, are key to maintaining stability in the region. In Macedonia, the Framework Agreement brokered by the United States and the EU has eased tensions by increasing the ethnic Albanians' political role, but it remains fragile and most of the agreement has yet to be implemented. Ethnic Slavs are worried about losing their dominance in the country. If they obstruct implementation of the accord, many Albanians could decide that the Slav-dominated government -- and by extension the international community -- cannot be trusted. United States and other international forces are most at risk in Bosnia, where Islamic extremists from outside the region played an important role in the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. There is considerable sympathy for international Islamic causes among the Muslim community in Bosnia. Some of the mujahedin who fought in the Bosnian wars of the early 1990s stayed there. These factors combine with others present throughout the Balkans -- weak border controls, large amounts of weapons, and pervasive corruption and organized crime -- to sustain an ongoing threat to U.S. forces there. CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman, I want to end my presentation by reaffirming what the President has said on many occasions regarding the threats we face from terrorists and other adversaries. We cannot -- and will not -- relax our guard against these enemies. If we did so, the terrorists would have won. And that will not happen. The terrorists, rather, should stand warned that we will not falter in our efforts, and in our commitment, until the threat they pose to us has been eliminated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you and your colleagues have for me. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Source:
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm
February 6, 2002
Statement for the Record of
Dale L. Watson
Executive Assistant Director
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Federal Bureau of Investigation
on
The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States
Before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
Good morning Chairman Graham, Vice-Chairman Shelby and members of the
committee. I am Dale Watson, the Executive Assistant Director of the FBI over
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. I am pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before your committee and I convey Director Mueller's regrets for not being
able to be with you today. This morning I would like to discuss the domestic and
international terrorist threat facing the United States and the measures the FBI is
taking to address this threat.
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, marked a dramatic escalation in a trend
toward more destructive terrorist attacks which began in the 1980s. Before the
September 11 attack, the October 23, 1983 truck bombings of U.S. and French
military barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which claimed a total of 295 lives, stood as the
most deadly act of terrorism. The attacks of September 11 produced casualty
figures more than ten times higher than those of the 1983 barracks attacks.
The September 11 attack also reflected a trend toward more indiscriminate targeting
among international terrorists. The vast majority of the more than 3,000 victims of
the attack were civilians. In addition, the attack represented the first known case of
suicide attacks carried out by international terrorists in the United States. The
September 11 attack also marked the first successful act of international terrorism in
the United States since the vehicle bombing of the World Trade Center in February
1993.
Despite its unprecedented scope and destruction, the September 11 attack
underscored many of the trends in international terrorism identified in recent years by
the U.S. intelligence community (Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of
the State Department, intelligence elements of the departments of Defense,
Treasury, Energy, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and
intelligence/counterterrorism elements of the FBI). Among these has been an
apparent shift in operational intensity from traditional sources of terrorism--state
sponsors and formalized terrorist organizations--to loosely affiliated extremists. This
trend has been paralleled by a general shift in tactics and methodologies among
international terrorists that focus on producing mass casualties. These trends
underscore the serious threat that international
terrorists continue to pose to nations around the world, particularly the United
States.
At the same time, the United States also faces significant challenges from domestic
terrorists. In fact, between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or
suspected incidents of terrorism in this country. Of these, 247 were attributed to
domestic terrorists, while 88 were determined to be international in nature.
Threats emanating from domestic and international terrorists will continue to
represent a significant challenge to the United States for the foreseeable future.
Further, as terrorists continue to refine and expand their methodologies, the threats
they pose will become even greater.
Background
The FBI divides the terrorist threat facing the United States into two broad
categories--domestic and international.
Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or
individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories)
without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance
of political or social objectives.
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any
state. Acts are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the
policy of a government, or affect the conduct of a government. These acts transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators
operate.
As events during the past several years demonstrate, both domestic and international
terrorist organizations represent threats to Americans within the borders of the
United States.
During the past decade we have witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the
terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing extremism overtook left-wing terrorism as
the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat to the country. During the past several
years, special interest extremism--as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front
(ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF)--has emerged as a serious terrorist
threat. The FBI estimates that ALF/ELF have committed approximately 600
criminal acts in the United States since 1996, resulting in damages in excess of 42
million dollars.
However, as the events of September 11 demonstrated with horrible clarity, the
United States also confronts serious challenges from international terrorists. The
transnational Al-Qaeda terrorist network headed by Usama Bin Laden has clearly
emerged as the most urgent threat to U.S. interests. The evidence linking Al-Qaeda
and Bin Laden to the attacks of September 11 is clear and irrefutable. The law
enforcement and military response mounted by the United States has done much to
weaken the organizational structure and capabilities of Al-Qaeda. Despite the
military setbacks suffered by
Al-Qaeda, however, it must continue to be viewed as a potent and highly capable
terrorist network with cells around the world. As we hold this hearing, Al-Qaeda is
clearly wounded, but not dead; down but not out.
The FBI has moved aggressively during the past decade to enhance its abilities to
prevent and investigate acts of terrorism against U.S. interests wherever they are
planned. The FBI operates 44 Legal Attache offices (Legats) in countries around
the world to help ensure that investigative resources are in place to support the
FBI's expanding focus on counterterrorism and international organized crime. In the
20 years since President Reagan designated the FBI as the lead agency for
countering terrorism in the United States, Congress and the Executive Branch have
taken important steps to enhance the federal government's counterterrorism
capabilities. The FBI's counterterrorism responsibilities were expanded in 1984 and
1986, when Congress passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise federal
jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage
by terrorists, or when certain U.S. interests are attacked. Since the mid-1980s, the
FBI has investigated more than 500 extraterritorial cases. In addition to the
investigation into the September 11 attack, several other ongoing extraterritorial
investigations rank among the FBI's most high profile cases, including our
investigation into the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, which killed
19 U.S. servicemen; the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
which killed 12 Americans; and the bombing of the USS Cole, which claimed the
lives of 17 U.S. sailors.
As evidenced by our enhanced ability to conduct counterterrorism investigations
overseas, the evolution of the FBI's response to terrorism during the past decade
reflects the changing dynamics of terrorism. In the direct aftermath of the 1993
World Trade Center bombing the FBI began to focus investigative attention on the
then-emerging phenomenon of Sunni extremism and its operational manifestation in
the radical international jihad movement. This effort paid almost immediate dividends
when investigators uncovered and thwarted a plot by a loosely affiliated group of
international terrorists led by Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman to bomb landmarks
throughout New York City during the summer of 1993.
This morning, I would like to briefly discuss the current terrorist threat in the United
States, as well as the FBI's efforts to address the threat posed by domestic and
international terrorists.
Terrorist Threat in the United States
The threat of terrorism to the United States remains despite proactive law
enforcement efforts and significant legislative counterterrorism initiatives. The overall
level of terrorist-related acts in the United States declined in the early 1990s, when
compared to figures for the 1970s and 1980s, but has increased steadily during the
past five years. There were two terrorist acts recorded in the United States in 1995,
three in 1996, four in 1997, five in 1995, 12 in 1999 and 8 in 2000 (FIGURES
COMBINE TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND SUSPECTED TERRORIST
INCIDENTS). While terrorist designations for the year 2001 are currently being
finalized, one incident, the attack of September 11, produced higher casualty figures
than all previous terrorist incidents in the United States combined. Relatively high
numbers of terrorist plots prevented by law enforcement in recent years further
underscore the continuing terrorist threat.
Domestic Terrorism
Domestic right-wing terrorist groups often adhere to the principles of racial
supremacy and embrace antigovernment, antiregulatory beliefs. Generally, extremist
right-wing groups engage in activity that is protected by constitutional guarantees of
free speech and assembly. Law enforcement becomes involved when the volatile
talk of these groups transgresses into unlawful action.
On the national level, formal right-wing hate groups, such as the National Alliance,
the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) and the Aryan Nations, represent a
continuing terrorist threat. Although efforts have been made by some extremist
groups to reduce openly racist rhetoric in order to appeal to a broader segment of
the population and to focus increased attention on antigovernment sentiment,
racism-based hatred remains an integral component of these groups' core
orientations.
Right-wing groups continue to represent a serious terrorist threat. Two of the seven
planned acts of terrorism prevented in 1999 were potentially large-scale,
high-casualty attacks being planned by organized right-wing extremist groups.
The second category of domestic terrorists, left-wing groups, generally profess a
revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the people
against the "dehumanizing effects" of capitalism and imperialism. They aim to bring
about change in the United States and believe that this change can be realized
through revolution rather than through the established political process. From the
1960s to the 1980s, leftist-oriented extremist groups posed the most serious
domestic terrorist threat to the United States. In the 1980s, however, the fortunes of
the leftist movement changed dramatically as law enforcement dismantled the
infrastructure of many of these groups, and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe
deprived the movement of its ideological foundation and patronage.
Terrorist groups seeking to secure full Puerto Rican independence from the United
States through violent means represent one of the remaining active vestiges of
left-wing terrorism. While these groups believe that bombings alone will not result in
change, they view these acts of terrorism as a means by which to draw attention to
their desire for independence. During the 1970s and 1980s numerous leftist groups,
including extremist Puerto Rican separatist groups such as the armed forces for
Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN--Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional Puertorriquena), carried out bombings on the U.S. mainland, primarily in
and around New York City. However, just as the leftist threat in general declined
dramatically throughout the 1990s, the threat posed by Puerto Rican extremist
groups to mainland U.S. communities decreased during the past decade.
Acts of terrorism continue to be perpetrated, however, by violent separatists in
Puerto Rico. As noted, three acts of terrorism and one suspected act of terrorism
have taken place in various Puerto Rican locales during the past four years. These
acts (including the March 31, 1998 bombing of a superaquaduct project in Arecibo,
the bombings of bank offices in Rio Piedras and Santa Isabel in June 1998, and the
bombing of a highway in Hato Rey in 1999) remain under investigation. The
extremist Puerto Rican separatist group, Los Macheteros, is suspected in each of
these attacks. The FBI has not recorded any acts of terrorism in Puerto Rico since
1999.
Anarchists and extremist socialist groups--many of which, such as the workers'
world party, reclaim the streets, and carnival against capitalism, have an international
presence--at times also represent a potential threat in the United States. For
example, anarchists, operating individually and in groups, caused much of the
damage during the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle.The third category of
domestic terrorism, special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and
left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve specific
issues, rather than effect widespread political change. Special interest extremists
continue to conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of
society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered
important to their causes. These groups occupy the extreme fringes of animal rights,
pro-life, environmental, anti-nuclear, and other movements. Some special interest
extremists--most notably within the animal rights and environmental
movements--have turned increasingly toward vandalism and terrorist activity in
attempts to further their causes.
In recent years, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)--an extremist animal rights
movement--has become one of the most active extremist elements in the United
States. Despite the destructive aspects of ALF's operations, its operational
philosophy discourages acts that harm "any animal, human and nonhuman." Animal
rights groups in the United States, including ALF, have generally adhered to this
mandate. A distinct but related group, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), claimed
responsibility for the arson fires set at a Vail (Colorado) ski resort in October 1998,
which caused 12 million dollars in damages. This incident remains under
investigation. Seven terrorist incidents occurring in the United States during 2000
have been attributed to either ALF or ELF. Several additional acts committed
during 2001 are currently being reviewed for possible designation as terrorist
incidents.
International Terrorism
The United States faces a formidable challenge from international terrorists. The
September 11 attack and the bombing of the USS Cole in the Yemenese port of
Aden in October 2000, as well as the prevention of an apparent attempt by Richard
Reid to destroy a Paris-to-Miami flight in December 2001, underscore the range of
threats to U.S. interests posed by international terrorism.
In general terms, the international terrorist threat to U.S. interests can be divided into
three categories: the radical international jihad movement, formalized terrorist
organizations, and state sponsors of international terrorism. Each of these categories
represents a threat to U.S. interests abroad and in the United States.
The most serious international terrorist threat to U.S. interests today stems from
Sunni Islamic extremists, such as Usama Bin Laden and individuals affiliated with his
Al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda leaders, including Usama Bin Laden, had been
harbored in Afghanistan since 1996 by the extremist Islamic regime of the Taliban.
Despite recent military setbacks suffered by the Taliban and the apparent death of
Al-Qaeda operational commander Mohamed Atef resulting from a U.S. bombing
raid, Al-Qaeda must continue to be viewed as a potent and highly capable terrorist
network. The network's willingness and capability to inflict large-scale violence and
destruction against U.S. persons and interests--as it demonstrated with the
September 11 attack, the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, and the
bombings of two U.S. embassies in east Africa in August 1998, among other
plots--makes it a clear and imminent threat to the United States.
However, the threat from Al-Qaeda is only a part of the overall threat from the
radical international jihad movement, which is composed of individuals of varying
nationalities, ethnicities, tribes, races, and terrorist group memberships who work
together in support of extremist Sunni goals. One of the primary goals of Sunni
extremists is the removal of U.S. military forces from the Persian gulf area, most
notably Saudi Arabia. The single common element among these diverse individuals is
their commitment to the radical international jihad movement, which includes a
radicalized ideology and agenda promoting the use of violence against the "enemies
of Islam" in order to overthrow all governments which are not ruled by Sharia
(conservative Islamic) law. A primary tactical objective of this movement has been
the planning and implementation of large-scale, high-profile, high-casualty terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests and citizens, and those of its allies, worldwide.
Richard Reid
On December 22, 2001, Richard C. Reid was arrested after a flight attendant on
American Airlines Flight 63 observed him attempting to apparently ignite an
improvised explosive in his sneakers while onboard the Paris-to-Miami flight. Aided
by passengers, attendants overpowered and subdued Reid and the flight was
diverted to Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.
Evidence strongly suggests that Reid, who was traveling on a valid British passport,
is affiliated with the Al-Qaeda network. Reid has been indicted on nine counts,
including placing an explosive device on an aircraft and attempted murder. FBI
investigation has determined that the explosives in Reid's shoes, if detonated in
certain areas of the passenger cabin, could have blown a hole in the fuselage of the
aircraft.
Zacarias Moussaoui
Investigation also has revealed that Reid and another indicted subject, Zacarias
Moussaoui, were known associates. Moussaoui came to the attention of the FBI
while taking flight training classes in Minnesota in August 2001. Moussaoui had paid
over $8,000 in cash for flight simulator lessons on a 747-400, which far exceeded
his training level as a pilot. Moussaoui showed unusual interest in the instructor's
comment that airplane cabin doors could not be opened during flight. In addition, his
flight instructor was concerned that Moussaoui expressed interest only in learning
how to take off and land the 747-400. In preparation for high fidelity simulator
training, he expressed strong interest in "piloting" a simulated flight from London's
Heathrow Airport to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. When the instructor
took his concerns to the FBI, Moussaoui was interviewed by Special Agents from
the FBI and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He was
determined to be an INS overstay and was detained by the INS on August 16,
2001. Following his detention, Moussaoui refused to allow a search to be
conducted of his possessions, to include a laptop computer and a computer disc.
Attempts were made to obtain authority to conduct a search of this computer.
However, due to the lack of probable cause and lack of predication, neither a
criminal nor intelligence search could be conducted. Following the September 11
attack a criminal search of the computer was conducted. Nothing was located which
connected Moussaoui with the events of September 11; however, information about
crop-dusting was located on the computer. As a result, crop dusting operations in
the United States were grounded briefly on two occasions in September 2001. On
December 11, 2001, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia indicted Moussaoui on six counts of conspiracy for his role in the events of
September 11, 2001.
The second category of international terrorist threat is made up of formal terrorist
organizations. These autonomous, generally transnational, groups have their own
personnel, infrastructures, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are
able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns on an international basis, and several
actively support terrorist-related activities in the United States. Extremist groups
such as Palestinian Hamas, the Irish Republican Army, the Egyptian El-Gama
Al-Islamiyya (IG), and Lebanese Hizballah have supporters in the United States,
though the activities of these U.S.-based cells revolve primarily around fund-raising,
recruiting, and low-level intelligence gathering.
Hizballah is a formal organization that has carried out numerous anti-U.S. attacks
overseas, including the October 1983 vehicle bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks
in Lebanon. With the exception of the Al-Qaeda network, Hizballah is responsible
for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist group in the world. On
June 21, 2001, the United States indicted 14 subjects--13 Saudis and 1 Lebanese
national--for their suspected involvement in the June 1996 bombing of Khobar
Towers in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. airmen died in the blast; Saudi Hizballah is
suspected of carrying out the attack. To date, Hizballah has never carried out a
terrorist attack in the United States.
State sponsors of terrorism make up the third category of international terrorist
threat. The primary state sponsors are Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya. These countries
view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Syria, which is also on the U.S.
Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism, has not been directly
involved in conducting terrorist activity for a number of years but still provides a safe
haven to international terrorist groups and loosely affiliated extremists. North Korea
and Cuba--also on the Department of State's list of state sponsors--have
significantly reduced their direct involvement with terrorism due, in part, to the
rapidly diminishing capacity of their economies to support such activity.
In perhaps the most infamous case of state sponsored terrorism, Libya is believed to
be behind the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, which killed 270 people (259 people on the plane and 11 on the ground).
On April 5, 1999, the Libyan government turned over two former intelligence
operatives, Abd al Basit al-Megrahi and Lamin Kalifah Fhima, to be tried in the
Netherlands by a special Scottish court for the bombing. Several years earlier, the
FBI had placed al-Megrahi and Fhima on its Top Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list,
marking the only time that officers of a foreign government were placed on the list.
On January 31, 2001, the three-judge court convicted al-Megrahi of murder for his
role in the bombing. Fhima was acquitted by the court and released.
Of the seven nations listed by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, Iran
represents the greatest threat to the United States. Despite a moderation in its public
anti-U.S. rhetoric since the 1997 election of Mohammed Khatemi as president, the
government of Iran, which is controlled by conservative clerics opposed to Khatemi,
continues to target dissidents and support anti-western terrorism, both financially
and logistically.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
The trend toward high-profile, high-impact attacks comes at a time when interest is
growing among domestic and international extremists in weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). A series of anthrax-related cases and threats occurring since
September 2001 provide a glimpse into emerging terrorist scenarios of the 21st
century.
A series of bioterrorism incidents using b. anthracis spores sent through the mail
have resulted in 22 anthrax cases and five deaths since October 3, 2001. The initial
anthrax cases occurred among persons with known or suspected contact with
opened letters contaminated with b. anthracis spores. Later, investigations identified
four confirmed cases and one suspected case among postal workers who had no
known contact with contaminated opened letters. This suggests that sealed
envelopes contaminated with anthrax passing through the postal system may be the
source of these exposures. The number of contaminated envelopes passing through
the postal system is under investigation.
Leads continue to be investigated; however, no suspect has been identified. On
November 9, 2001, the FBI issued a behavioral/linguistic assessment of the offender
based on the known anthrax parcels. As stated in this assessment, the offender is
believed to be an adult male who has access to a source of anthrax and possesses
the knowledge and expertise to refine it. The FBI heads a multi-agency effort to
identify the perpetrator of these deadly attacks.
Since October 2001 the FBI has responded to over 8,000 reports of use or
threatened use of anthrax or other hazardous materials. The current rash of anthrax
threats represents a large spike in a trend of increased WMD cases that began in the
mid-1990s. During the past four years, there has been a very limited number of
cases in the United States that actually involved use or threatened use of ricin. There
had been no criminal cases involving actual use of anthrax in the United States prior
to October 2001. To date, no evidence definitely links Al-Qaeda or any other
terrorist organization to these cases.
Cyber / National Infrastructure
During the past several years the FBI had identified a wide array of cyber threats,
ranging from defacement of web sites by juveniles to sophisticated intrusions
sponsored by foreign powers. Some of these incidents pose more significant threats
than others. The theft of national security information from a government agency or
the interruption of electrical power to a major metropolitan area obviously would
have greater consequences for national security, public safety, and the economy than
the defacement of a web-site. But even the less serious categories have real
consequences and, ultimately, can undermine public confidence in web-based
commerce (E-commerce) and violate privacy or property rights. An attack (or
"hack") on a web site that closes down an e-commerce site can have disastrous
consequences for a web-based business. An intrusion that results in the theft of
millions of credit card numbers from an online vendor can result in significant
financial loss and, more broadly, reduce consumers' willingness to engage in
e-commerce.
Beyond criminal threats, cyber space also faces a variety of significant national
security threats, including increasing threats from terrorists.
Terrorist groups are increasingly using new information technology and the Internet
to formulate plans, raise funds, spread propaganda, and engage in secure
communications. Cyberterrorism-–meaning the use of cyber tools to shut down
critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, or government
operations) for the purpose of coercing or intimidating a government or civilian
population–-is clearly an emerging threat.
On January 16, 2002, the FBI disseminated an advisory via the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System regarding possible attempts by terrorists
to use U.S. municipal and state web sites to obtain information on local energy
infrastructures, water reservoirs, dams, highly enriched uranium storage sites, and
nuclear and gas facilities. Although the FBI possesses no specific threat information
regarding these apparent intrusions, these types of activities on the part of terrorists
pose serious challenges to our national security.
The FBI Response to Terrorism
The FBI has developed a strong response to the threats posed by domestic and
international terrorism. Between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, the number of Special
Agents dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism programs grew by approximately
224 percent (to 1,669--nearly 16 percent of all FBI special agents). In recent years,
the FBI has strengthened its counterterrorism program to enhance its abilities to
carry out these objectives.
The FBI Counterterrorism Center
As you are aware, congressional appropriations have helped strengthen and expand
the FBI's counterterrorism capabilities. To enhance its mission, the FBI centralized
many specialized operational and analytical functions in the FBI Counterterrorism
Center.
Established in 1996, the FBI Counterterrorism Center combats terrorism on three
fronts: international terrorism operations both within the United States and in support
of extraterritorial investigations, domestic terrorism operations, and countermeasures
relating to both international and domestic terrorism.
Eighteen federal agencies maintain a regular presence in the center and participate in
its daily operations. These agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Secret Service, and the Department of State, among others. This multi-agency
arrangement provides an unprecedented opportunity for information sharing,
warning, and real-time intelligence analysis.
Interagency Cooperation
This sense of cooperation also has led to other important changes. During the past
several years, the FBI and CIA have developed a closer working relationship that
has strengthened the ability of each agency to respond to terrorist threats and has
improved the ability of the U.S. government to respond to terrorist attacks that do
occur.
An element of this cooperation is an ongoing exchange of personnel between the
two agencies. Included among the CIA employees detailed to the FBI's
Counterterrorism division is a veteran CIA case officer who serves as the Deputy
Section Chief for International Terrorism. Likewise, FBI agents are detailed to the
CIA, and a veteran special agent serves in a comparable position in the CIA's
Counterterrorist center.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center
Created in 1998, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) is an
interagency center housed at FBI headquarters that serves as the focal point for the
government's effort to warn of and respond to cyber intrusions, both domestic and
international. NIPC programs have been established in each of the FBI's 56 field
offices.
The FBI Laboratory
The FBI Laboratory division has developed a robust response capability to support
counterterrorism investigations worldwide. The FBI's mobile crime laboratory
provides the capability to collect and analyze a range of physical evidence on-scene,
and has been deployed at major crime scenes, including the World Trade Center
bombing, Khobar Towers, and the East African Embassy bombings. The mobile
crime laboratory contains analytical instrumentation for rapid screening and triage of
explosives and other trace evidence recovered at crime scenes.
The Laboratory also provides the capacity to rapidly respond to criminal acts
involving the use of chemical or biological agents with the mobile, self-contained Fly
Away Laboratory (FAL). The FAL consists of twelve suites of analytical
instrumentation supported by an array of equipment which allows for safe collection
of hazardous materials, sample preparation, storage, and analysis in a field setting.
The major objectives of the mobile crime laboratory and the FAL are to enhance
the safety of deployed personnel, generate leads through rapid analysis and
screening, and to preserve evidence for further examination at the FBI Laboratory.
In addition, the Laboratory has developed agreements with several other federal
agencies for rapid and effective analysis of chemical, biological, and radiological
materials. One partnership, the Laboratory Response Network, is supported by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Association of Public Health
Laboratories for the analysis of biological agents.
Threat Warning
Because warning is critical to the prevention of terrorist acts, the FBI also has
expanded the terrorist threat warning system first implemented in 1989. The system
now reaches all aspects of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
Currently, sixty federal agencies and their subcomponents receive information via
secure teletype through this system. The messages also are transmitted to all 56 FBI
field offices and 44 Legats.
If threat information requires nationwide unclassified dissemination to all federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies, the FBI transmits messages via the
National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. In addition, the FBI
disseminates threat information to security managers of thousands of U.S.
commercial interests around the country through the Awareness of National Security
Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. If warranted, the expanded NTWS also
enables the FBI to communicate threat information directly to the American people.
On September 11, the FBI issued a nationwide terrorist threat advisory via the
National Threat Warning System; this advisory is in place through March 11, 2002,
unless extended by the FBI. Since the terrorist attack of September 11, the FBI has
disseminated 37 warnings via the NTWS. The FBI also has issued over 40 be on
the lookout (BOLO) alerts via the NLETS system. BOLO alerts provide the names
of individuals who are of investigative interest to the FBI.
Through a 24-hour watch and other initiatives, the NIPC also has developed
processes to ensure that it receives relevant information in real-time or
near-real-time from all relevant sources, including the U.S. intelligence community,
FBI criminal investigations, other federal agencies, the private sector, emerging
intrusion detection systems, and open sources. This information is quickly evaluated
to determine if a broad-scale attack is imminent or underway. If a chemical,
biological, nuclear or radiological material is threatened, the FBI Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU) conducts an interagency assessment to
determine the credibility of the threat, utilizing subject matter experts and federal
agencies with relevant authorities. Based on the credibility of the threat, the
WMDOU will coordinate the appropriate response by federal assets. As a result of
this analysis, the FBI can issue warnings using an array of mechanisms, and
disseminate warnings to appropriate entities in the U.S. government and the private
sector so that they can take immediate protective steps.
The Future
I would like to conclude by talking briefly about steps we can take to further
strengthen our abilities to prevent and investigate terrorist activity.
Encryption
One of the most important of these steps involves the FBI's encryption initiative.
Communication is central to any collaborative effort--including criminal conspiracies.
Like most criminals, terrorists are naturally reluctant to put the details of their plots
down on paper. Thus, they generally depend on oral or electronic communication to
formulate the details of their terrorist activities.
Although the FBI, and the law enforcement community at large, fully supports the
development and use of innovative technologies to ensure that the United States
remains competitive in today's global market, we remain extremely concerned about
the serious public safety threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of technologies
that prevent law enforcement from gaining access to the plaintext of terrorist and/or
serious criminal-related evidence obtained through either court-authorized electronic
surveillance or the search and seizure of digital evidence.
The use of commercially available, non-recoverable encryption products by
individuals engaged in terrorist and other serious criminal activity can effectively
prevent law enforcement access to this critical evidence. Law enforcement's inability
to gain access to the plaintext of encrypted communications and/or computer
evidence in a timely manner seriously impairs our ability to successfully prevent and
prosecute terrorist and/or other serious criminal acts.
This significant challenge to effective law enforcement poses grave and serious
public safety consequences. Unless the FBI enhances its ability for gathering and
processing computer data obtained through electronic surveillance, search and
seizure of computer evidence, and its ability to gain access to the plain text of
encrypted evidence, investigators and prosecutors will be denied timely access to
valuable evidence that could be used to prevent and solve terrorist and other serious
criminal acts.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces
Cooperation among law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an important
component of a comprehensive response to terrorism. This cooperation assumes its
most tangible operational form in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces that are
authorized in 44 cities across the nation. These task forces are particularly
well-suited to responding to terrorism because they combine the national and
international investigative resources of the FBI with the street-level expertise of local
law enforcement agencies. This cop-to-cop cooperation has proven highly
successful in preventing several potential terrorist attacks. Perhaps the most notable
cases have come from New York City, where the city's Joint Terrorism Task Force
has been instrumental in thwarting two high-profile international terrorism plots--the
series of bombings planned by Shaykh Rahman in 1993 and the attempted bombing
of the New York City subway in 1997.
Not only were these plots prevented, but today, the conspirators who planned them
sit in federal prisons thanks, in large part, to the comprehensive investigative work
performed by the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Given the success of the Joint Terrorism Task Force concept, the FBI has
established 15 new JTTFs since the end of 1999. By the end of 2002 the FBI plans
to have established or authorized JTTFs in each of its 56 field divisions. By
integrating the investigative abilities of the FBI and local law enforcement agencies
these task forces represent an effective response to the threats posed to U.S.
communities by domestic and international terrorists.
Expansion of FBI Legats
The FBI's counterterrorism capabilities also have been enhanced by the expansion
of our Legat offices around the world. These small offices can have a significant
impact on the FBI's ability to track terrorist threats and bring investigative resources
to bear on cases where quick response is critical. As I've mentioned, the FBI
currently operates 44 such Legat offices. Many of these have opened within the past
five years in areas of the world where identifiable threats to our national interests
exist. We cannot escape the disquieting reality that in the 21st century, crime and
terrorism are carried out on an international scale. The law enforcement response
must match the threat. By expanding our first line of defense, we improve the ability
of the United States to prevent attacks and respond quickly to those that do occur.
Given the nature of the evolving terrorist threat and the destructive capabilities now
available to terrorists, the American people deserve nothing less. The expansion of
the number of FBI Legal Attache offices (Legats) around the world has enhanced
the ability of the FBI to prevent, respond to, and investigate terrorist acts committed
by international terrorists against U.S. interests worldwide. As evidenced by
developments in the Embassy Bombing cases in East Africa, the ability to bring
investigative resources to bear quickly in the aftermath of a terrorist act can have
significant impact on our ability to identify those responsible. I encourage Congress
to support our efforts to counter the international terrorist threat by continuing to
support expansion of our Legat program.
Results
Improved analysis and operational capabilities combined with increased cooperation
and integration have enhanced the FBI's ability to investigate and prevent acts of
terrorism.
Dozens of domestic extremists have been indicted and prosecuted during the past
ten years. Among these are Timothy McVeigh, who carried out the bombing of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. McVeigh was executed in June
2001 for perpetrating the worst act of domestic terrorism ever conducted in the
United States. More recently, on January 25, 2002, anti-abortion extremist Clayton
Lee Waagner was given a combined sentence of over 30 years in prison for various
theft and firearms violations. Waagner is also suspected of sending over 250 hoax
anthrax letters to reproductive services clinics in October and November 2001.
During the past ten years, more than 60 subjects associated with international
terrorism have been prosecuted in the United States. These include Ramzi Yousef,
operational mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot to
bomb U.S. airliners transiting the far east (convicted in May 1997); Tsutomu
Shirosaki, Japanese Red Army member who fired rockets at the U.S. Embassy
compound in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1986 (convicted in November 1997); and
Gazi-Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil, extremists who, in 1997, nearly carried out a plan
to bomb the New York City subway system (convicted in July 1998). Yousef and
Shirosaki were among the 16 fugitives indicted for terrorist-related activities that
have been rendered to the United States from overseas since 1987. The 1997 plot
to bomb the New York subway was narrowly averted by the FBI/New York City
Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force.
On October 18, 2001, four Al-Qaeda members received life sentences for their
roles in a conspiracy to kill Americans which resulted in the August 1998 embassy
bombings in East Africa. Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis
Mohamed, Wadih el-Hage, and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh were convicted earlier in
2001 in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) on a variety of charges related
to the embassies bombing plot. Two other subjects in this case are awaiting trial in
the SDNY.
In December 1999 the coordinated efforts of the FBI and other law
enforcement/intelligence agencies were instrumental in responding to the millennium
threat exposed when Ahmed Ressam was apprehended attempting to smuggle
explosives across the U.S.-Canadian border near Seattle. On April 6, 2001, after a
three-week trial in Los Angeles, Ressam was found guilty on all counts brought
against him. On March 7, 2001, Abdelghani Meskini, another individual suspected
of involvement in the plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport, had pled guilty in the
Southern District of New York to charges of providing material support to Ressam.
On July 13, 2001, a third suspect subject, Mokhtar Haouari, was convicted of
charges related to the plot. In January of this year, Haouari was sentenced to 24
years in prison for his role in supporting Ressam's plot to carry out terrorist activity
in the United States. One indicted subject, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, is in Algerian
custody.
In addition, numerous individuals have been indicted for their involvement in terrorist
activities and are currently being sought by the FBI. Usama Bin Laden and 15 other
subjects stand indicted for their roles in Al-Qaeda and the 1998 U.S. embassy
bombings in East Africa. Three additional subjects are in custody in the United
Kingdom but are expected to be extradited soon to stand trial in the SDNY.
In October 2001 the FBI established the Most Wanted Terrorists program to focus
expanded attention on indicted terrorist suspects. Usama Bin Laden was among the
first 22 names placed on this list. In June 1998 Bin Laden had been named to the
FBI's Top Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list.
Conclusion
Despite the current focus on international terrorism, it is important to remain
cognizant of the full range of threats that confront the United States. These threats
continue to include domestic and international terrorists. While the majority of
attacks perpetrated by domestic terrorists have produced low casualty figures, the
169 lives claimed in the Oklahoma City bombing and the potential very heavy loss
of lives that could have resulted from various thwarted plots demonstrate the interest
among some domestic extremists in inflicting mass casualties.
On September 11, 2001, the scope and sophistication of the international radical
jihad movement was demonstrated with horrendous clarity when 19 hijackers
commandeered four commercial airliners, crashing two of them into the World
Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and the other into a remote field in
Pennsylvania. This attack resulted in more casualties than any other terrorist act ever
recorded.
Even as the Al-Qaeda command structure in Afghanistan is destroyed, Al-Qaeda
cells in countries around the world will continue to pose a threat to U.S. and other
western interests. The plotters who carried out the September 11, 2001 attack
maintained a low profile and appeared to actively avoid coming to the attention of
law enforcement agencies. Such operational discipline underscores the challenge to
U.S. law enforcement agencies in uncovering and disrupting Al-Qaeda cells in the
United States. Although the public mind often groups international terrorists into a
standard stereotype, such a view fails to accommodate subtle but important
differences in goals and tactics among different extremist movements. For example,
the low-level operational scope of 17 November (assassinations, small-scale
bombings centered primarily in Athens) reflects the limited, ethnocentric strategic
goal of the organization (a nationalist Greek state). By contrast, the high-impact,
transnational operational focus of Al-Qaeda and other groups associated with the
international radical jihad movement clearly underscores a strategic goal to confront
the United States and other western interests with high-casualty attacks on a global
scale. Despite the military setbacks suffered by Al-Qaeda, extremists adhering to
the international jihad movement will continue to focus on attacks that yield
significant destruction and high casualties, thus maximizing worldwide media
attention and public anxiety. It also appears likely that as governments "harden" (or
make more secure) official targets, such as embassies and international schools,
these terrorists will increasingly seek out more vulnerable "softer" targets, such as
high-profile offices of multinational firms and Americans traveling and working
abroad.
Terrorism represents a continuing threat to the United States and a formidable
challenge to the FBI. In response to this threat, the FBI has developed a
broad-based counterterrorism program, based on robust investigations to disrupt
terrorist activities, interagency cooperation, and effective warning. While this
approach has yielded many successes, the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat
demands that our capabilities continually be refined and adapted to continue to
provide the most effective response.