7 July 2006
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[Federal Register: July 7, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 130)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 38564-38593]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr07jy06-26]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25,
27, 52, 53, 54, 63, 64, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 90, 95, 97 and 101
[EB Docket No. 06-119; FCC 06-83]
In the Matter of Recommendations of the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
(Independent Panel). The Independent Panel's report described the
impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as
the overall public and private response efforts. In addition, the
report included recommendations which relate to: pre-positioning the
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; improving recovery
coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the use
of existing resources; improving the operability and interoperability
of public safety and 911 communications in times of crisis; and
improving communication of emergency information to the public. The
Commission, in this proceeding, is to take the lessons learned from
this disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts as well as heightened readiness and
preparedness in the future. To accomplish this goal, the Commission
invites comment on what actions the Commission can take to address the
Independent Panel's recommendations.
DATES: Comments are due on or before August 7, 2006, and reply comments
are due on or before August 21, 2006. Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before September 5, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Send comments and reply comments to the Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. You may submit comments, identified
by EB Docket No. 06-119, by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov/.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Federal Communications Commission's Web site: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail; FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
In addition to filing with the Secretary, a copy of any comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements
contained herein should be submitted to Judith B. Herman, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20554, or via the Internet to PRA@fcc.gov, and to Kristy
L. LaLonde, OMB Desk Officer, Room 10234, NEOB, 725 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20503, via the Internet to Kristy_L.LaLonde@omb.eop.gov
or via fax at 202-395-5167.
[[Page 38565]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa M. Fowlkes, Assistant Bureau
Chief, Enforcement Bureau, at (202) 418-7450 or Jean Ann Collins,
Senior Counsel, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau at
(202) 418-1199. For additional information concerning the Paperwork
Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this
document, contact Judith B. Herman at (202) 418-0214 or via the
Internet at PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in EB Docket No. 06-119, FCC 06-83,
adopted June 16, 2006 and released June 19, 2006. The complete text of
this document is available for inspection and copying during normal
business hours in the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445
12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may
also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor Best
Copy and Printing, Inc., Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-
B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 488-5300,
facsimile (202) 488-5563, or via e-mail at fcc@bcpiweb.com. It is also
available on the Commission's Web site at http://www.fcc.gov.
This document contains proposed information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the OMB to
comment on the proposed information collection requirements contained
in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments are due September 5,
2006.
Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c)
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information
collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents, including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of information technology. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment
on how it might ``further reduce the information collection burden for
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''
OMB Control Number: None
Title: Emergency Communications Status and Contact Information.
Form No.: N/A.
Type of Review: New Collection.
Respondents: Business or other for-profit, not-for-profit, state,
local or tribal governments.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,300.
Frequency of Response: Contact information--0.167 hours for initial
collection; 0.084 hours for updates; Readiness Checklist--40 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion.
Estimated Total Annual Burden: 16,113 hours.
Estimated Total Annual Costs: $0.
Privacy Act Impact Assessment: N/A.
Needs and Uses: The Commission will use the information collected
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts in
the event of a natural disaster or emergency situation, as well as
heightened readiness and preparedness. Additionally, this information
collection will be used to compile a roster of key communications
providers and other emergency personnel throughout the United States
and in determining the extent of communications disruption and the
appropriate agency response. This information collection will be used
to compile a list of outages to communications infrastructure within an
area affected by a disaster. This information will assist in ensuring
rapid restoration of communications capabilities after disruption by a
natural disaster, terrorist attack or other emergency and will assist
in ensuring the public safety, public health, and other emergency and
defense personnel have effective communications services available to
them.
Synopsis of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Background. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plant
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service,
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
2. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Public Law 92-463, as amended (71 FR 933, January 6, 2006). The mission
of the Independent Panel was to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina
on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas
affected by the hurricane. Specifically, the Independent Panel was to
study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media industries, including public safety
communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to review the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to
the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was tasked
with making recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006,
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability,
and communications among first responders such as police, fire
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
3. The Independent Panel met directly on five occasions. Four of
these meetings were used to examine the facts surrounding the impact of
Hurricane Katrina and to obtain evidence concerning the extent of the
damage and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery efforts.
On one occasion, the Independent Panel met in the area struck by
Hurricane Katrina to hear first-hand from victims of the disaster. In
addition to the in-person meetings, the Independent Panel also received
written comments from interested members of the public. Finally, the
Independent Panel's informal working groups met on numerous occasions
via conference call and in person to discuss their progress.
4. On June 9, 2006, the Independent Panel held its final meeting in
Washington, DC to conclude its analysis and deliberations. The
Independent Panel finalized its findings and recommendations and
submitted its report on June 12, 2006. A copy of the report is attached
to this NPRM.
5. Introduction. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
Commission initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel.
Congress has charged the Commission with promoting the safety of life
and property
[[Page 38566]]
through the use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, the
Commission has already taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate
and we will continue to do so. The Independent Panel's report described
the impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history, as
well as the overall public and private response and recovery efforts.
Our goal in this proceeding is to take the lessons learned from this
disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts, as well as heightened readiness and
preparedness, in the future. To accomplish this goal, we invite comment
on what actions the Commission can take to address the Independent
Panel's recommendations.
6. We seek comment on the recommendations presented by the
Independent Panel in its final report. The Independent Panel's
recommendations are organized into four areas: (1) Pre-positioning the
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; (2) improving
recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize
the use of existing resources; (3) improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications in times of
crisis; and (4) improving communication of emergency information to the
public. In some cases, the Independent Panel recommends actions that
require the Commission to modify its rules pursuant to notice-and-
comment rulemaking. In other cases, the Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission take actions that are not dependent upon
rulemakings, such as increased outreach and education campaigns, or
recommends measures that may not fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction. In advocating implementation of the
Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters should note what
actions would fall within the Commission's statutory authority and
jurisdiction, and what the Commission could do to encourage the
appropriate entities (e.g., state and local authorities) to take
action. In evaluating the Independent Panel's recommendations, our goal
is to determine what actions the Commission should take to promote
greater resiliency and reliability of communications infrastructure, as
well as the actions the Commission should take to strengthen and
improve response and recovery efforts. We therefore invite broad
comment on the Independent Panel's recommendations and on the measures
the Commission should take to address the problems identified. We also
generally seek comment on whether, in adopting any of the Independent
Panel's recommendations, any additional safeguards should be
implemented to limit disclosure of sensitive infrastructure information
or commercial information to prevent exposing potential targets to
wrongdoers and subjecting regulated entities to competitive harm.
7. In addition to presenting recommendations, the Independent
Panel's final report describes the Independent Panel's observations
regarding the hurricane's impact and the sufficiency of the recovery
efforts. We also seek comment on whether the Independent Panel's
observations warrant additional measures or steps beyond the report's
specific recommendations. Thus, to the extent parties believe
additional measures beyond the Independent Panel's recommendations or
different actions are warranted, we welcome these suggestions and
recommendations. We also seek comment whether we should rely on
voluntary consensus recommendations, as advocated by the Independent
Panel, or whether we should rely on other measures for enhancing
readiness and promoting more effective response efforts.
8. Pre-Positioning for Disasters. The Independent Panel
recommendation notes that the sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the
extensive flooding that occurred severely tested the reliability and
resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. To help
speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends the adoption
of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network reliability
and resiliency. At the heart of the Independent Panel's recommendations
are steps the Independent Panel believes the communications industry,
public safety organizations, and the Commission should take for a
faster, more effective response to disasters and emergencies. In
particular, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work
with industry sectors, associations, and other organizations to
establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the communications industry
that would include developing formal business continuity plans,
conducting training exercises, developing suitable plans and
procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and equipment to
help in disaster response. We seek comment on these recommendations.
The Independent Panel recommends that we rely on checklists developed
by industry consensus groups, such as the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC). We seek comment on this recommendation, including
whether we should rely on the results of voluntary consensus
recommendations or instead rely on other measures. We invite parties to
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans. Are
the suggested elements presented by the Independent Panel adequate, or
are other elements useful or necessary? We seek comment on whether we
should adopt guidance or criteria for developing business continuity
plans, conducting exercises, developing and practicing communications
plans, or routinely archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-
site facilities.
9. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the awareness of
the public safety community in non-traditional emergency alternatives
through community education campaigns. We seek comment on this
recommendation and on other steps we can take within our jurisdiction
and statutory authority to assist the public safety community response
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of
specific Commission requirements. We invite comment on this suggestion.
Are there other areas where regulatory relief would be appropriate?
Should we establish specific thresholds or requirements in the
Commission's rules pertaining to demonstrations that should be made?
The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission coordinate
all federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times
of crisis. We seek comment on this recommendation and on the measures
the Commission can take within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction. Parties should address the appropriate content of
emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution, and related
issues. We seek comment on whether additional safeguards should be
implemented to address issues concerning potential disclosure of
sensitive infrastructure information or commercial information to avoid
potential harm to communications providers or others. Finally, we
invite comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the panel
that we could take within our statutory authority and jurisdiction to
[[Page 38567]]
improve or strengthen network resiliency and reliability.
10. We seek comment on whether and how the Commission can assist
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g.,
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, and so forth) with
developing communications plans for an emergency. We also seek comment
on whether the Commission should develop a hotline and/or Website to
assist these entities.
11. Recovery Coordination. The Independent Panel observed
significant challenges to maintenance and restoration of communications
services after Hurricane Katrina due in part to problems with access to
the affected area and key resources such as power and/or generator
fuel. The Independent Panel ``generally supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's) recommendation for a
national standard for credentialing telecommunications repair
workers.'' The Independent Panel advocates, however, expanding the
NSTAC's credentialing recommendations to include repair workers of all
communications infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, cable,
broadcasting, satellite). The Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and guidelines
to enable communications infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers to access affected areas post-disaster. The Independent Panel
also recommends that the Commission ``encourage states to develop and
implement a credentialing program consistent with [the NSTAC's
guidelines].'' We seek comment on these recommendations, including
measures the Commission can take within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
work with Congress and appropriate federal departments and agencies to
implement the NSTAC's recommendation that telecommunications
infrastructure providers should be afforded emergency responder status
under the Stafford Act and that this designation should be incorporated
into the National Response Plan and state and local emergency response
plans. The Independent Panel further recommends that the emergency
responder designation be expanded to include all communications
services providers (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable,
and broadcast media) and their contract workers. The Commission seeks
comment on these recommendations and on other steps we can take within
our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
12. The Independent Panel makes several recommendations related to
improving and enhancing communications and coordination among Federal,
state, and local authorities and the private sector. In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission ``should encourage,
but not require, each regional, state and local [Emergency Operating
Center (EOC)] and the [Joint Field Office (JFO)] to engage in the
following activities:
Facilitate coordination between communications
infrastructure providers and state and local emergency preparedness
officials;
Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for the
purposes of allocating communications infrastructure providers (and
their contractors and security teams) into disaster areas to perform
repairs;
Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure
providers;
Share information and coordinate resources to facilitate
repair of key communications infrastructure; and
Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of
priority lists for commercial power restoration.
We seek comment on these recommendations and on other measures the
Commission could take within its statutory authority and jurisdiction
to encourage other Federal agencies, state and local authorities, and
the private sector to address the Independent Panel's recommendations
in this regard.
13. In addition to recommending the Commission encourage other
governmental bodies to engage in these activities, the Independent
Panel notes its support for communications infrastructure providers
forming an industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating
recovery efforts, and other purposes. The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission work with the National Communications
System, an organization within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), to broaden the membership of the National Coordinating Center
for Telecommunications (NCC) to include representation of all types of
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and
other new technologies. We seek comment on these recommendations,
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National
Communications System coordination body. We seek comment on how the
Commission could best work within its own jurisdiction and statutory
authority to assist in promoting extensive, cross-jurisdictional
coordination. We also seek comment generally on how we can better
facilitate coordination during times of crisis.
14. The Independent Panel also recommended that the Commission work
with the DHS's National Communications System to promote the use of
existing priority communications services, such as Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Service (WPS), and
Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP). In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with the DHS's
National Communications System to promote WPS, GETS and TSP to all
eligible government, public safety, and critical industry groups. We
seek comment on how the Commission can address these recommendations
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction. Finally, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission create two Web sites
identifying: (1) The key state emergency management contacts and post-
disaster staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact
information for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster
response efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and
outage recovery. We seek comment on these recommendations.
15. First Responder Communications. The Independent Panel made
several recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of
public safety communications capabilities. As with other
recommendations, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission
encourage state and local authorities to take actions, and to assist in
supporting these efforts consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. For example, the Independent Panel recommended that the
Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and
maintain a cache of equipment components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public safety communications within hours
of a disaster. Such a cache of pre-positioned equipment would include
Radiofrequency (RF) gear (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) gateways,
dispatch consoles, etc), trailers, tower system components (e.g.,
antenna systems and
[[Page 38568]]
hydraulic masts), back-up power equipment, and fuel. We seek comment on
these recommendations. We invite parties to comment on the capabilities
and content of pre-positioned equipment, as well as the functionalities
most critical to support in the early stages of a crisis. The
Independent Panel Report also includes recommendations intended to
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications,
including a recommendation that the Commission encourage the
expeditious development of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz
systems and move promptly to review and approve such plans. The
Commission seeks comment on these recommendations, including how they
should be implemented within our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
16. The Independent Panel also made recommendations intended to
ensure a more robust 911 and E911 service. For example, the panel
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency
of the 911 and E911 architecture. In particular, the Independent Panel
recommends that service providers and network operators should consider
placing and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport
facilities and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power
capabilities (located on-site, when appropriate). The Independent Panel
further recommends that network operators should consider deploying
dual active 911 selective router architectures as a means for
eliminating single points of failure. The Independent Panel also
recommends that network operators, service providers, equipment
suppliers, and public safety authorities should establish alternative
methods of communication for critical personnel. We seek comment on how
the Commission can best encourage implementation of these
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction, and we welcome further suggestions on measures that could
be taken to strengthen 911 and E911 infrastructure and architecture.
17. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled. The Independent Panel also recommends
that the Commission work with other Federal agencies to enhance funding
for 911 enhancement and interoperability. The Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work to assist the emergency medical
community to facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of their
emergency communications system. The Independent Panel report includes
four recommendations regarding the emergency medical community, stating
that the Commission should, inter alia, educate the emergency medical
community about emergency communications and the various priority
communications services and help to coordinate this sector's emergency
communications efforts. We seek comment on how to address these
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. We also invite comment on what additional steps the
Commission can take within its statutory authority to assist the
emergency medical community enhance its disaster response capabilities.
18. Emergency Communications to the Public. The Independent Panel
report also includes recommendations intended to facilitate and
complement use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS), including
recommendations that the Commission educate state and local officials
about the existing EAS, its benefits, and how it can be utilized.
Further, the report recommends that the Commission develop a program
for educating the public about EAS and promote community awareness of
potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during power
outages or broadcast transmission failures. In order to ensure that all
Americans, including persons with disabilities and persons who do not
speak English, are able to receive emergency communications, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission: (1) Promptly find a
mechanism to resolve any technical hurdles in the current EAS to ensure
that persons with hearing or vision disabilities and persons who do not
speak English have equal access to public warnings; (2) work with the
various industry trade associations to create and publicize best
practices for serving persons with disabilities and persons who do not
speak English; and (3) encourage state and local government agencies
who provide emergency information to take steps to make critical
emergency information accessible to persons with disabilities and
persons who do not speak English. We seek comment on how to address
these recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. With respect to item (1), we note that the issue is the
subject of the Commission's ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding, and we
expect to address these and related issues in that proceeding.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
19. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this present Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the
policies and rules proposed in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the
deadlines for comments on the NPRM provided in section IV of the item.
The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including this IRFA, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
(SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be
published in the Federal Register.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
20. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf
Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plants
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service,
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
21. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Public Law 92-463, as amended. The mission of the Independent Panel was
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and
media infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane.
Specifically, the Independent Panel was to study the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on all
[[Page 38569]]
sectors of the telecommunications and media industries, including
public safety communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to
review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with
respect to the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was
tasked with making recommendations to the Commission, by June 15, 2006,
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability,
and communications among first responders such as police, fire
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
22. On June 12, 2006, the Independent Panel submitted its Report
and Recommendations. As explained in the NPRM, Congress has charged the
Commission with promoting the safety of life and property through the
use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, we have already
taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate and we will continue to
do so. The Independent Panel's report described the impact of the worst
natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as the overall public
and private response and recovery efforts. Our goal in this proceeding
is to take the lessons learned from this disaster and build upon them
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, as
well as heightened readiness and preparedness, in the future. To
accomplish this goal, we invite comment on what actions the Commission
can take to address the Independent Panel's recommendations.
23. As we note in the NPRM, in some cases, the Independent Panel
recommends action that require the Commission to modify its rules
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other cases, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission take actions that are
not dependent upon rulemakings, such as increased outreach and
education campaigns, or recommends measures that may not fall within
the Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction. In advocating
implementation of the Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters
should note what actions would fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction and what the Commission could do to
encourage the appropriate entities (e.g., states and local authorities)
to take action.
24. To speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends
that adoption of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network
reliability and resiliency. Specifically, the Independent Panel
recommends working with industry sectors, associations and other
organizations to establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the
communications industry that would include developing formal business
continuity plans, conducting training exercises, developing suitable
plans and procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and
equipment to help in disaster response. The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations. The Independent Panel also recommends that we rely on
checklists developed by industry consensus groups, such as the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security
and Reliability Council (MSRC). The NPRM seeks comment on this
recommendation, including whether we should rely on the results of
voluntary consensus recommendations or instead rely on other measures.
The NPRM also seeks comment on whether we should adopt guidance or
criteria for developing business continuity plans, conducting
exercises, developing and practicing communications plans, or routinely
archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-site facilities.
25. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the public
safety community's awareness of non-traditional emergency alternatives
through community education campaigns. The NPRM seeks comment on this
recommendation and other steps we can take within our jurisdiction and
statutory authority to assist the public safety community in responding
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of
specific Commission requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on this
suggestion. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission coordinate all federal outage and
infrastructure reporting requirements in times of crisis. In addition,
the NPRM seeks comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the
Panel that the Commission could take within our statutory authority and
jurisdiction to improve or strengthen network resiliency and
reliability.
26. As discussed in the NPRM, the Independent Panel generally
supports the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's
(NSTAC's) recommendation for a national standard for credentialing
telecommunications repair workers. The Independent Panel, however,
advocates expanding the NSTAC recommendations to include repair workers
of all communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and
government agencies to promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and guidelines to enable communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers to access affected areas post-
disaster. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
encourage states to develop and implement a credentialing program
consistent with the NSTAC guidelines. The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations as well as measures the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction.
27. The NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate
federal departments and agencies to implement the NSTAC's
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers should
be afforded emergency responder status under the Stafford Act and that
this designation should be incorporated into the National Response Plan
and state and local emergency response plans. With respect to this
proposal, the Independent Panel also recommends that the emergency
responder designation include all types of communications services.
28. In order to enable the communications industry and state and
local emergency officials to better coordinate their preparation for
and response to disasters affecting communications infrastructure, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with state and
local emergency officials and the communications industry to encourage
the formation of coordinating and planning bodies at the state or
regional level. As set forth in the NPRM, the Panel's recommendation
also lists activities that the Commission should encourage each state
or regional coordinating body to engage in. The NPRM seeks comment on
this recommendation and on the measures the Commission could take
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction to encourage other
Federal agencies, state and local authorities and the private sector to
address the Independent Panel's recommendations in this regard.
29. The Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with
the National Communications System (NCS) to broaden the membership of
the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications to include
representation from all types of
[[Page 38570]]
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and
other new technologies. The NPRM seeks comment on this recommendation,
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National
Communications System coordination body.
30. The NPRM seeks comment on several recommendations designed to
facilitate the use of existing priority communications services, such
as Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP),
all of which are administered by DHS's National Communications System.
In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission create two Web sites identifying:
(1) The key state emergency management contacts and post disaster
staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact information
for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster response
efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage
recovery.
31. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks comment on several
recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities. For example, it seeks comment on the
Panel's recommendation that the Commission encourage state and local
jurisdictions to retain and maintain a cache of equipment components
that would be needed to immediately restore existing public safety
communications within hours of a disaster. The NPRM also seeks comment
on a number of recommendations intended to facilitate interoperability
among first responder communications, including a recommendation that
the Commission encourage the expeditious development of regional plans
for the use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve
such plans.
32. Regarding 911 and E911 service, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency
of the 911 and E911 architecture. The Panel recommends that: (1)
Service providers and network operators consider placing and
maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport facilities
and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power capabilities
(located on-site, when appropriate); (2) network operators consider
deploying dual service 911 selective router architectures as a means
for eliminating single points of failure; and (3) network operators,
service providers, equipment suppliers, and public safety authorities
establish alternative methods of communication for critical personnel.
The NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
33. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends (1) the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled; (2) that the Commission work with
other federal agencies to enhance funding for 911 enhancement and
interoperability; and (3) that the Commission work to assist the
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and
effectiveness of their emergency communications system. The NPRM seeks
comment on these recommendations. In addition, the Independent Panel's
Report and Recommendations includes four recommendations regarding the
emergency medical community, stating that the Commission should, inter
alia, educate the emergency medical community about emergency
communications and the various priority communications services and
help to coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts. The
NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
34. Finally, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendations that the Commission: (1) Work with various industry
trade associations to create and publicize best practices for serving
persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak English; and (2)
encourage state and local government agencies to provide emergency
information to take steps to make critical emergency information
accessible to persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak
English.
Legal Basis
35. Authority for the actions proposed in this NPRM may be found in
sections 1, 4(i), 4(o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, (Act) 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(o), 303(r),
403 and 606.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules
Will Apply
36. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and,
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
37. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4 million
small businesses, according to SBA data. A ``small organization'' is
generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned
and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of
2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small organizations. The
term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as
``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts,
or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.''
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local
governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of
this total, 84,377 entities were ``small governmental jurisdictions.''
Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.
38. Television Broadcasting. The SBA has developed a small business
sized standard for television broadcasting, which consists of all such
firms having $13 million or less in annual receipts. Business concerns
included in this industry are those ``primarily engaged in broadcasting
images together with sound.'' According to Commission staff review of
the BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Television Analyzer Database
(BIA) on October 18, 2005, about 873 of the 1,307 commercial television
stations (or about 67 percent) have revenues of $12 million or less and
thus quality as small entities under the SBA definition. We note,
however, that, in assessing whether a business concern qualifies as
small under the above definition, business (control) affiliations must
be included. Our estimate, therefore, likely overstates the number of
small entities that might be affected by our action, because the
revenue figure on which it is based does not include or aggregate
revenues from affiliated companies. There are also 2,127 low power
television stations (LPTV). Given the nature of this service, we will
presume that all LPTV licensees qualify as small entities under the SBA
size standard.
[[Page 38571]]
39. Radio Stations. The proposed rules and policies potentially
will apply to all AM and commercial FM radio broadcasting licensees and
potential licensees. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting station that
has $6.5 million or less in annual receipts as a small business. A
radio broadcasting station is an establishment primarily engaged in
broadcasting aural programs by radio to the public. Included in this
industry are commercial, religious, educational, and other radio
stations. Radio broadcasting stations which primarily are engaged in
radio broadcasting and which produce radio program materials are
similarly included. However, radio stations that are separate
establishments and are primarily engaged in producing radio program
material are classified under another NAICS number. According to
Commission staff review of BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Radio
Analyzer Database on March 31, 2005, about 10,840 (95%) of 11,410
commercial radio stations have revenue of $6 million or less. We note,
however, that many radio stations are affiliated with much larger
corporations having much higher revenue. Our estimate, therefore,
likely overstates the number of small entities that might be affected
by our action.
40. Cable and Other Program Distribution. The Census Bureau defines
this category as follows: ``This industry comprises establishments
primarily engaged as third-party distribution systems for broadcast
programming. The establishments of this industry deliver visual, aural,
or textual programming received from cable networks, local television
stations, or radio networks to consumers via cable or direct-to-home
satellite systems on a subscription or fee basis. These establishments
do not generally originate programming material.'' The SBA has
developed a small business size standard for Cable and Other Program
Distribution, which is: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in
annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were a
total of 1,191 firms in this category that operated for the entire
year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10
million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than
$25 million. Thus, under this size standard, the majority of firms can
be considered small.
41. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed
its own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate
regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is
one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data
indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are
small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's
rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide,
6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379
systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size
standard, most cable systems are small.
42. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, also contains a size standard for small cable system
operators, which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an
affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity
or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed
$250,000,000.'' The Commission has determined that an operator serving
fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its
annual revenues, when combined with the total annual revenues of all
its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate. Industry
data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten
are small under this size standard. We note that the Commission neither
requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250
million, and therefore we are unable to estimate more accurately the
number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this
size standard.
43. Multipoint Distribution Systems. The established rules apply to
Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS) operated as part of a wireless
cable system. The Commission has defined ``small entity'' for purposes
of the auction of MDS frequencies as an entity that, together with its
affiliates, has average gross annual revenues that are not more than
$40 million for the preceding three calendar years. This definition of
small entity in the context of MDS auctions has been approved by the
SBA. The Commission completed its MDS auction in March 1996 for
authorizations in 493 basic trading areas. Of 67 winning bidders, 61
qualified as small entities. At this time, we estimate that of the 61
small business MDS auction winners, 48 remain small business licensees.
44. MDS also includes licensees of stations authorized prior to the
auction. As noted above, the SBA has developed a definition of small
entities for pay television services, cable and other subscription
programming, which includes all such companies generating $13.5 million
or less in annual receipts. This definition includes MDS and thus
applies to MDS licensees that did not participate in the MDS auction.
Information available to us indicates that there are approximately 392
incumbent MDS licensees that do not generate revenue in excess of $11
million annually. Therefore, we estimate that there are at least 440
(392 pre-auction plus 48 auction licensees) small MDS providers as
defined by the SBA and the Commission's auction rules which may be
affected by the rules adopted herein.
45. Instructional Television Fixed Service. The established rules
would also apply to Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)
facilities operated as part of a wireless cable system. The SBA
definition of small entities for pay television services also appears
to apply to ITFS. There are presently 2,032 ITFS licensees. All but 100
of these licenses are held by educational institutions. Educational
institutions are included in the definition of a small business.
However, we do not collect annual revenue data for ITFS licensees, and
are not able to ascertain how many of the 100 non-educational licensees
would be categorized as small under the SBA definition. Thus, we
tentatively conclude that at least 1,932 are small businesses and may
be affected by the established rules.
46. Wireless Service Providers. The SBA has developed a small
business size standard for wireless small businesses within the two
separate categories of Paging and Cellular and Other Wireless
Telecommunications. Under both SBA categories, a wireless business is
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data,
1,012 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of
wireless service. Of these 1,012 companies, an estimated 829 have 1,500
or fewer employees and 183 have more than 1,500 employees. This SBA
size standard also applies to wireless telephony. Wireless telephony
includes cellular, personal communications services, and specialized
mobile radio telephony carriers. According to the data, 437 carriers
reported that they were engaged in the provision of wireless telephony.
We have estimated that 260 of these are small businesses under the SBA
small business size standard.
47. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband
personal communications services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six
frequency blocks designated A
[[Page 38572]]
through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each block. The
Commission has created a small business size standard for Blocks C and
F as an entity that has average gross revenues of less than $40 million
in the three previous calendar years. For Block F, an additional small
business size standard for ``very small business'' was added and is
defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average
gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three
calendar years. These small business size standards, in the context of
broadband PCS auctions, have been approved by the SBA. No small
businesses within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid
successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning
bidders that qualified as small entities in the Block C auctions. A
total of 93 ``small'' and ``very small'' business bidders won
approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F.
On March 23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F Block
licenses; there were 113 small business winning bidders. On January 26,
2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and F Broadband PCS
licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in this auction,
29 qualified as ``small'' or ``very small'' businesses. Subsequent
events, concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency
determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being
available for grant.
48. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). We have
included small incumbent local exchange carriers in this present IRFA
analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one
that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard
(e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer
employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The
SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. We have therefore included
small incumbent local exchange carriers in this RFA analysis, although
we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses
and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts. Neither the Commission
nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically
for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate size standard
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 1,303 carriers have
reported that they are engaged in the provision of incumbent local
exchange services. Of these 1,303 carriers, an estimated 1,020 have
1,500 or fewer employees and 283 have more than 1,500 employees.
Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of incumbent
local exchange service are small businesses that may be affected by our
proposed rules.
49. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs),
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard
specifically for these service providers. The appropriate size standard
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 769 carriers have
reported that they are engaged in the provision of either competitive
access provider services or competitive local exchange carrier
services. Of these 769 carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 12
carriers have reported that they are ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and all 12 are estimated to have 1.500 or fewer employees.
In addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are ``Other Local
Service Providers.'' Of the 39, an estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and one has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange
service, competitive access providers, ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers'' are small entities
that may be affected by our proposed rules.
50. Satellite Telecommunications and Other Telecommunications.
There is no small business size standard developed specifically for
providers of satellite service. The appropriate size standards under
SBA rules are for the two broad census categories of ``Satellite
Telecommunications'' and ``Other Telecommunications.'' Under both
categories, such a business is small if it has $13.5 million or less in
average annual receipts.
51. The first category of Satellite Telecommunications ``comprises
establishments primarily engaged in providing point-to-point
telecommunications services to other establishments in the
telecommunications and broadcasting industries by forwarding and
receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or
reselling satellite telecommunications.'' For this category, Census
Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of 371 firms that
operated for the entire year. Of this total, 307 firms had annual
receipts of under $10 million, and 26 firms had receipts of $10 million
to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of
Satellite Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be
affected by our action.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
52. This NPRM contains proposals that may result in specific
reporting or recordkeeping requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on the
Independent Panel's recommendation that the Commission coordinate all
federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times of
crisis. Specifically, the NPRM seeks comment on the appropriate content
of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution and
related issues. The NPRM requests suggestions on the appropriate
content of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution
and related issues. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent
Panel's recommendation that the Commission establish a ``Readiness
Checklist'' for the communications industry that would include, inter
alia, developing formal business continuity plans. The NPRM requests
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans as well
as whether the Commission should adopt guidance or criteria for the
elements that would comprise the Readiness Checklist.
Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
53. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption
[[Page 38573]]
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.'' We invite comment on whether small entities should be
subject to different requirements if we adopt rules to promote more
effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, and whether
differentiating such requirements based on the size of the entities is
warranted. For example, should there be timing differences for
requirements imposed on small entities? Should small entities be
subject to different continuity of operations requirements?
Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
54. None.
Ex Parte Rules
These matters shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose''
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required. Other requirements
pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in Sec.
1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.
Ordering Clauses
55. It is ordered, that pursuant to sections 1, 4(i) and (o), 201,
303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i) and (o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 606, this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking Is hereby Adopted.
56. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Government Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, Shall Send a
copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Council for Advocacy of
the Small Business Administration.
Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Deputy Secretary.
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission
June 12, 2006.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
I. Panel Formation and Charge
II. Process and Activities of the Panel
PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON THE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
RECOVERY EFFORT
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of
Communications Networks
B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina
II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures
A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources
B. Coordination Between Industry and Government
C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs
III. First Responder Communications
A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures
B. Lack of Interoperability
C. PSAP Rerouting
D. Emergency Medical Communications
IV. Emergency Communications to the Public
A. Lack of Activation
B. Limitations on Coverage
C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities and Non-English Speaking
Americans
D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A: Members of the Independent Panel
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (``Katrina Panel'' or ``Panel'') hereby submits
its report to the Federal Communications Commission (``Commission'' or
``FCC''). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas
affected by the hurricane and making recommendations for improving
disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications among
first responders.
FINDINGS
Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the Gulf Coast
region, including its communications networks. The sheer force of this
deadly hurricane and the extensive flooding from the breached levees in
New Orleans severely tested the reliability and resiliency of the
communications infrastructure in the area. Indeed, every sector of the
communications industry was impacted by the storm. The Panel observed
that most of the region's communications infrastructure fared fairly
well through the storm's extreme wind and rain, with the coastal areas
suffering the worst damage. However, the unique conditions in Katrina's
aftermath--substantial flooding, widespread, extended power outages,
and serious security issues--were responsible for damaging or
disrupting communications service to a huge geographic area for a
prolonged period of time. Indeed, in reviewing the impact on each
communications sector, there appeared to be three main problems that
caused the majority of communications network interruptions: (1)
flooding; (2) lack of power and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant
pathways for communications traffic. In addition, a fourth item--
inadvertent line cuts during restoration--resulted in additional
network damage, causing new outages or delaying service restoration.
The Panel also observed significant impediments to the recovery
effort resulting from:
Inconsistent and unclear requirements for communications
infrastructure repair crews and their subcontractors to gain access to
the affected area;
Limited access to power and/or generator fuel;
Limited security for communications infrastructure and
personnel;
Lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment;
Lack of established coordination between the
communications industry and state and local officials as well as among
federal, state and local government officials with respect to
communications matters; and
Limited use of available priority communications services,
such as GETS, WPS and TSP.
On a more positive note, in the wake of the storm, lines of
communication between the communications industry and the federal
government were established and seemed generally effective in
facilitating coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief,
and gathering outage information. The FCC was widely praised as playing
a critical role in helping to restore communications connectivity. In
[[Page 38574]]
addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and equipment among
communications industry participants helped to maximize the assets
available and bolster the recovery effort. However, additional
coordination of personnel and assets within industry and among
government agencies could have substantially facilitated restoration of
communications networks.
With respect to emergency communications, Hurricane Katrina
significantly hampered the functionality of these typically resilient
systems. The areas in and around New Orleans were seriously impacted,
due to heavier storm impact and the levee flooding. As a result, more
than 2,000 police, fire and emergency medical service personnel were
forced to communicate in single channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing
only three mutual aid frequencies. This level of destruction did not
extend to inland areas, which generally did not lose their
communications capabilities and were soon operating at pre-Katrina
capabilities. In the hardest hit areas, however, the disruption of
public safety communications operability, as well as a lack of
interoperability, frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous
confusion among official personnel and the general public.
The Panel observed that lack of effective first responder
communications after the storm revealed inadequate planning,
coordination and training on the use of technologies that can help to
restore emergency communications. Very few public safety agencies had
stockpiles of key equipment on hand to implement rapid repairs or
alternative, redundant systems to turn to when their primary systems
failed. To the extent alternative systems were available, lack of
training and familiarity with the equipment limited functionality and
impeded the recovery effort. Communications assets that could have been
used to fill gaps were apparently not requested or deployed in
sufficient quantities to have a significant impact. Hurricane Katrina
also highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability among
public safety communications systems operating in different frequency
bands and with different technical standards. Additionally, 911
emergency call handling suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing
of calls to PSAPs not incapacitated by the hurricane. Finally, the
emergency medical community seemed lacking in contingency
communications planning and information about technologies and services
that might address their critical communications needs.
The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable
emergency information to the public is critical--before, during and
after such events. While the Panel understands that the National
Weather Service used the Emergency Alert System (``EAS'') to provide
severe weather warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of
Katrina making landfall, the system was apparently not utilized by
state and local officials to provide localized emergency evacuation and
other important information. In the absence of EAS activation,
inconsistent or erroneous information was sometimes provided within the
affected area. Further, the Panel heard about notification technologies
that may permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and wireless
telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile
devices, thus complementing the traditional broadcast-based EAS.
Ensuring emergency communications reach Americans with hearing or
visual disabilities or who do not speak English was a major challenge.
Although the broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide
on-screen sign language interpreters, closed captioning, and critical
information in a second language, these steps were reported to be
insufficient in certain instances. Shelters also generally did not have
communications capabilities for those with hearing or speech
disabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on communications networks and the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a number
of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness,
network reliability and communications among first responders. These
recommendations fall within four basic areas:
[rtrif] Pre-positioning the communications industry and the
government for disasters in order to achieve greater network
reliability and resiliency. These recommendations include:
Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry--A
Readiness Checklist. The FCC should work with and encourage each
industry sector, through their organizations or associations, to
develop and publicize sector-specific readiness recommendations.
Pre-positioning for Public Safety--An Awareness Program
for Non-Traditional Emergency Alternatives. The FCC should take steps
to educate the public safety community about the availability and
capabilities of non-traditional technologies that might provide
effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications
systems.
Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements--An A
Priori Program for Disaster Areas. The FCC should explore amending its
rules to permit automatic grants of certain types of waivers or special
temporary authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if the
President declares that area to be a ``disaster area''.
Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring--A Single
Repository and Contact with Consistent Data Collection. The FCC should
coordinate with other federal and state agencies to identify a single
repository/point of contact for communications outage information in
the wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is the
Federal agency best situated to perform this function.
[rtrif] Improving recovery coordination to address existing
shortcomings and to maximize the use of existing resources. These
recommendations include:
Remedying Existing Shortcomings--National Credentialing
Guidelines for Communications Infrastructure Providers. The FCC should
work with other appropriate federal departments and agencies and the
communications industry to promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and process guidelines for enabling communications
infrastructure providers and their contracted workers access to the
affected area post-disaster.
Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Emergency Responder
Status for Communications Infrastructure Providers. The Panel supports
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's
(``NSTAC's'') recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers be afforded emergency responder
status under the Stafford Act, but recommends that it be broadened to
include all communications infrastructure providers.
Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Utilization of State/
Regional Coordination Bodies. The FCC should work with state and local
government and the communications industry (including wireline,
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local Emergency
Operations Centers, as well as the Joint Field Office.
Maximizing Existing Resources--Expanding and Publicizing
Emergency
[[Page 38575]]
Communications Programs (GETS, WPS, and TSP). The FCC should work with
the National Communications System (``NCS'') to actively and
aggressively promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible government,
public safety, and critical industry groups.
Maximizing Existing Resources--Broadening NCC to Include
All Communications Infrastructure Sectors. The FCC should work with the
NCS to broaden the membership of the National Coordination Center for
Telecommunications (``NCC'') to include adequate representation of all
types of communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite
and other new technologies, as appropriate.
Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency
Coordination Information. The FCC should create a password-protected
Web site, accessible by credentialed entities, listing the key state
emergency management contacts, as well as post-disaster coordination
areas for communications providers.
Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency
Response Team Information. The FCC should create a Web site to
publicize the agency's emergency response team's contact information
and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage recovery.
[rtrif] Improving the operability and interoperability of public
safety and 911 communications in times of crisis. These recommendations
include:
Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and
Personnel--An Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives
Inventory. The FCC should encourage state and local jurisdictions to
retain and maintain, including through arrangements with the private
sector, a cache of equipment components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public safety communications. The FCC
should also work with the NCC to develop inventories of alternative
communications assets.
Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications
Capabilities--Facilitating First Responder Interoperability. The FCC
should take several steps to facilitate interoperability among first
responder communications, including maintaining the schedule for
commercial spectrum auctions to fund the federal public safety grant
programs; working with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (``NTIA'') and the Department of Homeland Security
(``DHS'') to establish appropriate criteria for these grants;
encouraging the expeditious development and approval of 700 MHz
regional plans; working with NTIA and DHS to develop spectrum sharing
among federal, state and local agencies for emergency response
purposes; and publicizing interoperability successes and best
practices.
Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned--A
Plan for Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and Public
Safety Answering Points (``PSAPs''). The FCC should encourage
implementation of certain Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council (``NRIC'') best practice recommendations to ensure more robust
E-911 service. In addition, the FCC should recommend and take steps to
permit the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP more than 200 miles
away, as well as urge applicable federal programs to expand eligibility
for 911 enhancement/interoperability grants.
Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning
Emergency Medical and Hospital Communications Needs--An Outreach
Program to Educate and Include the Emergency Medical Community in
Emergency Communications Preparedness. The FCC should work to assist
the emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems through
education and clarification of Stafford Act classification and funding
eligibility.
[rtrif] Improving communication of emergency information to the
public. These recommendations include:
Actions to Alert and Inform--Revitalize and Publicize the
Underutilized Emergency Alert System. The FCC should revitalize and
publicize the underutilized EAS through education and the exploration
of complementary notification technologies.
Actions to Alert and Inform--Commence Efforts to Ensure
that Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans
Receive Meaningful Alerts. The FCC should commence efforts to ensure
that persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans
receive meaningful alerts, including resolving technical hurdles to
these individual's utilization of EAS, publicizing best practices for
serving these individuals, and encouraging state and local emergency
agencies to make critical emergency information accessible to persons
with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
Actions to Alert and Inform--Ensure Consistent and
Reliable Emergency Information Through a Consolidated and Coordinated
Public Information Program. The FCC should work with federal, state and
local agencies to ensure consistent and reliable emergency information
through a consolidated and coordinated public information program.
* * * * *
The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for
their actions to assist industry and first responders before, during
and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this Panel to identify
steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The
Panel hopes that its observations and recommendations prove useful to
the Commission and assist our Nation in preparing for and responding to
future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lay ahead for us.
INTRODUCTION
The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (``Katrina Panel'' or ``Panel'') hereby submits
its report to the Federal Communications Commission (``Commission'' or
``FCC''). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure\1\ in the
areas affected by the hurricane. As directed by the Commission, this
report presents the Panel's findings as well as recommendations for
improving disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications
among first responders.
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\1\ Throughout this report, the terms ``communications
infrastructure'' and ``communications networks'' are intended to
refer to both telecommunications (e.g., telephony, wireless,
satellite, WISP) and media (e.g., radio, television, cable)
infrastructure. ``Communications providers'' is intended to refer to
the operators of these networks.
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I. Panel Formation and Charge
On September 15, 2005, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin announced that
he would establish an independent expert panel to review the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on the communications infrastructure.\2\ Chairman
Martin made the announcement at the FCC's Open Meeting focusing on the
effects of Hurricane Katrina, which was held in
[[Page 38576]]
Atlanta, Georgia. He stated that the Panel would be composed of public
safety and communications industry representatives.\3\ The twenty-seven
members of the Panel, reflecting that diverse composition, are
identified in Appendix A. Chairman Martin appointed Nancy J. Victory of
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, the former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Communications and Information and Administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, to chair the
Panel.\4\
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\2\ Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, Open Meeting on the Effects of Hurricane
Katrina, Atlanta, GA, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261095A1.pdf
[hereinafter ``Martin Sept. 15 Statement'']; see also FCC Takes
Steps to Assist in Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief, 2005 FCC LEXIS
5109 (rel. Sept. 15, 2005) (Commission news release).
\3\ Martin Sept. 15 Statement at 3.
\4\ Chairman Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J. Victory as Chair of
the Federal Communication Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing
the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 2005 FCC
LEXIS 6514 (rel. Nov. 28, 2005) (Commission news release).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In accordance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, the FCC published a notice announcing the establishment
of the Katrina Panel in the Federal Register on January 6, 2006.\5\ The
Panel's charter details the Katrina Panel's objectives and the scope of
its activity.\6\ Specifically, the Charter directs the Panel:
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\5\ See Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 933 (Jan. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/hkipnoe.pdf. Access to the public
comments filed with and notices generated by the Katrina Panel
(unless otherwise noted with a URL designation in the citations
which follow) is through the Panel's website, available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/
.
\6\ See FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, Charter (filed Jan. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf.
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To study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of
the telecommunications and media industries, including public safety
communications;
To review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery effort with respect to this infrastructure; and
To make recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability,
and communication among first responders such as police, fire fighters,
and emergency medical personnel.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id. at 1-2.
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Pursuant to the Charter, the Panel became operational on January 9,
2006. The Charter also provides that the Panel will terminate on June
15, 2006 and must carry out its duties before that date.
II. Process and Activities of the Panel
In order to gather information to fulfill the directives of its
Charter, the Panel called upon the experiences of its members, many of
whom were directly involved in the recovery efforts following Hurricane
Katrina. The Panel also solicited broad public input by providing
processes by which interested parties could submit written comments\8\
and provide oral presentations.\9\ The Panel additionally invited
certain experts to present to the Panel or demonstrate new technologies
and applications. The written comments received by the Panel, as well
as transcripts of the Panel's meetings, are publicly available at the
FCC's Public Reference Room and on the Panel's website. Finally, the
Panel also reviewed publicly available information regarding matters
under the Panel's consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal
Advisory Committee Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Notice of opportunity
to provide oral presentations, 71 Fed. Reg. 5846 (Feb. 3, 2006),
available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-1057.pdf
.
\9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel met five times to hear oral presentations, to discuss
draft findings and recommendations, and to finalize and approve this
report. Those meetings occurred on January 30, March 6-7, April 18, May
12, and June 9, 2006. The March 6-7 meeting was held in Jackson,
Mississippi, where the Panel was able to hear oral presentations by
interested parties. All other meetings of the Panel occurred in
Washington, DC. All of these meetings were public, with prior notice of
their date, time and location provided to the public.\10\
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\10\ See, e.g., Notice of Appointment Of Members To Serve On
Federal Communications Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing The
Impact Of Hurricane Katrina On Communications Networks; And
Independent Panel's First Meeting Scheduled For January 30, 2006,
Public Notice, 21 FCC Rcd 197 (2006). The Commission also published
notices in the Federal Register announcing Panel meetings. See,
e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory Committee
Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Notice of public meeting, 71 Fed. Reg. 2233
(Jan. 13, 2006). The Panel's website at &fnl;http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/Meetings.html
contains more information about meeting notices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel formed informal working groups (``IWGs''), made up of
small numbers of Panel members, to help it effectively review and
process the necessary information within the time required. The working
groups met numerous times in person and telephonically during the
Panel's existence. These working groups were not decision-making
bodies. Rather, they compiled and sorted information in particular
issue areas for presentation to the full Panel. The Panel had three
informal working groups:
IWG-1: Infrastructure Resiliency. This working group
focused its discussions and efforts on four main areas: (1) Reviewing
how and why certain portions of the communications networks failed; (2)
identifying which portions of the communications networks continued to
work and withstood the hurricane and why; (3) examining how
communications technology can be made less vulnerable to failing; and
(4) studying what steps can be taken, pre-event, to strengthen the
communications infrastructure. Marion Scott, Vice President--
Operations, CenturyTel, served as the Chair of this working group and
Steve Dean, Fire Chief of Mobile, Alabama, served as Vice-Chair.
IWG-2: Recovery Coordination and Procedures. This working
group focused on seven main issues: (1) Examining ways to increase the
speed with which communications networks can be restored post-event;
(2) reviewing whether communications technology could have been used
more effectively during the recovery period, including issues relating
to consumer education and post-event deployment of communications
technology; (3) reviewing the intra-industry procedures that
communications providers use to coordinate recovery efforts; (4)
reviewing the industry-government procedures that private
communications firms and federal, state and local governments use to
coordinate recovery efforts; (5) studying ways that private industry
can obtain faster and more efficient access to impacted areas; (6)
reviewing the security and protection procedures utilized by private
communications industry members when they send their first responders
to impacted areas; and (7) reviewing how well emergency communications
services, including Telecommunications Service Priority, Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service, and Wireless Priority Service,
performed during Katrina and the extent to which emergency responders
used these services. Steve Davis, Senior Vice President--Engineering,
Clear Channel Radio, served as the Chair of this working group and Lt.
Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police,
served as Vice-Chair.
IWG-3: Emergency Communications. This working group
focused on six main issues: (1) Identifying means for ensuring or
enabling rapid deployment of interoperable communications in the wake
of an event like Hurricane Katrina that can be implemented in the short
term; (2) identifying any coordination that needs to occur among public
safety entities to facilitate implementation of
[[Page 38577]]
such a system in the wake of a disaster; (3) reviewing Hurricane
Katrina's impact on the Gulf Coast Region's 911 and E-911 systems; (4)
reviewing the impact of the hurricane on PSAPs and the procedures used
to re-route emergency calls; (5) examining whether and how the
communications networks could have provided greater 911 connectivity
for private citizens; and (6) reviewing the adequacy of emergency
communications to the public before, during and after the hurricane,
and the best ways to alert and inform the public about emergencies in
the future. Steve Delahousey, Vice President--Operations, American
Medical Response, served as the Chair of this working group and Jim
Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group, served as Vice-Chair.
Typically, discussion about various findings and recommendations
occurred first within the working groups. The working groups then
presented draft findings and recommendations to the full Panel for
further discussion. Certain issues were referred back to the working
groups for additional discussion and revision.
The Panel held its final meeting on June 9, 2006. During this
meeting, the Panel discussed the final draft report, including
recommendations to the Commission. The Panel then unanimously approved
this report for submission to the Commission.\11\
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\11\ The Panel would like to recognize and express appreciation
to Lisa Fowlkes and Jean Ann Collins, the Designated and Alternate
Designated FACA Officers for the Panel, for their important
contributions in enabling the Panel to carry out its mission under
the Charter. In addition, the Panel would like to thank Michael A.
Lewis, Thomas Dombrowsky, and Brendan T. Carr of Wiley Rein &
Fielding LLP for their considerable assistance in preparing this
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON THE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
RECOVERY EFFORT
The Katrina Panel has been charged with studying the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the telecommunications and media
industries, including public safety communications. The Panel has also
been directed to review the effectiveness of the recovery effort with
respect to this infrastructure. To inform its views on these issues,
the Panel heard oral presentations and reviewed written comments from
numerous government and industry representatives, as well as other
interested members of the public. The Panel members also brought to
bear their own experiences with Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. As
a result of digesting and discussing all of this information, the Panel
members identified a number of areas where problems were observed or
communications recovery and restoration efforts could have been more
effective. The Panel also identified areas where successes were
achieved--successes that should be repeated. These observed problems
and successes, which are detailed below, generally formed the basis for
the Panel's recommendations to the Commission.
The Panel's observations below are divided into four sections.
Section I, Network Reliability and Resiliency, discusses the successes
and failures in the resiliency and reliability of various types of
communications networks from an operational perspective. This section
looks at the effects of both the hurricane itself and the subsequent
levee breaches on communications infrastructure. Section II, Recovery
Coordination and Procedures, reviews the challenges communications
infrastructure providers encountered in restoring and maintaining
communications service, particularly with regard to access and
credentialing issues, restoration of power, and security. Section III,
First Responder Communications, examines the challenges posed to public
safety and emergency first responders in the days following Hurricane
Katrina. And finally Section IV, Emergency Communication to the Public,
focuses on the adequacy and effectiveness of emergency communications
to the public before, during and after Hurricane Katrina.
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the extensive flooding
resulting from the breached levees severely tested the reliability and
resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. Katrina
also affected areas of the Gulf Coast in varied fashions. In the high
impact zones near Gulfport, MS and New Orleans, LA, the hurricane
created much heavier damage to the infrastructure due to strong winds
and, in New Orleans, extensive flooding in the days after the storm. In
less impacted areas, damage was less severe and recovery efforts were
more easily accomplished. Katrina taxed each type of communications
infrastructure in a variety of ways: (1) strong winds and rain made it
difficult for technical staff to support and maintain the networks and
blew antennas out of alignment; (2) heavy flooding following Katrina
overwhelmed a large portion of the communications infrastructure,
damaging equipment and impeding recovery; (3) single points of failure
in vital communications links led to widespread communications outages
across a variety of networks; and (4) the duration of power outages far
outlasted most generator fuel reserves, leading to the failure of
otherwise functional infrastructure. However, there were resiliency
successes in the aftermath: (1) a large portion of the communications
infrastructure withstood the storm's wind and rain with only minor
damage (as distinguished from post-storm flooding from levee breaches
and power outages, which had a more devastating impact); (2) satellite
networks, although taxed by extensive numbers of additional users,
remained available and usable throughout the affected region; and (3)
the communications networks operated by utilities appeared to have a
very high rate of survivability. By examining the failures in network
resiliency and reliability, along with the successes, we can better
prepare communications infrastructure to withstand or quickly recover
from future catastrophic events.
A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of Communications
Networks
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath had a devastating impact on
communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. In the affected areas
of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, more than three million customer
telephone lines were knocked out of service. Both switching centers and
customer lines sustained damage. Thirty-eight 911 call centers went
down. Approximately 100 broadcast stations were unable to transmit and
hundreds of thousands of cable customers lost service.\12\ Even
generally resilient public safety networks experienced massive outages.
In short, Katrina had a catastrophic impact over a huge geographic
area. Further, due to the unique circumstances associated with this
disaster, repair and activation of the communications infrastructure in
the region was not a matter of days, but rather a long and slow
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, Hearing on Public Safety Communications
from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at 2
(Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261417A1.pdf
[hereinafter ``Martin Sept. 29
Written Statement''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To understand the precise impact that Hurricane Katrina had on
communications networks, it is useful to distinguish between the impact
of the
[[Page 38578]]
storm itself (i.e., hurricane force winds and rain) and the effect of
what came later--extensive flooding from breached levees and
widespread, long term power outages. As detailed below, it appears that
most communications infrastructure in the areas impacted by Katrina
fared fairly well through the storm's wind and rain, in most cases
sustaining only minor damage or damage that should have been promptly
repairable. Indeed, the tower industry reported that of all the towers
in the path of the 2005 hurricanes in the Southeastern and Gulf Coast
areas of the United States, less than 1 percent suffered any structural
damage.\13\ The coastal areas that bore the brunt of the storm suffered
the worst infrastructure damage from the hurricane. Not to diminish the
significant impact of the hurricane itself, what made Katrina unique
and particularly catastrophic were the unique conditions after the
winds subsided--substantial flooding and widespread, extended power
outages. These developments impacted communications networks greatly,
causing irreparable damage to submerged electronics and prolonged
outages in many cases. The Panel's observations on how each type of
communications infrastructure withstood Katrina and its challenging
aftermath is presented below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Comments of PCIA--The Wireless Infrastructure
Association, at 1 (May 15, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Public Safety Communications Networks. Public safety
communications networks are generally built to be reliable in extreme
conditions.\14\ To ensure this, the systems are planned to accommodate
everyday peak service times as well as large incidents. They are also
designed to account for radio system disruptions, such as power
outages, transmission failures, system interconnect failures, and
personal radio equipment failures. However, these systems are generally
not designed for widespread catastrophes of long duration--the
situation resulting from Katrina.\15\ As a result of the storm and its
aftermath, public safety networks in the Gulf states experienced a
large number of transmission outages that impacted the functionality of
both primary and back-up systems. The loss of power and the failure of
switches in the wireline telephone network also had a huge impact on
the ability of public safety systems to function.\16\ Public safety
personnel's apparent lack of familiarity with the operation of back-up
or alternate systems (such as satellite systems) also limited
functionality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Chief Harlin R. McEwen,
Chairman, Communications and Technology Committee, International
Association of Chiefs of Police, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
``McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement''].
\15\ Id. at 4.
\16\ See id. at 6.
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a. Tower Failures. In general, public safety's antenna towers
remained standing after the storm. The winds did blow antennas out of
alignment, requiring readjustment. However, the main cause of
transmission failures was loss of power (as discussed below). Most
public safety radio systems by design are able to handle and manage a
single or isolated subsystem failure or loss.\17\ However, Katrina
affected parts of four states, causing transmission losses at a much
greater number and over a larger area than public safety planning had
envisioned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Power Failures. Power for radio base stations and battery/
chargers for portable radio devices are carefully planned for public
safety systems. However, generators are typically designed to keep base
stations operating for 24 to 48 hours. The long duration of power
outages in the wake of Katrina substantially exceeded the capabilities
of most of public safety's back-up generators and fuel reserves.\18\
Similarly, portable radios and back-up batteries generally have an 8 to
10 hour duty cycle.\19\ Without access to power to recharge the devices
and backup batteries, portable devices quickly ran out of power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See id.
\19\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Wireline and Network Infrastructure Failures. Katrina and the
subsequent levee breaches caused significant failures of the Public
Switched Telephone Network (``PSTN''), particularly in the New Orleans
area.\20\ Public safety radio networks rely on interconnection with the
PSTN or by fixed microwave links to get communications through to
public safety responders. Given PSTN failures, as well as damage to
fixed microwave links, public safety communications were significantly
affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Training Issues. Because of failures of the primary public
safety networks, public safety personnel had to utilize back-up or
alternative communications technologies with which they may not have
had substantial experience. Confusion or unfamiliarity with the
capabilities or operational requirements of the alternative technology
seemed to result in limitations in functionality.\21\ For example, some
public safety personnel handed satellite phones were not familiar with
their special dialing requirements and, as a result, thought the phones
did not work.\22\ Public safety personnel did not seem to have adequate
training on alternative communications technologies, such as paging,
satellite, license-exempt WISP systems, and thus were not able to
transition seamlessly to these alternatives when existing public safety
communications networks failed. Additionally, because alternative
technologies were used so infrequently, there were reported problems
with upkeep and maintenance of the equipment.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Sandy Bogucki, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Tr. at 54-55 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
\22\ Written Testimony of David Cavossa, Executive Director,
Satellite Industry Association, Before the FCC's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony'']; Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 55.
\23\ See Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.
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2. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). Handling of 911 calls
was identified as a problem during Katrina. As a result of the storm
and subsequent flooding, thirty-eight 911 call centers ceased to
function.\24\ Limited training and advanced planning on how to handle
rerouting of emergency calls under this situation created serious
problems.\25\ As an example, the City of Biloxi was able to relocate
their 911 call center prior to landfall; however, representatives
relocated to the facility did not have full 911 capabilities. This
severely hampered their ability to effectively route 911 calls to the
appropriate agencies. The Katrina experience identified that there
appeared to be a lack of 911 PSAP failovers and some deficits in
training on routing and handling of calls when a crisis and rerouting
occurs. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 911 call centers, especially
in the less impacted portions of the region, were up and running by
September 9.\26\
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\24\ See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
\25\ See, e.g., Comments of Comcare at 2 (May 11, 2006) (there
was no plan to bring in additional telecommunicators to the region
to keep up with the influx of 911 calls from victims and rescue
response teams).
\26\ See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 27.
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3. Wireline. According to FCC data, more than 3 million customer
phone lines were knocked out in the Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama
area following Hurricane Katrina.\27\ The wireline
[[Page 38579]]
telephone network sustained significant damage both to the switching
centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect buildings and
customers to the network.\28\ Katrina highlighted the dependence on
tandems and tandem access to SS7 switches.\29\ The high volume routes
from tandem switches, especially in and around New Orleans were
especially critical and vulnerable. Katrina highlighted the need for
diversity of call routing and avoiding strict reliance upon a single
routing solution. One tandem switch, which was critical for 911 call
routing, was lost from September 4 to September 21. This switch went
down due to flooding that did not allow for fuel to be replenished. Due
to the high winds and severe flooding, there were multiple breaks in
the fiber network supporting the PSTN. Katrina demonstrated that in
many areas there may be a lack of multiple fiber routes throughout the
wireline network and that aerial fiber was more at risk than
underground fiber. As with other private sector communications
providers, lack of access to facilities (due to both flooding and
inadequate credentialing), lack of commercial power, and lack of
security greatly hampered recovery efforts. Nevertheless, ten days
after Katrina, nearly 90 percent of wireline customers in the Gulf
region who had lost service had their service restored.\30\ However,
the vast majority of these customers were in the less impacted regions
of the Gulf; regions that were harder hit sustained more infrastructure
damage and continued to have difficulty in restoring service.
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\27\ See Written Statement of Kenneth P. Moran, Director, Office
of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, on Hurricane Katrina,
Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260895A1.pdf
[hereinafter ``Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement''].
\28\ Id. at 2-3.
\29\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Woody Glover, Director, St.
Tammany Parish Communications District, Tr. at 64-67 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
\30\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 43.
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4. Cellular/PCS. Local cellular and personal communications service
(``PCS'') networks received considerable damage with more than 1,000
base station sites impacted.\31\ In general, cellular/PCS base stations
were not destroyed by Katrina, although some antennas required
adjustment after the storm. Rather, the majority of the adverse effects
and outages encountered by wireless providers were due to a lack of
commercial power or a lack of transport connectivity to the wireless
switch (wireline T1 line lost or fixed microwave backhaul offline). The
transport connectivity is generally provided by the local exchange
carrier. With either failure, wireless providers would be required to
make a site visit to return the base station to operational status.
Wireless providers cited security for their personnel, access and fuel
as the most pressing needs and problems affecting restoration of
wireless service. However, within one week after Katrina, approximately
80 percent of wireless cell sites were up and running.\32\ Consistent
with other systems, the 20 percent of base stations still affected were
in the areas most impacted by Katrina. Cellular base stations on wheels
(``COWs'') were successfully used as needed to restore service
throughout the affected region. Over 100 COWs were delivered to the
Gulf Coast region.\33\ In addition to voice services, text messaging
was used successfully during the crisis and appeared to offer
communications when the voice networks became overloaded with traffic.
Additionally, wireless providers' push-to-talk services appeared to be
more resilient than interconnected voice service inasmuch as they do
not necessarily rely upon connectivity to the PSTN.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
\32\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 44.
\33\ S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, 109th
Cong., Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared at 18-4, May
2006, available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter ``Senate Report on Katrina''].
\34\ See Written Testimony of Dave Flessas, VP, Network
Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp, Before the FCC's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Sprint Nextel Jan. 30 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Paging. Paging systems seemed more reliable in some instances
than voice/cellular systems because paging systems utilize satellite
networks, rather than terrestrial systems, for backbone
infrastructure.\35\ Paging technology is also inherently redundant,
which means that messages may still be relayed if a single transmitter
or group of transmitters in a network fails.\36\ Paging signals
penetrate buildings very well, thus providing an added level of
reliability.\37\ Additionally, pagers benefited from having a long
battery life and thus remained operating longer during the power
outages.\38\ Other positive observations concerning paging systems
included that they were effective at text messaging and were equipped
to provide broadcast messaging.\39\ Finally, although it is unclear
whether this function was utilized, group pages can be sent out during
times of emergencies to alert thousands of pager units all at the same
time.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See, e.g., Written Testimony of Vincent D. Kelly, President
and Chief Executive Officer, USA Mobility, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 7
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6
Written Testimony'']; Oral Testimony of Bruce Deer, President,
American Association of Paging Carriers, Tr. at 122-123 (Mar. 6,
2006) [hereinafter ``Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
\36\ See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written
Testimony at 7-8.
\37\ Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.
\38\ Id.
\39\ See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written
Testimony at 3.
\40\ See, e.g., Comments of Interstate Wireless, Inc., at 1 (May
10, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Satellite. Satellite networks appeared to be the communications
service least disrupted by Hurricane Katrina.\41\ As these networks do
not heavily depend upon terrestrial-based infrastructure, they are
typically not affected by wind, rain, flooding or power outages.\42\ As
a result, both fixed and mobile satellite systems provided a
functional, alternative communications path for those in the storm-
ravaged region.\43\ Mobile satellite operators reported large increases
in satellite traffic without any particular network/infrastructure
issues.\44\ More than 20,000 satellite phones were deployed to the Gulf
Coast region in the days following Katrina.\45\ Broadband capacity
[[Page 38580]]
was provided by fixed satellite operators for voice, video and data
network applications. Nevertheless, there were functionality issues
with satellite communications - largely due to lack of user training
and equipment preparation.\46\ Some satellite phones require
specialized dialing in order to place a call. They also require line of
sight with the satellite and thus do not generally work indoors.\47\
Users who had not been trained or used a satellite phone prior to
Katrina reported frustration and difficulty in rapid and effective use
of these devices.\48\ Satellite phones also require charged batteries.
Handsets that were not charged and ready to go were of no use as there
was often no power to recharge handsets. Additionally, most of
Louisiana's parishes (all but three) did not have satellite phones on
hand because they had previously chosen to discontinue their service as
a cost-saving measure.\49\ Finally, users expressed the observation
that satellite data networks (replacing wireline T1 service) were more
robust and had fewer difficulties in obtaining and maintaining
communications with the satellite network than voice services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See, e.g., Comments of Globalstar LLC, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Globalstar Comments''].
\42\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (``satellite
phones do not rely on terrestrial * * * infrastructure that is
necessary for land mobile radio, land-line, and cellular
communications''); Written Statement of Tony Trujillo, Chairman,
Satellite Industry Association, Hearing on Public Safety
Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons,
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/09292005Hearing1648/Trujillo.pdf
[hereinafter ``Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement''].
\43\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy
Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the
State of Louisiana, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
United States House of Representatives, at 12 (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearing/12-14-05/smith_121405.doc
[hereinafter ``Jeff Smith Written Statement'']; Written
Statement of Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama State Emergency
Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by
the State of Alabama, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
United States House of Representatives, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2005),
available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/11_09_05/baughman_110905.doc
; Written Statement of Robert Latham, Director,
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina:
Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Before the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House of
Representatives, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_07_05/latham_120705.pdf
.
\44\ Globalstar Comments at 2.
\45\ Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 4.
\46\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (problems with
satellite phones do not appear to have been caused by the phones
themselves or the satellite networks; a combination of user error
and obstruction of satellite signals were most likely the problems);
Cavossa-SIA Testimony at 4-5; Bogucki Mar. 6 Public Testimony, Tr.
at 55.
\47\ Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 5.
\48\ Id. at 4.
\49\ See Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 172-73 (2006), available at http://www.gpo.access.gov/serialset/creports/Katrina.html
, [hereinafter
``House Report''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Broadcasting. The television and radio broadcasting industry was
also hard hit by Katrina. Approximately 28 percent of television
stations experienced downtime in the storm zone; approximately 35
percent of radio stations failed in one fashion or another.\50\ In
addition, in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only 4 of the 41
broadcast radio stations remained on the air in the wake of the
hurricane.\51\ Some broadcasters continued broadcasting only by
partnering with other broadcasters whose signals were not
interrupted.\52\ Broadcasters reported very few tower losses as a
result of Katrina. Instead, the wind displacing and causing misaligning
antennas was the biggest cause of broadcast outages. Although this type
of damage could be readily repaired, the lengthy power outages--which
substantially exceeded back-up generator capabilities--prevented many
broadcast stations from coming back on the air. Power outages at the
viewer/listener end were also an issue as they prevented broadcast
transmissions from being successfully received. Additionally, the lack
of security for broadcast facilities and repair personnel impeded
recovery efforts. Nevertheless, within three weeks after Katrina, more
than 90 percent of broadcasters were up and running in the affected
region.\53\ However, in the areas most impacted by the storm, the vast
majority of stations remained down much longer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45; Written
Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission, Hearing on Communications in a Disaster, Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation at 2 (Sept.
22, 2005) (an estimated 100 broadcast stations were knocked off the
air).
\51\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
\52\ Oral Testimony of Dave Vincent, Station Manager, WLOX-TV,
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at 309 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''] (WLOX in
Biloxi partnered with WXXV in Gulfport, Mississippi, which carried
WLOX's signal until they could get back on the air).
\53\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Cable. As with the broadcasting industry, cable companies in the
region reported limited infrastructure damage to their head ends
following Katrina. In the areas hardest hit by the storm itself, aerial
cable infrastructure was heavily damaged. Some cable facilities are
underground; the storm's wind and rain had only minimal effects on
them. However, the opposite was true in areas where the levees' breach
caused heavy flooding. There, underground facilities were heavily
damaged and the electronics in those facilities were generally
completely lost. The cable industry indicated that new cable plants
generally allowed for multiple points of failure and system workarounds
that permitted the network to operate in spite of some widespread
faults in the infrastructure. However, lack of power to cable
facilities and security proved to be key problems. The cable operator
serving New Orleans indicated that, even where its network was intact,
lack of power/fuel prevented it from restoring operations in those
areas.\54\ Also, similar to broadcasting, power outages at the viewer
end prevented cable programming from being successfully received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ See, e.g., Comments of Greg Bicket, Cox Communications, at
1 (Jan. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Utilities. Electric utility networks (including utility-owned
commercial wireless networks) appeared to have a high rate of
survivability following Katrina.\55\ These communications systems did
not have a significant rate of failure because: (1) the systems were
designed to remain intact to aid restoration of electric service
following a significant storm event; (2) they were built with
significant onsite back-up power supplies (batteries and generators);
(3) last mile connections to tower sites and the backbone transport are
typically owned by the utility and have redundant paths (both T1 and
fixed microwave); and (4) the staff responsible for the communications
network have a focus on continuing maintenance of network elements (for
example, exercising standby generators on a routine basis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See, e.g., UTC Comments, Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of
Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks, at 2
(Jan. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. License Exempt Wireless (WISPs). The License Exempt Wireless or
wireless internet service provider (``WISP'') infrastructure, in
general, was not heavily damaged by Katrina or the subsequent flooding,
although some antennas required adjustment because of high winds.
Rather, the majority of the adverse effects and outages encountered by
WISP providers were due to a lack of commercial power and difficulty
with fuel resupply. WISP providers cited access difficulties as their
most pressing problem in restoring their networks.
11. Amateur Radio Service. As with other communications services,
amateur radio stations were also adversely affected by Katrina.
Equipment was damaged or lost due to the storm and trained amateurs
were difficult to find in the immediate aftermath. However, once called
into help, amateur radio operators volunteered to support many
agencies, such as FEMA, the National Weather Service, Hurricane Watch
and the American Red Cross.\56\ Amateurs provided wireless
communications in many locations where there was no other means of
communicating and also provided other technical aid to the communities
affected by Katrina.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See Hurricane Katrina Amateur Radio Emergency
Communications Relief Effort Operations Review Summary, Written
Statement submitted by Gregory Sarratt, W4OZK, at 2 (Mar. 7, 2006).
\57\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina
In reviewing the detailed reports from each communications sector,
there were three main problems that caused the majority of
communications network interruptions: (1) Flooding; (2) lack of power
and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant pathways for communications
traffic. In addition, a fourth item--inadvertent line cuts during
restoration--resulted in additional network damage, causing
[[Page 38581]]
new outages or delaying service restoration. Each of these areas of
concern is detailed below.
1. Flooding. Hurricanes typically have flooding associated with
them due to the torrential rainfall and storm surge associated with the
storms. However, in addition to these sources of flooding, the levee
breaks in New Orleans caused catastrophic flooding that was extremely
detrimental to the communications networks.\58\ While communications
infrastructure had been hardened to prepare against strong winds from a
hurricane, the widespread flooding of long duration associated with
Katrina destroyed or disabled substantial portions of the
communications networks and impeded trained personnel from reaching and
operating the facilities.\59\ In addition, as detailed below, the
massive flooding caused widespread power outages that were not readily
remedied (electric substations could not be reached nor were there
personnel available to remedy the outages). The flooding also wiped out
transportation options, preventing fuel for generators from getting
where it needed to be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See, e.g., House Report at 164 (reporting that flooding
knocked out two telephone company switches and hindered the
communications abilities of six out of eight police districts in New
Orleans, as well as the police department headquarters).
\59\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Juliette M. Saussy,
Director, Emergency Medical Services of the City of New Orleans,
Louisiana, Tr. at 43-44 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Saussy Mar. 6
Oral Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Power and Fuel. Katrina caused extensive damage to the power
grid. Significant portions of electrical facilities in Mississippi,
Alabama and Louisiana--including both power lines and electric plants--
were severely impaired due to wind and flooding. As a result, power to
support the communications networks was generally unavailable
throughout the region.\60\ This meant that, for communications systems
to continue to operate, backup batteries and generators were required.
While the communications industry has generally been diligent in
deploying backup batteries and generators and ensuring that these
systems have one to two days of fuel or charge, not all locations had
them installed. Furthermore, not all locations were able to exercise
and test the backup equipment in any systemic fashion. Thus, some
generators and batteries did not function during the crisis. Where
generators were installed and operational, the fuel was generally
exhausted prior to restoration of power. Finally, flooding, shortages
of fuel and restrictions on access to the affected area made refueling
extraordinarily difficult.\61\ In some instances, fuel was confiscated
by federal or local authorities when it was brought into the Katrina
region.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ House Report. at 166.
\61\ Id. at 164.
\62\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing
Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology
Officer, BellSouth, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006) (FEMA commandeered
communications fuel reserves in order to refuel helicopters).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Redundant pathways. The switches that failed, especially
tandems, had widespread effects on a broad variety of communications in
and out of the Katrina region. In addition, T1 and other leased lines
were heavily used by the communications networks throughout the region,
with those failures leading to loss of service. As an example, a major
tandem switch in New Orleans was isolated, which meant that no
communications from parts of New Orleans to outside the region could
occur. This switch, an access tandem that carried long distance traffic
through New Orleans and out to other offices, had two major routes out
of the city (one to the east and one to the west). The eastern route
was severed by a barge that came ashore during the hurricane and cut
the aerial fiber associated with the route. If only this route had been
lost, the access tandem traffic could have continued. However, the
western route was also severed--initially by large trees falling across
aerial cables, then subsequently by construction crews removing debris
from highway rights-of-way. While there were provisions for rerouting
traffic out of the city, the simultaneous loss of both of these major
paths significantly limited communications service in parts of New
Orleans.
4. Line cuts. During the restoration process following Katrina,
there were numerous instances of fiber lines cut accidentally by
parties seeking to restore power, phone, and cable, remove trees and
other debris, and engage in similar restoration activities.\63\
BellSouth indicated in its comments to the Katrina Panel that several
of its major routes were cut multiple times.\64\ For example, on
Monday, September 12th, a major fiber route from Hammond, Louisiana to
Covington, Louisiana was cut by a tree trimming company.\65\ Cox
Communications reported that, by the eleventh day after the storm, more
outages of its network in the region were caused by human damage than
storm damage. Public safety entities also noted similar cuts in service
during the restoration process.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See, e.g., Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 66
(Mar. 6, 2006).
\64\ See Comments by William L. Smith, BellSouth, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Smith-
BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement'').
\65\ Id.
\66\ See, e.g., Comments of Robert G. Bailey, National Emergency
Number Association, Harris County Emergency Communications, at 1
(Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these major causes of network interruptions,
security and access to facilities were consistently mentioned as
significant issues affecting restoration of communications services.
These problems are discussed in detail in the following section.
II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures
After Katrina's wind and rain subsided, challenges to
communications service maintenance and restoration continued. Flooding,
which submerged and damaged equipment and blocked access for
restoration, was a major problem. The Panel also observed significant
challenges to the recovery effort resulting from (1) inconsistent and
unclear requirements for communications infrastructure repair crews and
their subcontractors to gain access to the affected area; (2) limited
access to power and/or generator fuel; (3) limited security for
communications infrastructure and personnel and lack of pre-positioned
back-up equipment; (4) lack of established coordination between the
communications industry and state and local officials as well as among
federal, state and local government officials with respect to
communications matters; and (5) limited use of available priority
communications services. On the other hand, lines of communication
between the communications industry and the federal government were
established and seemed generally effective in facilitating
coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering
outage information. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and
equipment among communications industry participants helped to maximize
the assets available and bolster the recovery effort. However,
additional industry coordination of personnel and assets internally and
among governments could have substantially facilitated restoration of
communications networks.
A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources.
1. Perimeter Access and Credentialing. Communications
[[Page 38582]]
restoration efforts were hampered significantly by the inability of
communications infrastructure repair crews and their contracted workers
to access the impacted area post-disaster.\67\ For important safety and
security reasons, law enforcement personnel set up a perimeter around
much of the impacted region and imposed restrictions on who could
access the area. Communications infrastructure repair crews from all
sectors of the industry had great difficulty crossing the perimeter to
access their facilities in need of repair.\68\ This seemed to be a
particular problem for smaller or non-traditional communications
companies,\69\ who tended to have lower levels of name recognition with
law enforcement personnel guarding the perimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of William L. Smith, Chief
Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., Before the FCC's Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 188 (Jan.
30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony''];
see also Statement of Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network
Group, Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 125 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Jacot-
Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony'']; Trujillo Sept. 29 Written
Statement at 9; Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
\68\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (repair workers
sometimes had difficulty gaining access to their equipment and
facilities because the police and National Guard refused to let
crews enter the affected area); Federal Support to
Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers in National Emergencies:
Designation as ``Emergency Responders (Private Sector)'', The
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee,
Legislative and Regulatory Task Force, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Jan. 31 NSTAC Report''].
\69\ See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Industry Association
at 6 (January 27, 2006) (describing how satellite system repair
crews had difficulty obtaining access to the impacted area);
Comments of Xspedius Communications, LLC, at 2, 6 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Comments of Xspedius''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although some jurisdictions provided credentials to communications
infrastructure repair crews to permit them to access the affected area,
the process appeared to be unique for each local jurisdiction.
Communications providers reported that credentials that permitted
access through one checkpoint would not be honored at another.\70\ In
many cases, different checkpoints required different documentation and
credentialing before permitting access.\71\ As a result, repair crews
needed to carry multiple credentials and letters from various federal,
state and local officials.\72\ There was no uniform credentialing
method in place whereby one type of credential would permit access at
any checkpoint.\73\ Communications providers were also not clear about
which agency had authority to issue the necessary credentials.\74\ And
there did not appear to be any mechanism in place for issuing
credentials to those who needed them prior to Katrina making landfall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing
Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006)
(industry representatives said that their technicians would benefit
from having uniform credentialing that is recognized by the multiple
law enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area).
\71\ See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 5
(stating that a credential that permitted access in one county was
sometimes not honored in a different county).
\72\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 2-3.
\73\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at Findings at 8
(efforts by private sector to restore communications efforts were
hampered by the fact that the government did not provide uniform
credentials to gain access to affected areas).
\74\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once communications infrastructure repair crews gained access to
the impacted area, they had no guarantee they would be allowed to
remain there. The enforcement of curfews and other security procedures
at times interrupted repair work and required communications
restoration crews to exit the area. In at least one instance, law
enforcement personnel insisted that communications technicians cease
their work splicing a key telecommunications cable and exit the area in
order to enforce a curfew.\75\ Although such practices may have been
necessary from a security standpoint, they did interrupt and hamper the
recovery process.
The problems with access were not all one-sided. Law enforcement
personnel also expressed frustration with the access situation,
particularly with respect to the different credentials issued and not
knowing what to ask for or what to honor. It was also reported that
credentialed communications infrastructure repair personnel sometimes
allowed non-credentialed individuals to ride in their vehicles through
checkpoints, which compromised the security of the area. It also caused
law enforcement personnel at the perimeter to be wary of persons
seeking to access the affected area and the credentials they presented,
potentially further slowing the access process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 191; see
also Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Fuel. Problems with maintaining and restoring power for
communications infrastructure significantly affected the recovery
process. As described in Section I.B.2 above, many facilities could
have been up and operating much more quickly if communications
providers had access to sufficient fuel. The commercial power upon
which the vast majority of communications networks depended for day-to-
day operations was knocked out over a huge geographic area. Back-up
generators and batteries were not present at all facilities. Where they
were deployed, most provided only enough power to operate particular
communications facilities for 24-48 hours--generally a sufficient
period of time to permit the restoration of commercial power in most
situations, but not enough for a catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina.
Access to fuel reserves or priority power restoration appeared
extremely limited for the communications industry.\76\ Only a few
communications providers had stockpiles of fuel or special supplier
arrangements. However, if the fuel was not located fairly near to the
perimeter, it was difficult and expensive to get it where it was needed
in a timely fashion. Perimeter access issues also impeded the ability
to bring reserve fuel into the region. Moreover, many roads and
traditional means of accessing certain facilities could not be used due
to the extensive flooding that followed Hurricane Katrina. And many
communications providers did not anticipate the need for alternative
means of reaching their facilities. In addition, some providers
reported having their limited fuel reserves confiscated by law
enforcement personnel for other pressing needs.\77\ Although electric
and other utilities maintain priority lists for commercial power
restoration, it does not appear that commercial communications
providers were on or eligible for such lists. Indeed, one wireless
provider speaking at the Katrina Panel's January 2006 meeting--more
than 4 months after Katrina's landfall--reported that it had 23 cell
sites in the impacted area still running on backup generators.\78\ Most
communications providers also did not appear to be able to access any
government fuel reserves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ See, e.g., Comments of Mississippi Assn. of Broadcasters at
1-2 (Jan. 27, 2006).
\77\ See, e.g., id.; House Report at 167 (``[O]ne of Nextel's
fuel trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its fuel taken for other
purposes while en route to refuel cell tower generators, and the
Mississippi State Police redirected a fuel truck carrying fuel
designated for a cell tower generator to fuel generators at Gulfport
Memorial Hospital.'').
\78\ See Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On a positive note, several companies apparently shared their
reserve fuel with other communications providers who needed it, even
their competitors.\79\
[[Page 38583]]
This sharing occurred on a purely ad hoc basis.\80\ There did not
appear to be any forum or coordination area for fostering industry
sharing of fuel or other equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
312 (describing how the radio station shared fuel with a nearby news
organization).
\80\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Steve Davis, Senior Vice
President of Engineering, Clear Channel Radio, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at
81-82 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan.
30 Oral Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Security. Limited security for key communications facilities and
communications infrastructure repair crews also hampered the recovery
effort.\81\ Security concerns, both actual and perceived, led to delays
in the restoration of communications networks.\82\ Communications
providers reported generators being stolen from key facilities, even if
they were bolted down. Lack of security for communications
infrastructure repair workers at times delayed their access to certain
facilities to make repairs.\83\ Some providers employed their own
security crews.\84\ However, obtaining credentials to allow these
individuals to access the affected area was sometimes a problem.
Further, communications infrastructure repair crews generally did not
receive security details from law enforcement. Clearly, law enforcement
had other very significant responsibilities in the wake of Katrina. In
addition, communications providers are apparently not considered
``emergency responders'' under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act \85\ and the National Response Plan and
thus are not eligible to receive non-monetary Federal assistance, like
security protection for critical facilities and repair personnel.\86\
In one instance, however, a major communications provider successfully
sought governmental security for its Poydras St. office in New Orleans,
which serves as a regional hub for multiple telecommunications
carriers. Both the Louisiana State Police and the FBI provided security
so that BellSouth workers could return to the office and keep it in
service.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4.
\82\ The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,
February 2006, at 40, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/
.
\83\ Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.
\84\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (when
government security proved unavailable, many telecommunications
providers hired private security to protect their workers and
supplies); Written Statement of Dave Flessas, Vice President for
Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp., Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 2
(Jan. 30, 2006) (security issues forced Sprint to hire armored
guards to protect its employees and contractors); Jan. 31 NSTAC
Report at 5.
\85\ Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended [hereinafter ``Stafford
Act''].
\86\ See, e.g., Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 9;
Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 125; see also Oral
Testimony of Captain Thomas Wetherald, Deputy Operations Director,
National Communications System, Before the FCC's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony''].
\87\ Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apparently, several companies that had their own security forces
shared them with other communications providers by forming a convoy to
go to a particular area.\88\ Such arrangements seemed to occur on a
purely informal basis. There did not appear to be any forum or staging
area for fostering industry sharing of security forces or other
resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Pre-positioning of Equipment. Limited pre-positioning of
communications equipment may have slowed the recovery process. While
some individual companies and organizations had some backup
communications technologies on-hand for use after a disaster, most did
not appear to locate strategic stockpiles of communications equipment
that could be rapidly deployed and immediately used by persons in the
impacted area.
B. Coordination Between Industry and Government
1. Industry--Federal Government Coordination. Despite problems
related above at the scene of the disaster, at the federal level,
industry and government recovery coordination for the communications
sector appeared to function as intended. Under the National Response
Plan, the lead federal agency for emergency support functions regarding
communications is the National Communications System (``NCS''). NCS
manages the National Coordination Center for Telecommunications
(``NCC'') in Washington, DC, which is a joint industry-federal
government endeavor with 36 member companies.\89\ The NCC meets on a
regular basis during non-emergency situations; during and immediately
after Katrina, it met daily and conducted analysis and situational
monitoring of ongoing events and response capabilities.\90\ The Katrina
Panel heard that this group played an important and effective role in
coordinating communications network recovery and allowing for
information sharing among affected industry members.\91\ Yet, NCC
membership is limited to only certain providers and does not represent
a broad cross-section of the communications industry (for example, no
broadcasters, WISPs, or cable providers are members).\92\ Accordingly,
certain industry sectors or companies that might have been helpful were
not a part of this coordination effort. State and local government are
also not a part of this coordination effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ The NSTAC Report on the National Coordinating Center (4/27/
06 Draft), The President's National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee, May 10, 2006, at 9-10 [hereinafter ``May 10
NSTAC Report''].
\90\ See Written Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Director,
National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, Before
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Committee on Homeland
Security, United States House of Representatives, at 2, 6 (Oct. 26,
2005), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyFonash.pdf.
\91\ See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
17-18.
\92\ See May 10 NSTAC Report at 4.
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The FCC was widely praised as playing a critical role in helping to
restore communications connectivity in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.\93\ During and immediately after Katrina, the Commission
stayed open 24 hours a day, seven days a week to respond to the
disaster.\94\ Within hours of Katrina's landfall in the Gulf Coast
region, the Commission established an internal Task Force to coordinate
its response efforts,\95\ focusing on providing regulatory relief where
necessary, coordinating efforts with other federal agencies, and
providing information and assistance to evacuees. To assist
communications providers in their recovery, the Commission established
emergency procedures to streamline various waiver and special temporary
authority processes to speed needed relief,\96\ reached out to various
providers to determine their needs, and assisted communications
providers in obtaining access to necessary resources.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ See, e.g., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned at 142-43 (February 2006).
\94\ See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 3.
\95\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 4.
\96\ See, e.g., International Bureau Announces Procedures to
Provide Emergency Communications in Areas Impacted by Hurricane
Katrina, FCC Public Notice (rel. Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260835A1.pdf
.
\97\ See Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr.
at 83 (describing how the Audio Division of the FCC's Media Bureau
helped radio licensees secure access to fuel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These actions by the Commission appeared substantially to assist
the industry in the recovery effort. The emergency, 24/7 contacts the
Commission made available and the
[[Page 38584]]
new streamlined processes clearly accelerated the time frame for
receiving necessary regulatory approvals. However, the extensive
communications outages made accessing this new information about who to
contact and how to comply with the new processes difficult. Similarly,
repair crews often did not know what repairs they needed to make until
they reached the site.
In addition, while it was generally clear to communications
providers that the Commission was the right agency to contact for
regulatory relief after the disaster, the roles of other federal
agencies in the recovery effort were not as clear to a large portion of
the industry.\98\ Communications providers who needed federal
assistance (such as obtaining fuel authorizations or access to the
impacted area), often did not know whom to contact. Industry
participants also appeared generally unclear about which federal agency
was responsible for implementing important recovery programs or
distributing resources to communications companies operating in the
impacted area. Competing requests for outage information from
government entities at the federal, state and local level added to the
confusion about agency roles. And responding to duplicative, repeated
inquiries in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was cited by some as a
distraction to communications providers' restoration efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ See, e.g., Written Statement of C. Patrick Roberts,
President of the Florida Association of Broadcasters, Before the
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina,
at 3 (Mar. 7, 2006) (observing that America must have a more
cohesive and comprehensive program among federal, state, and local
governments to prepare for disasters); see also Sprint-Nextel Jan.
30 Written Testimony at 4-5 (recognizing that there is a need to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the government agencies
that are involved in telecommunications restoration).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Industry--State and Local Government Coordination. In general,
coordination between communications providers and state and local
government officials in the affected region for communications network
recovery purposes did not appear to exist except on an ad hoc basis.
For the most part, there did not appear to be in existence any
organized mechanism for communications providers to share information
with local officials or to seek their assistance with respect to
specific recovery issues, like access and fuel. Following Katrina, the
Panel heard that state and local government representatives were
exchanging business cards with communications providers in their area
for the first time. Local government officials noted that they
sometimes did not know where to turn to figure out why communications
to and from key government locations did not work and how to express
their priorities for communications service restoration. In addition,
coordinating credentialing, access, fuel sharing, security and other
key recovery efforts was difficult because there were no identified
staging areas or coordination points for the communications industry.
3. Federal Government, State and Local Government Coordination. The
Panel is not aware of pre-established mechanisms through which the
federal government coordinated with state and local governments
concerning communications network restoration issues in the wake of
Katrina. For example, the Panel heard that civilian public safety
officials were often unable to communicate with military officials
brought in to assist local law enforcement. In addition, state and
local governments are not a part of the NCC \99\ and, therefore, were
not able to directly coordinate with that industry-federal government
group. As noted above, and due in part to a lack of pre-arranged
recovery procedures, state and local government officials did not seem
to be part of communications network recovery efforts. This meant that
their restoration priorities may not have been effectively conveyed to
communications providers and that communications providers did not have
an identified place to turn for assistance with access and other
recovery issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ See May 10 NSTAC Report at 3.
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C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs
The federal government, through the NCS, has established several
programs for priority communications services during and following an
emergency.\100\ These are the Government Emergency Telecommunications
Service (``GETS''), which enables an eligible user to get priority call
completion for wireline telephone calls; the Wireless Priority Service
(``WPS''), which enables an eligible user to get access to the next
free channel when making a wireless call; and Telecommunications
Service Priority (``TSP''), which enables a qualifying user to get
priority restoration and provisioning of telecommunications
services.\101\ During and after Katrina, these priority services seemed
to work well for those who subscribed to them. However, only a small
percentage of those eligible for the services appeared to do so. This
is particularly true of public safety users--many eligible public
safety entities have not signed up for these services. It also appears
to be true for some communications providers, including broadcast,
WISP, and cable companies. These priority services could be an
extremely useful tool in network restoration efforts. Yet, they are
tools that appear not fully utilized. Like other emergency tools, they
require training and practice. In some cases, users who had access to
these services did not fully understand how to use them (e.g., that a
WPS call requires inputting a GETS code so the call would get priority
treatment when it reached the landline network).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
18.
\101\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy
Manager, National Communications System, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security and Gov't Affairs, Hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and
Communications in a Catastrophe at 3-4 (Feb. 6, 2006), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/ --files/020606Fonash.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. First Responder Communications
In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the ability of public
safety and emergency first responders to communicate varied greatly
across the affected region. The areas in and around New Orleans were
seriously impacted.\102\ New Orleans EMS was forced to cease 911
operations in anticipation of Katrina's landfall and, after the levees
were breached, a total loss of EMS and fire communications ensued.\103\
The communications infrastructure in coastal areas was heavily damaged
due to winds or flooding.\104\ As a result, more than 2,000 police,
fire and EMS personnel were forced to communicate in single channel
mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only three mutual aid frequencies.\105\
Some mutual-aid channels required each speaker to wait his or her turn
before speaking, sometimes up to twenty minutes.\106\ This level of
destruction did not extend to inland areas affected by the hurricane
so, in contrast to New Orleans, neither Baton Rouge nor Jackson County,
Mississippi, completely lost their communications capabilities and were
soon operating at pre-Katrina capabilities.\107\ In the
[[Page 38585]]
hardest hit areas, however, the disruption of public safety
communications operability, as well as a lack of interoperability,
frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous confusion among
official personnel \108\ and the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ See, e.g., Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43.
\103\ Id.
\104\ Jeff Smith Written Statement at 12.
\105\ Presentation of Major Mike Sauter, Office of Technology
and Communications, New Orleans Police Department, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 1
(Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter ``Sauter Written Statement''].
\106\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 21-6 (NOFD and NOPD
were forced to use a mutual aid channel, rather than the 800 MHz
trunk system they were supposed to operate on; transmission over the
mutual aid channel was limited and could not reach certain parts of
the city).
\107\ See Oral Testimony of George W. Sholl, Director, Jackson
County Emergency Communications District, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at Tr.
at 58-59 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Scholl Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony''].
\108\ Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State and local first responders are required to act and
communicate within minutes after disasters have occurred and not hours
or days later when Federal or other resources from outside the affected
area become available. As further described below, the lack of
effective emergency communications after the storm revealed inadequate
planning, coordination and training on the use of technologies that can
help to restore emergency communications. Hurricane Katrina also
highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability among public
safety communications systems operating in different frequency bands
and with different technical standards.\109\ One advantage that New
Orleans had was the fact that no broadcasters were using the 700 MHz
spectrum set aside for public safety, thus freeing it up immediately
for first responder use.\110\ As a result of this availability,
communications providers were able to provide emergency trucks and
hundreds of radios that operated on this spectrum as soon as first
responders needed them.\111\ Finally, 911 emergency call handling
suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing of calls to PSAPs not
incapacitated by the hurricane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel (ret.) Terry J.
Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security for New Orleans, Hurricane
Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Before
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House of
Representatives, at 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_14_05/ebbert_121405.doc
.
\110\ See Written Statement of Kelly Kirwin, Vice President,
Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Before the FCC's Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement''] (in some major
cities (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco), the 700 MHz
spectrum would not be available to first responders).
\111\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures
It was described to the Panel that public safety officials plan for
disasters but that Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophe.\112\ This left
many state and local agencies, those who are required to respond first
to such emergencies, ill-prepared to restore communications essential
to their ability to do their jobs.\113\ Very few public safety agencies
had stockpiles of key equipment on hand to implement rapid repairs or
patches to their systems. Had they been available, spare radios,
batteries and chargers as well as portable repeaters or self-sufficient
communications vehicles (also known as ``communications on wheels'')
would have enabled greater local communications capabilities.\114\
Further, when the primary communications system failed, many public
safety entities did not have plans for an alternative, redundant system
to take its place.\115\ Similarly, public safety entities, including
state and local government offices, did not appear to have plans in
place for call forwarding or number portability to route their calls to
alternative locations when they relocated. The apparent absence of
contingency plans to address massive system failures, including
widespread power outages,\116\ was a major impediment to the rapid
restoration of first responder communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Written Statement of Sheriff Kevin Beary, Major County
Sheriffs Assn. at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Beary Jan. 30
Written Statement''].
\113\ Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.
\114\ Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement at 1.
\115\ Presentation of Sheriff Ted Sexton, Sr. National Sheriffs
Assn at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006); McEwen Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 35-
36.
\116\ McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public safety agencies rely heavily on their equipment vendors to
support them during such disasters by providing replacement parts and
spare radios. Motorola stated that 72 hours prior to Katrina's
landfall, it had mobilized more than 100,000 pieces of equipment and
more than 300 employees to support their customers.\117\ Similarly, M/
A-Com supported the restoration and maintenance of the New Orleans 800
MHz system as well as the systems for Mobile, Biloxi, Gulfport, and St.
Tammany Parish.\118\ Reports indicate that these efforts with
established vendors were generally well-executed, except for problems
with access into New Orleans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement at 2.
\118\ Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Panel was made aware of a variety of non-traditional,
alternative technologies that could have served as effective, back-up
communications for public safety until their primary systems were
repaired. As noted in Section I, satellite infrastructure was generally
unaffected by the storm and could have provided a viable back-up
system. Two-way paging operations remained generally operational during
the storm and did provide communications capabilities for some police,
fire emergency medical personnel, but could have been more widely
utilized.\119\ Other types of non-traditional technology that can be
deployed quickly, such as WiFi and WiMax, or self-contained
communications vehicles, could also have been effectively utilized.
These all appear deserving of exploration as back-up communications
options to primary public safety systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 7-
9; Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 122-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First responders' lack of training on alternative, back-up
communications equipment was also an impediment in the recovery
effort.\120\ This lack of training may have accounted for a sizeable
number of communications failures during the first 48 hours after
Katrina.\121\ Public safety officials noted that that there was little
time after Katrina to investigate the capabilities of new technologies
for which none of their personnel had been adequately trained. This
highlights the need for public safety entities to have contingency
communications plans with training as a key component. The lack of
training issue evidenced itself in particular with the distribution of
satellite phones. These phones proved to be a beneficial resource to
some, while others described the service as spotty and capacity
strained. In many cases, it appears that complaints about spotty
coverage really resulted from the user's lack of understanding about
how to use the phone (e.g., some satellite phones have a unique dialing
pattern and they generally do not work indoors).\122\ However, the
uncontrolled distribution of satellite phones could also have triggered
capacity issues in certain areas.\123\ Additionally, public safety
officials reminded the Panel that users must be properly trained before
they can be expected to competently use technologies during high stress
events.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ See, e.g., Written Statement of James Monroe III, Chief
Executive Officer, Globalstar LLC, Before the FCC's Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 4 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement''] (some first
responders failed to keep handset batteries charged, others did not
realize that satellite phones require a clear line of sight between
the handset and the satellite).
\121\ Id.
\122\ Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 4-5.
\123\ See Report of Ed Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire
Department, Hurricane Katrina Independent Panel Meeting, at 1 (Jan.
30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Written Report of Ed Smith''].
\124\ See, e.g., Scholl Oral Testimony, Tr. at 57-58, 61-62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, it seems that communications assets that were available
and could have been used by first responders were
[[Page 38586]]
not requested or deployed. There have been reports that federal
government communications assets operated and maintained by FEMA and
USDA were available, but not utilized, for state and local public
safety operations.\125\ This underutilization may have been due to the
fact that FEMA's pre-staged communications vehicles apparently were
located 250-350 miles away from the devastated areas,\126\ and that
FEMA did not request deployment of these vehicles until twenty-four
hours after landfall.\127\ Further, first responders were not made
aware of these assets and/or did not know how to request them.\128\ As
noted above, many public safety officials failed to subscribe to the
GETS, TSP and WPS priority programs, despite their eligibility.\129\
Communications assets made available by the private sector also appear
to have been underutilized by first responders. The Panel heard that
manufacturers of alternative public safety communications systems were
unable to gain the attention of key public safety officials to
effectuate their proposed donation of equipment and services. Some
offered equipment or access to their network in Katrina's aftermath but
``found no takers''.\130\ These and other outlets could have provided
some measure of communications capabilities, while repairs to primary
systems were completed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,
February 2006, at 55.
\126\ Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff
interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications Specialist, Region
VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).
\127\ Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff
interview of William Milani, Chief Mobile Operations Section, FEMA,
conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).
\128\ See, e.g., Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement at 5 (first
responders generally did not have pre-emergency deployment plans
that they could invoke in advance of the actual emergency).
\129\ During and after Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new GETS
access code numbers to first responders, and the GETS system was
used to make more than 35,000 calls between August 28 and September
9. House Report at 176. During Katrina, the NCS enabled and
distributed more than 4,000 new WPS phones. Id. The NCS also
completed more than 1,500 TSP assignments following Hurricane
Katrina. Id. at 177. It would have been helpful if these assets had
been in place before the disaster and first responders were fully
trained in how to use them.
\130\ Statement of Jerry Knoblach, Chairman & CEO, Space Data
Corporation, Before the Federal Communications Commission's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, at 6 (Mar. 7, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Lack of Interoperability
Because of its scope and severity, Hurricane Katrina demanded a
coordinated response from federal and affected state and local
agencies, as well as volunteers from states both neighboring and
distant. The Panel heard evidence that, in many cases, responders in
different agencies were unable to communicate due to incompatible
frequency assignments.\131\ When the existing infrastructure for the
New Orleans system was incapacitated by flooding, communications were
almost completely thwarted as too many users attempted to use the three
mutual aid channels in the 800 MHz band.\132\ In addition,
communications between the military and first responders also appeared
to suffer from lack of interoperability.\133\ In some cases, the
military was reduced to using human runners to physically carry
messages between deployed units and first responders.\134\ In another
case, a military helicopter had to drop a message in a bottle to warn
first responders about a dangerous gas leak.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ A Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake of Government
Inaction to Address Communications Interoperability Failures
Following Hurricane Katrina, First Response Coalition, December
2005.
\132\ Sauter Written Statement at 1; Written Report of Ed Smith
at 1.
\133\ See Written Statement of Dr. William W. Pinsky on behalf
of the American Hospital Association, The State of Interoperable
Communications: Perspectives from the Field, Before the Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee on
Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, at 5
(Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyPinsky.pdf
.
\134\ See, e.g., Written Statement of The Honorable Timothy J.
Roemer, Director, Center for National Policy, Public Safety
Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons,
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of
Representatives, at 5 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearings/09292005Hearing1648/Roemer.pdf
(describing the use of human couriers by the National Guard).
\135\ Heather Greenfield, Katrina Revealed Gaps In Emergency
Response System, The Wash. Times, Dec. 28, 2005, at B1, available at
http://washingtontimes.com/metro/20051227-095134-3753r.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While most observers characterized ``operability'' as the primary
communications failure following Katrina,\136\ increased ability to
interoperate with other agencies would have provided greater redundant
communications paths and a more coordinated response. While
technological solutions, such as IP gateways to integrate frequencies
across multiple bands,\137\ are a critical tool for improving
interoperability, the Panel was reminded that technology is not the
sole driver of an optimal solution.\138\ Training, agreement on
standard operating procedures, governance or leadership and proper
usage are all critical elements of the interoperability continuum.\139\
However, the Panel heard testimony that Project SAFECOM, which is
intended to provide a solution for interoperability among Federal,
state and local officials, will take years to achieve its
objectives.\140\ However, the Panel is also aware of more expedient
proposals, such as the M/A-COM, Inc. proposal to mandate construction
of all Federal and non-Federal mutual aid channels to provide baseline
interoperability to all emergency responders that operate across
multiple frequency bands using disparate technologies.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina--Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 55; Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
44.
\137\ See, e.g., Presentation to the Meeting of the Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, Dr. John Vaughan, Vice President TYCO Electronics: M/A-
COM, March 6, 2006; see also Presentation to the FCC's Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, Wesley D. Smith, Technical Director, ARINC (Mar. 7, 2006).
\138\ See Interoperability Continuum Brochure, Project Safecom,
Dept. of Homeland Security (April 5, 2005), available at http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66-A36E-4DD1-A00A-54C477B47AFC/0/ContinuumBrochure40505.pdf
.
\139\ Id. at 4.
\140\ Oral Testimony of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of SAFECOM,
Dept. of Homeland Security, Tr. at 29-30 (Apr. 18, 2006); see also
Stephen Losey, Defense re-examines homeland role, tactics, Federal
Times.com (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1174164
.
\141\ See Further Comments of M/A-Com, Inc. (May 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. PSAP Rerouting
When a PSAP becomes disabled, 911 emergency calls from the public
are typically diverted to a secondary neighboring PSAP using
preconfigured traffic routes. In many cases, Katrina disabled both the
primary and secondary PSAPs, which resulted in many unanswered
emergency calls. Additionally, many PSAPs in Louisiana did not have
protocols in place to identify where 911 calls should go and had not
arranged for any rerouting, resulting in dropped emergency calls.\142\
The Panel heard testimony that Katrina has highlighted a need to
identify additional back-up PSAPs at remote locations. However, FCC
regulations may currently restrict the ability of local phone companies
to establish pre-configured routes across LATA boundaries.\143\ In
addition, the routing of calls to more distant PSAPs would require
specific planning to ensure appropriate and timely response to
emergency calls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ House Report at 173.
\143\ Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 38587]]
D. Emergency Medical Communications
There are indications that the emergency medical community was
lacking in contingency communications planning and information about
technologies and services that might address their critical
communications needs.\144\ In particular, this group of first
responders did not seem to avail itself of existing priority
communications services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP. It also appeared
that emergency medical personnel were not always integrated into a
locality's public safety communications planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ See House Report at 269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Emergency Communications to the Public
The communications infrastructure, in all of its forms, is a key
asset in delivering information to the American public. In emergencies
and disaster situations, ensuring public safety is the first priority.
The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable and relevant
information to the public is critical--before, during and after such
events. Moreover, to the extent a more well-informed citizenry is
better able to prepare for and respond to disasters, there should be
less strain on already taxed resources, thereby benefiting recovery
efforts.
The Emergency Alert System (``EAS'') and its predecessor systems
have long made use of broadcast radio and television stations as the
principal tools for communicating with the public about emergencies and
disaster situations. The Panel heard stories of heroic efforts by
broadcasters and cable operators to provide members of the public
impacted by Katrina with important storm-related information. However,
there were also reports of missed opportunities to utilize the EAS and
limitations in existing efforts to deliver emergency information to all
members of the public. New technologies may address some of these
limitations by facilitating the provision of both macro- and micro-
level information about impending disasters and recovery efforts.
A. Lack of Activation
The EAS can be activated by the federal government as well as by
state and local officials to disseminate official news and information
to the public in the event of an emergency. The Panel understands that
the National Weather Service used the EAS to provide severe weather
warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of Katrina making
landfall.\145\ However, the Panel also heard that the EAS was not
utilized by state and local officials to provide localized emergency
evacuation and other important information.\146\ That means that an
existing and effective means of distributing timely information to our
citizens was not fully utilized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina----Lessons
Learned, February 2006, at 28.
\146\ Comments of Hilary Styron of the National Organization on
Disability Emergency Preparedness Initiative at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ``Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Limitations in Coverage
The primary source of emergency information about Katrina came
through broadcast (including satellite broadcast) and cable
infrastructure, whether through the EAS or local or national news
programming. Citizens who were not watching TV or listening to the
radio at the time of the broadcast missed this emergency information.
Damage to communications infrastructure made it difficult for news and
emergency information to reach the public, as did power outages.\147\
As a result, a fairly large percentage of the public likely were
uninformed. The Panel heard about notification technologies that may
permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and wireless
telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile
devices.\148\ For example, the Association of Public Television
Stations has developed a means for utilizing the digital transmissions
of public television stations to datacast emergency information to
computers or wireless devices.\149\ In addition, the St. Charles Parish
Public School District used a telephone-based, time-sensitive
notification technology to send out recorded evacuation messages to
over 21,000 phone numbers in advance of Katrina's landfall.\150\ The
District continued to utilize this technology to provide members of the
public with specific information regarding conditions in the community
in the storm's aftermath. While the use of phone-based technologies for
post-disaster communications is necessarily dependent on the state of
the telephone network, such technologies--which are less subject to
disruption from power outages--offer the potential for complementing
the traditional broadcast-based EAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
\148\ Comments of Notification Technologies, Inc., EB Docket No.
04-296 (Jan. 24, 2006).
\149\ Written Testimony of John M. Lawson, President and CEO,
Association of Public Television Stations, Before the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (April 18, 2006).
\150\ Id. at 12.
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The Panel also understands that the FCC is considering extending
the reach of the existing emergency alert system to other technologies,
such as wireless and the Internet.\151\ The Panel understands that
there are ongoing collaborative industry-government efforts to overcome
the hurdles to extending alerts to other technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ Review of the Emergency Alert System, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 18,625,
18,653 (] 69) (2005).
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C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking
Americans
Ensuring emergency communications reach all Americans, even those
with hearing and visual disabilities or who do not speak English,
remains a major challenge. Unfortunately, accessibility to suitable
communications devices for the deaf and hard of hearing was difficult
during and after Hurricane Katrina.\152\ This problem was intensified
by the fact that Katrina brought humidity, rain, flooding, and high
temperatures (which translate into perspiration), all of which reduce
the effectiveness of hearing aids and cochlear implants.\153\ For
persons with visual impairments, telephone and broadcast outages made
information very hard to obtain, and many people with vision loss were
unable to evacuate.\154\
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\152\ See, e.g., Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2 (over 80%
of shelters did not have access to communications devices for the
deaf; over 60% of shelters did not have captioning capabilities
utilized on the televisions screens and several broadcasters did not
caption their emergency information, even though it is required by
the FCC); Oral Testimony of Cheryl Heppner, Vice Chair, Deaf and
Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, FCC Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, Tr. at 283 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Heppner Mar. 6
Oral Testimony''] (many television stations did not provide visual
information).
\153\ Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 282.
\154\ Comment of the American Council of the Blind and American
Foundation for the Blind, at 2 (May 3, 2006).
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The broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide on-
screen sign language interpreters and close captioning. Broadcasters
also sometimes broadcast critical information in a second language
where there are a significant number of non-English speaking residents
in the community. For example, a Spanish-language radio station in the
New Orleans area provided warnings, and information about family
members and disaster relief assistance.\155\
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\155\ See, e.g., Comments by the National Council of La Raza, In
the Eye of the Storm: How the Gov't and Private Response to
Hurricane Katrina Failed Latinos at 5 (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter
``La Raza Comments''].
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[[Page 38588]]
However, the Panel also heard that written or captioned information
was at times inadequate and that station logos or captions sometimes
covered up the sign-language interpreter or close-captioning.\156\
Additionally, personnel who provided these critical services often
evacuated, leaving the station with no ability to deliver these
services. Further, specialized radios relied upon by the hearing-
impaired, because they can display text messages, are not currently
designed to be battery-operated and thus became useless when power goes
out.\157\ The distribution of emergency weather information in
languages other than English appeared limited, based primarily on the
willingness and ability of local weather forecasting offices and the
availability of ethnic media outlets.\158\ Innovative notification
technologies, such as those described above, may provide a partial
answer to the emergency communications needs of persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking members of the public as such
technologies can be used to deliver targeted messages in a specified
format.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 283-84; Remarks by
Cheryl Heppner, Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network,
at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006).
\157\ Heppner Mar. 6. Oral Testimony at 283-85.
\158\ See, e.g., La Raza Comments at 5 (citing Interview with
official at the National Weather Service, Jan. 6, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Relatedly, individuals with disabilities often had a difficult time
using communications capabilities at shelters or other recovery
areas.\159\ Phone and computer banks provided at these locations
generally did not have capabilities to assist the hearing or speech-
impaired.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ Id.; Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2.
\160\ See, e.g., id.; Comments of the Consortium for Citizens
With Disabilities at 1-2 (April 13, 2006); Styron Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 291.
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D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information
One of the benefits of the EAS is that it facilitates the
communication of a uniform message to the public by an authoritative or
credible spokesperson, thereby minimizing confusion and contributing to
an orderly public response. However, as noted above, the EAS was not
activated in several jurisdictions. Moreover, while broadcasters, cable
operators and satellite providers went to considerable lengths to
provide the public with information regarding Katrina and its impact,
the Panel understands that inconsistent or erroneous information about
critical emergency issues was sometimes provided within the affected
region. For example, information regarding conditions in one portion of
New Orleans did not necessarily accurately depict conditions in other
areas of the city. The dissemination of targeted information from an
authoritative source through the EAS or other notification technologies
might have assisted with this problem.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on communications networks and the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a number
of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness,
network reliability and communications among first responders. As with
its observations, these recommendations are grouped into four sections.
The first contains recommendations for steps to better pre-position the
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency. The second section
presents suggestions for improving recovery coordination to address
existing shortcomings and to maximize the use of existing resources.
The third section focuses on first responder communications issues,
recommending essential steps for improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications in times of
crisis. And finally, the last group of recommendations presents the
Panel's suggestions for improving emergency communications to the
public. All of our citizens deserve to be sufficiently informed should
a major disaster strike in the future.
Pre-Positioning for Disasters--A Proactive, Rather Than Reactive
Program for Network Reliability and Resiliency
1. Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry--A Readiness
Checklist--The FCC should work with and encourage each industry sector,
through their organizations or associations, to develop and publicize
sector-specific readiness recommendations. Such a checklist should be
based upon relevant industry best practices as set forth by groups such
as the Media Security and Reliability Council (``MSRC'') and the
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (``NRIC''). Any such
checklist should include the following elements:
a. Developing and implementing business continuity plans, which
would at a minimum address:
i. Power reserves,
ii. Cache of essential replacement equipment,
iii. Adequate sparing levels,
iv. Credentialing,
v. Emergency Operations Center (``EOC'') coordination,
vi. Training/disaster drills, and
vii. Appropriate disaster preparedness checklists;
b. Conducting exercises to evaluate these plans and train
personnel;
c. Developing and practicing a communications plan to identify
``key players'' and multiple means of contacting them (including
alternate communications channels, such as alpha pagers, Internet,
satellite phones, VOIP, private lines, BlackBerry-type devices, etc.);
d. Routinely archiving critical system backups and providing for
their storage in a ``secure off-site'' facilities.
2. Pre-positioning for Public Safety--An Awareness Program for Non-
Traditional Emergency Alternatives--The FCC should take steps to
educate the public safety community about the availability and
capabilities of non-traditional technologies that might provide
effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications
systems. Examples of these technologies would be pagers, satellite
technology and phones, portable towers and repeaters, point-to-point
microwave links, license-exempt WISP systems, other systems less
reliant on the PSTN, and bridging technologies/gateways that would
facilitate interoperability. One means for the FCC to do this would be
to organize an exhibit area or demonstration of these technologies in
conjunction with one or more large public safety conferences, such as:
a. APCO International Annual Conference and Exposition August 6-10,
2006; Orlando, FL
b. IAFC Fire Rescue International September 14-16, 2006; Dallas, TX
c. International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference October
14-18, 2006; Boston, MA
d. NENA Annual Conference and Trade Show June 9-14, 2007; Fort
Worth, TX
e. National Sheriff's Association Annual Conference June 23-27,
2007; Salt Lake City, UT
f. National Fraternal Order of Police August 13-16, 2007;
Louisville, KY
The FCC should also consider organizing a similar exhibit/
demonstration for other industry sectors that might benefit from this
information
3. Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements--An A Priori
Program for
[[Page 38589]]
Disaster Areas--The FCC should explore amending its rules to permit
automatic grants of certain types of waivers or special temporary
authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if the President
declares that area to be a ``disaster area''. As a condition of the
waiver or STA, the FCC could require verbal or written notification to
the Commission staff contemporaneously with activation or promptly
after the fact. Further, the FCC should examine expanding the on-line
filing opportunities for STA requests, including STA requests for AM
broadcast stations. Examples of possible rule waivers and STAs to study
for this treatment include:
a. Wireline.
i. Waiver of certain carrier change requirements to allow customers
whose long distance service was disrupted to be connected to an
operational long distance provider.
ii. Waiver of aging residential numbers rules for customers in the
affected area. This allows carriers to disconnect temporarily
customers' telephone service, upon request, and reinstate the same
number when the service is reconnected.
iii. Waiver of number portability requirements to allow rerouting
of traffic to switches unaffected by the crisis.
iv. Waiver of reporting filings, such as Form 477 on local
competition and broadband data, during the crisis.
b. Wireless.
i. Waiver of amateur radio and license exempt rules permitting
transmissions necessary to meet essential communications needs.
ii. Waiver of application filing deadlines (e.g., renewals,
construction notifications, discontinuance notices, etc.), construction
requirements, and discontinuance of service requirements.
iii. Streamlined STA process, such that parties in the affected
area may simply notify the FCC in writing or verbally of a need to
operate in order to restore service.
c. Broadcast and Cable.
i. Waiver of non-commercial educational (``NCE'') rules to permit
NCE television and radio stations in the affected area to simulcast and
rebroadcast commercial station programming during a crisis.
ii. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of
emergency antennas within 24 hours.
iii. Waiver of limits on AM nighttime operations, so long as
operation is conducted on a noncommercial basis.
iv. Waiver of rules on limited and discontinued operations.
v. Tolling of broadcast station construction deadlines.
vi. Automatic STAs, or STAs granted through written or oral
notification, for broadcast stations to go silent.
vii. Waiver of restrictions on simulcast programming of commonly
owned stations within the same band.
viii. Waiver of location and staffing requirements of a main studio
within the community.
ix. Waiver of activation and post-event Section 73.1250 reporting
requirements related to transmission of point-to-point communications
during a declared emergency.
d. Satellite.
i. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of emergency
antenna equipment within 24 hours.
ii. Streamlined STA process for satellite operators responding to a
declared emergency.
4. Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring--A Single
Repository and Contact with Consistent Data Collection--The FCC should
coordinate with other federal and state agencies to identify a single
repository/point of contact for communications outage information in
the wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is the
federal agency best situated to perform this function. The FCC should
work with affected industry members and their trade associations to
establish a consolidated data set and geographic area for data
collection. Once broad agreement is reached on the appropriate outage
information to be collected, it should be consistently applied and not
subject to routine changes. To the extent practical, the frequency of
voluntary reporting and duration of reporting requirements should be
specified as part of any emergency outage reporting plan. The Panel
suggests that reporting no more than once a day would strike the right
balance between supplying important outage information and not
distracting resources from critical recovery efforts. Additionally, any
proprietary information that is gathered through voluntary outage
reporting must be kept confidential, with only aggregated information
provided to appropriate government entities, such as the local EOC,
during a crisis situation. Any carrier-specific data should be
disclosed to other agencies only with appropriate confidentiality
safeguards (such as non-disclosure agreements) in place.
Recovery Coordination--Critical Steps for Addressing Existing
Shortcomings and Maximizing Use of Existing Resources
1. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--National Credentialing
Guidelines for Communications Infrastructure Providers--The Panel
generally supports the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee's (``NSTAC's'') recommendation for a national standard for
credentialing telecommunications repair workers, but believes this
should be broadened to include repair workers of all communications
infrastructure providers (including wireline, wireless, WISP,
satellite, cable and broadcasting infrastructure providers).
Specifically, the Panel recommends that the FCC work with other
appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications
industry to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and
process guidelines for enabling communications infrastructure providers
and their contracted workers access to the affected area post-disaster.
The FCC should encourage states to develop and implement a
credentialing program consistent with these guidelines as promptly as
possible and encourage appropriate communications industry members to
secure any necessary credentialing. Under this program, credentials
should be available to be issued to communications infrastructure
providers at any time during the year, including before, during and
after a disaster situation. The credentials should be issued directly
to communications infrastructure providers, which will then be
responsible for distributing these credentials to their employees and
contracted workers. These credentials, together with company-issued
employee or contractor identification should be sufficient to permit
access. As a condition of credentialing, the program should require
that communications infrastructure providers receiving credentials
ensure that their employees and contracted workers receiving
credentials complete basic National Incident Management System
(``NIMS'') training (i.e., ``Introduction to NIMS''). The FCC should
work with the communications industry to develop an appropriate basic
NIMS training course (no more than one hour) for communications repair
workers that can be completed online. Once developed, this
communications-specific training course should replace ``Introduction
to NIMS'' as the requirement for credentialing. The FCC should also
[[Page 38590]]
encourage states to recognize and accept credentials issued by other
states.
2. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Emergency Responder Status for
Communications Infrastructure Providers--The Panel supports the NSTAC's
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers and
their contracted workers be afforded emergency responder status under
the Stafford Act and that this designation be incorporated into the
National Response Plan, as well as state and local emergency response
plans. However, the Panel suggests that this recommendation be
broadened to include all communications infrastructure providers
(including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting
infrastructure providers) and their contracted workers. The FCC should
work with Congress and the other appropriate federal departments and
agencies to implement this broadened recommendation.
3. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Utilization of State/Regional
Coordination Bodies--The FCC should work with state and local
government and the communications industry (including wireline,
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local EOCs, as
well as the Joint Field Office (``JFO''). The FCC should encourage, but
not require, each regional, state and local EOC and the JFO to engage
in the following activities:
a. Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure
providers (including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and
broadcasting providers, where appropriate) and state and local
emergency preparedness officials (such as the state emergency
operations center) in the state or region at the EOC or JFO. The
parties should meet on a periodic basis to develop channels of
communications (both pre- and post-disaster), to construct joint
preparedness and response plans, and to conduct joint exercises.
b. Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for purposes
of allowing communications infrastructure providers, their contracted
workers and private security teams, if any, access to the affected area
post-disaster. These requirements and procedures should be consistent
with any nationally-developed credentialing guidelines. Where possible,
web-based applications should be created to pre-clear or expedite
movement of communications infrastructure providers into a disaster
area.
c. Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure
providers, their contracted workers, and private security teams, if
any, to gather post-disaster where credentialing, security, escorts and
further coordination can be achieved. The state's Emergency
Preparedness Plan should describe the process for informing
communications infrastructure providers where these coordination
area(s) will be located.
d. Post-disaster, share information and coordinate resources to
facilitate repair of key communications infrastructure. Specifically,
this would include identifying key damaged infrastructure; if
necessary, assigning priorities for access and scarce resources (fuel,
security, etc.) to repair this infrastructure. Additionally, the
coordination body and staging area can provide a means for industry to
share and maximize scarce resources (share surplus equipment, double
and triple up on security escorts to a particular area, etc.).
e. Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of priority
lists for commercial power restoration. Include commercial
communications providers on this priority list and coordinate power
restoration activities with communications restoration.
The Panel would also support communications infrastructure
providers in a state or region forming an industry-only group for
disaster planning, coordinating recovery efforts and other purposes.
Nevertheless, the Panel believes that coordinating capabilities and
staffing of regional, state and local EOCs, as well as the JFO, need to
be better utilized for the purposes described above.
4. Maximizing Existing Resources--Expanding and Publicizing
Emergency Communications Programs (GETS, WPS and TSP)--To facilitate
the use of existing emergency communications services and programs, the
FCC should:
a. Work with the National Communications System (``NCS'') to
actively and aggressively promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible
government, public safety, and critical industry groups. As part of
this outreach effort, the Commission should target groups that have
relatively low levels of participation. For example, the Panel
recommends that the Commission reach out to the emergency medical
community and major trauma centers to make them aware of the
availability of these services.
b. Work with the NCS to clarify whether broadcast, WISP, satellite,
and cable company repair crews are eligible for GETS and WPS under the
Commission's existing rules. If so, the Commission should promote the
availability of these programs to those entities and urge their
subscribership. If the Commission determines that these entities are
not eligible, the Panel recommends that the Commission revise its rules
so that these entities can subscribe to WPS and GETS.
c. Work with the NCS to explore whether it is technically and
financially feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS
treatment when they reach landline facilities (thus avoiding the need
for a WPS caller to also enter GETS information). The Commission may
desire to set up an industry task force to explore this issue.
d. Work with the NCS and the communications sector to establish and
promote best practices to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP
subscribers are properly trained in how to use these services.
5. Maximizing Existing Resources--Broadening NCC to Include All
Communications Infrastructure Sectors--The FCC should work with the NCS
to broaden the membership of the National Coordination Center for
Telecommunications (``NCC'') to include adequate representation of all
types of communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite
and other new technologies, as appropriate.
6. Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency
Coordination Information--The FCC should create a password-protected
Web site, accessible by credentialed entities (under recovery
coordination recommendation 1), listing the key state
emergency management contacts (especially the contacts for
communications coordinating bodies), as well as post-disaster
coordination areas for communications providers. During an emergency,
this Web site should be updated on a 24/7 basis.
7. Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency
Response Team Information--The FCC should create a Web site to
publicize the agency's emergency response team's contact information
and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage recovery.
First Responder Communications--Essential Steps for Addressing Lessons
Learned From Hurricane Katrina
1. Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and
Personnel--An Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives
Inventory--To facilitate the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities, the FCC should:
[[Page 38591]]
a. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain,
including through arrangements with the private sector, a cache of
equipment components that would be needed to immediately restore
existing public safety communications within hours of a disaster. At a
minimum, the cache should include the necessary equipment to quickly
restore communications capabilities on all relevant mutual aid
channels. Such a cache would consist of:
i. RF gear, such as 800 MHz, UHF, VHF, Mutual Aid, IP Gateway, and
dispatch consoles;
ii. trailer and equipment housing;
iii. tower system components (antenna system, hydraulic mast);
iv. power system components (generator, UPS, batteries,
distribution panel); and
v. fuel.
The cache should be maintained as a regional or statewide resource
and located in areas protected from disaster impacts. The cache should
be included as an element of the National Response Plan.
b. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to utilize the cache
through training exercises on a regular basis.
c. Support the ongoing efforts of the NCC to develop and maintain a
database of state and local public safety system information, including
frequency usage, to allow for more efficient spectrum sharing, rapid
on-site frequency coordination, and emergency provision of supplemental
equipment in the event of system failures.
d. Urge public safety licensees to familiarize themselves with
alternative communications technologies to provide communications when
normal public safety networks are down. Such technologies include
satellite telephones, two-way paging devices, and other technologies
less reliant on the PSTN. Most importantly, public safety agencies
should be reminded/encouraged to train and use such devices prior to
emergencies.
e. Support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory of
available communications assets (including local, state, federal
civilian and military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a
catastrophic event. The list should include land mobile radios,
portable infrastructure equipment, bridging technologies/gateways, and
backup power system components. This information should include the
steps necessary for requesting the deployment of these assets. The FCC
should work with the NCC and the appropriate agencies to educate key
state and local emergency response personnel on the availability of
these assets and how to request them.
f. Coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately
following any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which
federal, state and local officials can identify and locate private
sector communications assets that can be made rapidly available to
first responders and relief organizations. One such means to be
considered would be a Web site maintained by either the FCC or NCC
through which the private sector could register available assets along
with product information. The Web site should be designed with a
special area for registering available equipment to assist persons with
disabilities in their communications needs.
2. Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications
Capabilities--Facilitating First Responder Interoperability--To
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications, the
FCC should:
a. Consistent with recent legislation, maintain the schedule for
commencing commercial spectrum auctions before January 28, 2008 to
fully fund the $1 billion public safety interoperability program.
b. Work with National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (``NTIA'') and the Department of Homeland Security
(``DHS'') to establish appropriate criteria for the distribution of the
$1 billion in a manner that best promotes interoperability with the 700
MHz band. Among other things, such criteria should mandate that any
radios purchased with grant monies must be capable of operating on 700
MHz and 800 MHz channels established for mutual aid and
interoperability voice communications.
c. Encourage the expeditious development of regional plans for the
use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve such
plans.
d. Expeditiously approve any requests by broadcasters to terminate
analog service in the 700 MHz band before the end of the digital
television transition in 2009 in order to allow public safety users
immediate access to this spectrum.
e. Work with the NTIA and DHS to develop strategies and policies to
expedite allowing Federal (including the military), state and local
agencies to share spectrum for emergency response purposes,
particularly the Federal incident response channels and channels
established for mutual aid and interoperability.
f. Publicize interoperability successes and/or best practices by
public safety entities to serve as models to further interoperability.
3. Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned--A Plan for
Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and PSAPs--In order
to ensure a more robust E-911 service, the FCC should encourage the
implementation of these best practice recommendations issued by Focus
Group 1C of the FCC-chartered NRIC VII:
a. Service providers and network operators should consider placing
and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport
facilities (e.g., geographically diverse facility routes, automatically
invoked standby routing, diverse digital cross-connect system services,
self-healing fiber ring topologies, or any combination thereof). See
NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-0566.
b. Service providers, network operators and property managers
should ensure availability of emergency/backup power (e.g., batteries,
generators, fuel cells) to maintain critical communications services
during times of commercial power failures, including natural and
manmade occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/
blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/backup power generators should be
located onsite, when appropriate. See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-5204.
c. Network operators should consider deploying dual active 911
selective router architectures to enable circuits from the caller's
serving end office to be split between two selective routers in order
to eliminate single points of failure. Diversity should also be
considered on interoffice transport facilities connecting each 911
selective router to the PSAP serving end office. See NRIC VII
Recommendations 7-7-0571.
d. Network operators, service providers, equipment suppliers and
public safety authorities should establish alternative methods of
communication for critical personnel. See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-
1011.
In addition, the FCC should:
a. Recommend the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP that is
more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary and secondary
PSAPs are disabled. This requires the FCC to eliminate any regulatory
prohibition against the transport of 911 across LATA boundaries. The
Panel recommends that the FCC expeditiously initiate such a rulemaking.
This rulemaking should also consider
[[Page 38592]]
permitting a backup E-911 tandem across a LATA boundary.
b. Recommend that the FCC urge the DHS, Fire Grant Act, and other
applicable federal programs to permit state or local 911 commissions or
emergency communications districts, which provide 911 or public safety
communications services, to be eligible to apply for 911 enhancement
and communications enhancement/interoperability grants.
4. Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning
Emergency Medical and Hospital Communications Needs--An Outreach
Program to Educate and Include the Emergency Medical Community in
Emergency Communications Preparedness--The FCC should work to assist
the emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems. Among other
things, the FCC should:
a. Educate the emergency medical community about emergency
communications and help to coordinate this sector's emergency
communications efforts;
b. Educate the emergency medical community about the various
priority communications services (i.e., GETS, WPS and TSP) and urge
them to subscribe;
c. Work with Congress and the other appropriate federal departments
and agencies to ensure emergency medical personnel are treated as
public safety personnel under the Stafford Act; and
d. Support DHS efforts to make emergency medical providers eligible
for funding for emergency communications equipment under the State
Homeland Security Grant Program.
Emergency Communications to the Public--Actions To Alert and Inform
1. Actions to Alert and Inform--Revitalize and Publicize the
Underutilized Emergency Alert System--To facilitate and complement the
use of the existing Emergency Alert System (``EAS''), the FCC should:
a. Educate state and local officials about the existing EAS, its
benefits, and how it can be best utilized.
b. Develop a program for educating the public about the EAS and
promote community awareness of potential mechanisms for accessing those
alerts sent during power outages or broadcast transmission failures.
c. Move expeditiously to complete its proceeding to explore the
technical and financial viability of expanding the EAS to other
technologies, such as wireless services and the Internet, recognizing
that changes to communications networks and equipment take time to
implement.
d. Consistent with proposed legislation, work with Congress and
other appropriate federal departments and agencies to explore the
technical and financial viability of establishing a comprehensive
national warning system that complements existing systems and allows
local officials to increase the penetration of warnings to the public
as well as target, when necessary, alerts to a particular area.
e. Work with the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies on
pilot programs that would allow more immediate evaluation and testing
of new notification technologies.
f. Work with the Department of Commerce to expand the distribution
of certain critical non-weather emergency warnings over NOAA weather
radios to supplement the EAS.
2. Actions to Alert and Inform--Commence Efforts to Ensure that
Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans Receive
Meaningful Alerts--To help to ensure that all Americans, including
those with hearing or visual disabilities or who do not speak English,
can receive emergency communications, the FCC should:
a. Promptly find a mechanism to resolve any technical and financial
hurdles in the current EAS to ensure that non-English-speaking people
or persons with disabilities have access to public warnings, if readily
achievable.
b. Work with the various industry trade associations and the
disabled community to create and publicize best practices for serving
persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
c. Encourage state and local government agencies who provide
emergency information (through video or audio broadcasts or Web sites)
to take steps to make critical emergency information accessible to
persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
3. Actions to Alert and Inform--Ensure Consistent and Reliable
Emergency Information Through a Consolidated and Coordinated Public
Information Program--Public information functions should be coordinated
and integrated across jurisdictions and across functional agencies,
among federal, state, local and tribal partners, and with private
sector and non-governmental organizations. The FCC should work with all
involved parties to help facilitate the following:
a. Integration of media representatives into the development of
disaster communications plans (ESF 2). These plans should
establish systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate
information to the public during crisis or emergency situations.
b. Designation of a public information officer at each EOC. This
individual should be accessible to the media to handle media and public
inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor monitoring
and response, and other functions required to coordinate, clear with
appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely
information related to the incident, particularly regarding information
on public health, safety and protection.
c. During large-scale disasters, the formation of a Joint
Information Center (``JIC'') for the collocation of representatives
from federal, regional, state, local and/or tribal EOCs tasked with
primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIC would provide
the mechanism for integrating public information activities across
jurisdictions and with private sector and non-governmental
organizations. Media operations should be an integral part of the JIC.
CONCLUSION
The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for
their actions to assist industry and first responders before, during
and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this Panel to identify
steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The
Panel thanks the Commission for the opportunity to address the
important issues associated with this devastating hurricane's effect on
our nation's communications networks. In this effort, the Panel members
have brought to bear a broad background of public safety and industry
experiences, including (for many) first-hand knowledge of the
devastation wrought by Katrina. The Panel has also benefited from
information provided in the many comments and expert presentations. The
Panel hopes that its resulting observations and recommendations prove
useful to the Commission in helping to ensure that the communications
industry, first responders, and government at all levels are better
prepared for future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lie
ahead for us.
APPENDIX A--Members of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
Chair: Nancy J. Victory, Partner, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP
[[Page 38593]]
Carson Agnew, Executive Vice President, Mobile Satellite Ventures,
LP
Michael R. Anderson, Chairman, PART-15.ORG
Robert G. (Gil) Bailey, ENP, Telecommunications Manager, Harrison
County, MS Emergency Communications Commission
Kevin Beary, Sheriff, Orange County, FL
Greg Bicket, Vice President/Regional Manager, Cox Communications
Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State
Police
Steve Davis, Senior Vice President--Engineering, Clear Channel Radio
Robert G. Dawson, President & CEO, SouthernLINC Wireless
Stephen A. Dean, Fire Chief, City of Mobile, AL
Steve Delahousey, Vice President--Operations, American Medical
Response
Dave Flessas, Vice President--Network Operations, Sprint Nextel
Corp.
Martin D. Hadfield, Vice President--Engineering, Entercom
Communications Corp.
Jim O. Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group
Tony Kent, Vice President--Engineering & Network Operations,
Cellular South
Kelly Kirwan, Vice President--State and Local Government and
Commercial Markets Division, The Americas Group, Government,
Enterprise, and Mobility Solutions, Motorola Communications and
Electronics, Inc.
Jonathan D. Linkous, Executive Director, American Telemedicine
Association
Adora Obi Nweze, Director, Hurricane Relief Efforts, NAACP;
President, Florida State Conference, NAACP; Member, National Board
of Directors, NAACP
Eduardo Pe[ntilde]a, Board Member, League of United Latin American
Citizens
Billy Pitts, President of Government Affairs, The NTI Group
Major Michael Sauter, Commander, Office of Technology and
Communications, New Orleans Police Department
Marion Scott, Vice President--Operations, CenturyTel
Kay Sears, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing, G2
Satellite Solutions, PanAmSat Corporation
Edmund M. ``Ted'' Sexton, Sr., President, National Sheriffs
Association
Edwin D. Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire Department
William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corporation
Patrick Yoes, President, Louisiana Fraternal Order of Police,
National Secretary, Fraternal Order of Police
[FR Doc. 06-6013 Filed 7-6-06; 8:45 am]
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