25 November 1999
Source:
http://gpo.sailor.lib.md.us/bin/GPOAccess.cgi
This provides excerpts from three Congressional reports on intelligence funding for 2000 which describe actions concerning the National Security Agency, SIGINT operations and other initiatives.
See related news report: http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/25/nsa.woes/
[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/hr106-457.txt]
[Page H11630-H11643]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr05no99-89]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1555
Mr. GOSS submitted the following conference report and statement on
the bill (H.R. 1555), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes:
Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-457)
*****
SEC. 309. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the National Security Agency, and the
Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of
the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, a report in classified and
unclassified form providing a detailed analysis of the legal
standards employed by elements of the intelligence community
in conducting signals intelligence activities, including
electronic surveillance.
(b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall
specifically include a statement of each of the following
legal standards:
(1) The legal standards for interception of communications
when such interception may result in the acquisition of
information from a communication to or from United States
persons.
(2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the
communications to or from United States persons.
(3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States
sources of information pertaining to communications to or
from United States persons.
(4) The legal standards for dissemination of information
acquired through the interception of the communications to or
from United States persons.
(c) Definitions.--As used in this section:
(1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning
given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning
given that term under section 101(i) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)).
(3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate.
*****
SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLASSIFICATION AND
DECLASSIFICATION.
It is the sense of Congress that the systematic
declassification of records of permanent historical value is
in the public interest and that the management of
classification and declassification by Executive branch
agencies requires comprehensive reform and the dedication by
the Executive branch of additional resources.
*****
SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING
STATIONS.
Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974), as
amended by section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2262), is
further amended by striking ``for fiscal years 1998 and
1999'' and inserting ``for fiscal years 2000 and 2001''.
*****
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE
The managers on the part of the Senate and the House at the
conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and the
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the
Senate and
the House in explanation of the effect of the action agreed
upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying
conference report:
The Senate amendments struck all of the House bill after
the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of
the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the
House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between
the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute
agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical
corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements
reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clerical
changes.
The managers agree that the congressionally directed
actions described in the respective committee reports or
classified annexes should be undertaken to the extent that
such congressional directed actions are not amended, altered,
or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint
Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to the
conference report on the bill H.R. 1555.
-----
sec. 309. report on legal standards applied for electronic surveillance
The House bill and Senate amendment contained similar
provisions. The Senate recedes to the House provision with a
modification.
-----
sec. 502. funding for infrastructure and quality of life improvements
at menwith hill and bad aibling stations
The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The
House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position.
*****
[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/ic110999.txt]
[Page H11755-H11762]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr09no99-76]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1555, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2000
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of
earlier today, I call up the conference report on the House bill (H.R.
1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for
its immediate consideration in the House.
*****
Mr. Goss.
Mr. Speaker, in H.R. 1555 we begin the funding for the intelligence
community of the next millennium. That, Mr. Speaker, is a most useful
perspective for what we have tried to do in our conference report. How
can we adapt the tools and skills of the Cold War to meet the
challenges of the 21st century? These are new times. We need new ways
to approach them.
Underlying that question is how, and in some cases whether, we plan
to meet those challenges. How we define our interests, Mr. Speaker,
will depend on how we define ourselves. What kind of country will we be
in the next century? In 2020, when my grandchildren are grown, what
will the American flag mean to them and to people around the world?
In the classified schedule of authorizations in our conference
report, we frame a preliminary answer to these questions. In that
report, Mr. Speaker, we bring forward the basic tools and skills of the
Cold War to bear on the new threats of the next century: the
international drug cartels that bring poison into our cities, the
elusive conspiracies that put the pieces of nuclear weapons into the
hands of rogue leaders, and the shadowy networks that want to bomb our
buildings overseas and here at home.
We will also need to use these tools and skills to meet new and
unanticipated challenges that will arise in the coming years. Synthetic
pharmaceuticals, genetic terrorists? I cannot know what threats will
face my grandchildren in the year 2020 as Americans, but I can tell the
Members what intelligence tools and skills will be necessary to meet
those threats.
That is our job. We may not know the who, In other words, but we
clearly know the how. We have learned that, and now we have to provide
for it. In our conference report, Mr. Speaker, we continue to focus on
this, how we will meet the threats and the challenges of the future,
which is indeed upon us.
We will need more human intelligence or HUMINT, as we call it. Over
the past year we have had to understand and to act upon crises in
Belgrade, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, East Timor, southern Colombia, and a
whole host of other hard-to-pronounce places. In each case,
policymakers need more HUMINT on the plans and the intentions of the
rogue leaders, dissidents, terrorists, guerillas, and traffickers
involved in these crises.
Where will the crises of the year 2000 arise, Kabul, Kinshasa, Lagos?
I do not know, but they will be out there, and wherever they do arise
our policymakers will need intelligence officers on the ground to
collect HUMINT on the plans and intentions of those involved.
For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the
rebuilding of our HUMINT capabilities around the world. No surprises is
the right way to go.
We will continue to need signals intelligence, or SIGINT, as it is
called. As in the past, our ability to collect SIGINT has helped to
protect our shores from cocaine and our citizens from terrorists. That
ability, however, is threatened in a fundamental way by digital
technologies.
For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the
recapitalization of our SIGINT capability.
This is a huge undertaking and an extraordinarily significant one.
We must improve the processing of imagery intelligence, or IMINT as
it is called. Our ability to collect imagery has accelerated at
lightning speed, but our ability to process imagery remains at a crawl.
Collection and processing, however, are two halves of one whole. They
must work together.
At present, the combination of collection and processing and imagery
is a Ferrari welded to a Ford Falcon. That combination simply will not
drive our IMINT capability in 2020. And for that reason, Mr. Speaker,
our conference report challenges the Intelligence Community to invest
more in its ability to process imagery. It does no good to have the
pictures if we do not have analysts to review them.
We must rebuild our covert action capability. The rise of rogue
leaders and regional conflicts has demonstrated once again that the
President must have an option between the use of F-16s and doing
nothing. The President must have, whenever appropriate, the ability to
influence an adversary through the various forms of covert action,
properly oversighted, of course.
For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report provides
additional funding for development of the Intelligence Community's
covert action capabilities.
Rebuilding and refining our HUMINT, our SIGINT, our IMINT, and our
covert action capabilities are central to the conference report
accompanying H.R. 1555. In addition, we address legislatively a number
of specific issues that have arisen with regard to the use and the
oversight of these capabilities.
In section 309 of our conference report, we direct the National
Security Agency, the NSA, to report in detail on the legal standards
that it employs for the interception of communications. I can report,
notwithstanding this provision, that the committee has substantial
insight into the action of the NSA and the guidance of its legal staff.
I have thus far no reason to believe that the NSA is not scrupulous in
following the Constitution and the laws conducting its SIGINT mission.
However, our job is oversight and we take it seriously.
*****
Mr. BISHOP.
This conference report would add about 1 percent to the President's
request for national intelligence activities. As with the House version
of the bill, there would be modest increases in the budgets for
activities centered in the National Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and somewhat
less money for the National Reconnaissance Office, which manages the
acquisition of our intelligence satellites.
I am pleased that we have fully funded the major satellite
acquisition programs, including the new future imagery architecture, or
FIA. These new imagery satellites will greatly increase the volume of
imagery we can collect, as well as provide for more frequent coverage
of targets, which together will address deficiencies identified in
Operation Desert Storm and more recent conflicts.
However, these enhanced collection capabilities will not count for
much unless we also invest in the means to exploit and disseminate the
imagery on the ground. On this score, executive branch planning has
been extremely poor. The conference report would require a reduction in
planned collection capabilities unless substantial improvements are
planned for exploitation and dissemination.
I would also like to call attention to significant problems at the
National Security Agency. The NSA is facing tremendous challenges
coping with the explosive development of commercial communications and
computer technology. As the new NSA director has pointed out, while the
new technology is providing incredible benefits to our Nation's
security and economy, it is taxing in the extreme to those charged with
intercepting the communications of hostile powers and drug lords. At
the same time, NSA has not demonstrated much prowess in coping with the
challenge.
The new director of NSA, I believe, grasps the seriousness of the
situation. I hope that we have made progress in focusing the attention
of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on
this critical issue.
Fixing NSA's internal problems is only half the answer. A sustained
funding increase of some magnitude will also probably be necessary, and
there are no obvious candidates yet for offsetting cuts. Action,
however, is imperative since the nation cannot navigate with an
impaired sense of hearing.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is a responsible bill that will enhance
our nation's security. It supports our military forces and our efforts
to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons proliferation.
I am pleased to endorse it, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to support it as well.
*****
Mr. CASTLE.
In our hearings on support for the military, a predominant theme was
the continued imbalance between collection and other intelligence
assets. For years, the committee has stressed the need for better
planning and financing of intelligence processing, analysis and
dissemination. This year we are insisting that our future imagery
satellite capabilities be at least roughly balanced with ground
capabilities.
Signals intelligence has also suffered from gaps in what we call
``end to end'' capability, as well as from enormous leaps in target
technology. For several years, the committee has insisted that changes
are needed at the National Security Agency in order to modernize our
SIGINT capabilities and improve efficiency.
The committee is most gratified that the new director of NSA,
Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, agreed to conduct unrestrained studies
of the need for reform, using both an internal and an external team.
These studies were just completed. Both endorsed previous committee
findings identifying systemic obstacles to efficiency and change. The
difficult part, sorting and implementing solutions proposed by the
teams, soon begins. General Hayden has our strong support for decisive
action that will, by nature, be controversial.
We will not rest easy until SIGINT is once again healthy.
*****
[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/ic111999.txt]
[Page S14947-S14950] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr19no99pt2-152] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000--CONFERENCE REPORT Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader I submit a report of the committee of conference on the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration. ***** The conference report includes key initiatives that I believe are vital for the future of our Intelligence Community. These initiatives include: 1. bolstering advanced research and development across the Community, to facilitate, among other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; 2. strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action; 3. expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile intelligence; 4. boosting education, recruiting, and technical training for Intelligence Community personnel; 5. enhancing analytical capabilities; 6. streamlining dissemination of intelligence products; 7. developing our ability to process, exploit and disseminate commercial imagery; and 8. providing new tools for information operations. ***** In the Senate, we had a distinguished panel of Americans with a broad range of expertise--our Technical Advisory Group--that took a look at some key areas within the Intelligence Community and brought forward some very important recommendations. We thank all the members of the Technical Advisory Group for their time and efforts. I will briefly summarize some of their findings, to the extent that I can in open session, along with some of the other findings of our conference. First, our ability to collect and analyze information on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires renewed emphasis and innovative thinking. As our potential enemies seek out the ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, we must develop the ability to detect these efforts. This bill places a great deal of emphasis on our ability to collect such information known as Measurements and Signatures Intelligence or MASINT. Second, both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees agree that our Intelligence Community and our Defense Department must move quickly to address what our Technical Advisory Group identifies as a critical shortfall in our ability to properly task, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence information collection by our airborne and overhead imagery assets. As we modernize our Imagery Intelligence or IMINT architecture, the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees agree that we should not be spending the taxpayers money on collection architectures that we may not be able to utilize fully. Third, we have once again placed strong emphasis on recapitalizing the National Security Agency's information technology infrastructure. ***** Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join Chairman Shelby in urging my colleagues to vote in favor of the intelligence authorization conference report. This report is a culmination of the lengthy effort to fund intelligence activities for fiscal year 2000. It has not been easy to arrive at this point because the committee had to address many significant nonintelligence issues ranging from the reorganization of the Department of Energy to the establishment of procedures for blocking the assets of drug kingpins. We have arrived at this point because we have reached several important compromises with our House colleagues, and the report deserves the Senate's full support. This conference report supports many new initiatives. In my view, one of the most important new initiatives is to make the year 2000 a watershed year for intelligence. The watershed represents a turnaround in spending on intelligence activities. I believe it is time to increase spending because we now have a much better understanding of the threats facing the United States of America and the important role intelligence plays in meeting those threats. One of the most difficult parts of my job as the Intelligence Committee vice chairman has been to talk to people about the importance of intelligence. This job is difficult because most of the information is classified. Therefore, public debate on the condition of the intelligence community is extremely rare and discussing funding levels is almost impossible. My colleagues are well aware that classified conference reports and the classified schedules of authorizations are available for their review in S. 407 but you have to go there to get the details. We cannot talk about them now. Let me say, however, intelligence is stretched very thin. Our global reach is supported by intelligence as global coverage. Without adequate coverage, we make policy mistakes. The Intelligence Community is stretched thin in trying to meet all of its commitments to policy makers. But I can't tell you on the floor of the Senate how thin it is stretched, and I can't tell you how much it's going to cost to fix. I can only tell you I'm glad fiscal year 2000 is a watershed year for intelligence. A second initiative this bill supports is striking the balance between intelligence collection and the subsequent exploitation and dissemination of the information collected. My colleagues should know that one of the problems of insufficient funding is that the Intelligence Community is unable properly to exploit and disseminate all of the information it gathers. If you think about it, this may seem odd. That is, the Community is collecting more information than it is able to analyze and deliver to its customers. But it is not odd. Among other things, it reflects constrained Intelligence budgets. As the Community has moved into advanced technologies, it has invested in the future by developing new intelligence collection systems. The idea was that by the time these new systems were ready to be used, we would have been able to find the funding to exploit and disseminate the information being collected. Well the future is now, and we haven't been able to find the funding to balance collection, exploitation, and dissemination. In this bill we have confronted the issue and proposed important solutions. Again, I urge my colleagues to read the classified report in S-407 in order to get the details. *****